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Letter from the Editor 
In this issue, the International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law revisits an enduring topic of 
concern: restrictions on foreign funding of civil society. Last fall, we published an overview of 
the subject.
1
 Now, we feature expert reports from the field: Egypt, by Mohamed ElAgati; 
Ethiopia, by Debebe Hailegebriel; Russia, by Aleksej Bogoroditskii; Sri Lanka, by Rohan 
Edrisinha; and Venezuela, by Marcos Carrillo.  
 This issue also includes a summary of current nonprofit law in Vietnam, by Mark Sidel. 
In another article, Mahammad Guluzade and Natalia Bourjaily dissect a European Court of 
Human Rights case challenging Azerbaijan‘s dissolution of a registered public union. Peter 
Elson argues that one cannot fully understand charity regulations in Canada and England without 
considering their history. And Georg von Schnurbein and Daniela Schönenberg examine 
changes in the governance of civil society organizations in Switzerland.  
We thank USAID for its generous support of the articles on restrictions on foreign 
funding of civil society. We also thank our authors for their incisive and timely articles. 
Stephen Bates 
Editor 
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 
sbates@icnl.org 
                                                 
1
 Rebecca B. Vernon, ―Closing the Door on Aid,‖ International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 11(4), 
August 2009, http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol11iss4/special_1.htm. 
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Restrictions on Foreign Funding of Civil Society 
Introduction 
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law
1
 
 
Introduction 
The ability to seek and secure financial resources is fundamental to many, if not most, 
not-for-profit, non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The legal and regulatory framework 
may facilitate or impede efforts to secure resources. Indeed, the law may place NGOs in a 
precarious position by imposing barriers to specific resource categories – such as funding from 
foreign sources. The issue has immediate relevance in many countries. In the past six months 
alone: 
 The President of Azerbaijan issued a decree prohibiting NGOs from concluding any 
transactions with grant funds unless the grant is registered with the Ministry of Justice 
(December 2009). 
 In China, in 2010, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange introduced new rules 
governing the administration of foreign funds donated to or by domestic institutions. 
Most notably, domestic ―enterprises‖ receiving funds donated from abroad by foreign 
nonprofits must file documentation with permitted banks to include an application; a 
copy of the domestic institution‘s business license; a notarized donation agreement with 
the purpose of the donation described; a registration certificate for the overseas 
organization; and other raw materials that may be required. Much about the new rules 
and their potential impact remain unclear, with uncertainty surrounding whether or not 
the new rules apply to non-enterprise social organizations and other NGOs. 
 In the first quarter of 2010, the Bill for the Duty of Disclosure for Someone Supported 
by a Foreign Political Entity passed its preliminary first reading in the Israeli Knesset. 
Under the terms of the draft Bill, Israeli NGOs that accept foreign governmental funding 
and attempt to influence Israeli government policy would be required to disclose all 
funding from ―foreign political entities.‖ These same Israeli NGOs would lose their tax-
exempt status. And board members and staff of non-compliant NGOs would be subject 
to criminal liability, including imprisonment.  
 The Egyptian newspaper Al Dustour published what is reported to be the leaked text of 
a Draft Law to replace the existing Law on Associations and Foundations (Law 84 of 
2002); the Draft Law requires civil society organizations (CSOs) to obtain permission 
from the Ministry of Social Solidarity prior to receiving foreign funds or affiliating or 
                                                 
1
 This paper is made possible with the generous support of the American people through the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government. 
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partnering with foreign organizations, and gives the Ministry apparently unlimited 
discretion to approve or deny such requests.  
 The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in Yemen has released draft amendments to 
the Law on Associations and Foundations that would represent a significant degradation 
in the status of NGOs in that country. Among other things, the proposed law would 
require NGOs to seek prior approval before receiving funds from abroad, conducting 
public fundraising at home, or publishing any public media statements.  
This new wave of restrictions – including laws either enacted or proposed – adds further 
momentum to a regulatory backlash against civil society that has been frequently noted by the 
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), commentators, academics, and practitioners. 
Countries rely on a panoply of legal tools to prohibit or limit access to certain resources. 
Examples include restrictions on the ability to engage in economic activities; limits on the 
opportunity to compete for government grants or contracts; burdensome tax obligations; and 
restrictions on investment alternatives. But perhaps the most common – and arguably, the most 
controversial – of resource barriers are restrictions on funding from foreign sources, including 
foreign governments, multilateral institutions, private foundations, and individuals. 
The barriers to foreign funding assume many forms: outright prohibitions (as in Eritrea, 
where the law restricts the UN and bilateral aid agencies from funding NGOs); the requirement 
of advance approval (as in Jordan, where foreign funding to associations is subject to the 
approval of the Council of Ministers); and the mandatory routing of government funding through 
government banks (as in Uzbekistan, where foreign funding for NGOs must be channeled 
through government banks, which has reportedly led to the obstruction of at least 80 percent of 
foreign grants to NGOs). These regulatory approaches are outlined in the Defending Civil Society 
report, published in February 2008.
2
  
In the two years since publication of Defending Civil Society, we have witnessed ongoing 
efforts – and sometimes innovative approaches – to constrict access to funding resources, and 
foreign funding in particular. In Egypt, as stated above, a new draft Law would replace the 
existing Law on Associations and Foundations (Law 84 of 2002), require organizations to obtain 
permission from the Ministry of Social Solidarity prior to receiving foreign funds or affiliating or 
partnering with foreign organizations, and give the Ministry apparently unlimited discretion to 
approve or deny such requests. In Venezuela, the draft Law on International Cooperation, which 
remains pending, would create an international cooperation fund and require compliance with 
government priorities. In Sri Lanka, a draft Bill on NGOs has been prepared, but not released to 
the public; it may be reasonable to presume, however, that the Bill is likely to empower the state 
to investigate the financial management and accountability of NGOs that receive foreign 
funding, as this has been the practice of the Select Committee of Parliament, active since 2006. 
In Russia, a government list of foreign donors has been substantially reduced, thereby 
limiting the number of organizations legally able to provide tax-exempt grants to Russian 
recipients. Perhaps most notorious of all recent regulatory acts is the Proclamation to Provide for 
the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies (CSP), enacted in Ethiopia in 
February 2009. The law is one of the most controversial NGO laws in Africa, and indeed in the 
world. The Proclamation, among other things, restricts NGOs that receive more than 10 percent 
                                                 
2
 See ICNL and the World Movement for Democracy Secretariat at the National Endowment for 
Democracy, Defending Civil Society, February 2008, http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/news/2008/3-21.htm.  
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of their financing from foreign sources from working on the advancement of human rights, 
promoting the rights of children and the disabled, equality of gender, nations and nationalities, 
promoting good governance and conflict resolution as well as the efficiency of the justice 
system.  
These five countries – Egypt, Ethiopia, Russia, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela – are in the 
spotlight of this issue of the International Journal for Not-for-Profit Law. In countries like Egypt 
and Ethiopia, organizations which are dependent on foreign funds – especially human rights and 
opposition groups – may find themselves starved of funds and effectively unable to continue 
operations. In Sri Lanka and Venezuela, where draft laws currently threaten the sector, concern 
runs high over the content of the draft law (Sri Lanka) and over whether the law will actually be 
enacted (Venezuela). In Russia, more encouragingly, there have been recent improvements to the 
regulatory environment for civil society, but these improvements have not necessarily touched 
upon foreign funding restrictions. 
While each country report describes the legal constraints at issue, the focus of the reports 
is more squarely on the political context within which the legal constraints have arisen. Prior to 
the drafting and enactment of laws or regulations imposing such barriers, there are often warning 
signs, in the form of ominous statements by government officials or politicians or the enactment 
of restrictive law in other areas, such as the media. The proffered government justifications for 
the barriers are as diverse as the constraints themselves and can include calls for increased 
accountability and transparency of CSOs; preventing foreign interference with domestic political 
processes; protecting national security; combating terrorism and extremism; and the coordination 
and harmonization of foreign aid and CSOs implementing foreign aid programs. And the civil 
society responses, unsurprisingly, vary with each country context. These are the questions that 
this issue of the International Journal for Not-for-Profit Law explores.  
ICNL is grateful for the ongoing support of USAID and Pact, who made these reports 
possible under the auspices of the NGO Legal Enabling Environment Program (LEEP). ICNL 
also expresses its appreciation to the local partners in each country and is pleased to present the 
results of their efforts. We hope that the country reports will raise awareness and provoke 
consideration of what has become an ongoing threat to civil society in many countries.  
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 Restrictions on Foreign Funding of Civil Society 
Egypt 
Mohamed ElAgati
1
 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the issue of foreign funding of civil society 
organizations (CSOs) has been controversial in the Arab region. Some are supportive; others are 
critical. Hypocrisy is not uncommon in the debate; for example, some of those who seek to 
discredit rights-based groups because of their use of foreign funding are the same people who 
welcome foreign financing in other areas, including sensitive areas such as political parties and 
the media.  
Governments in the Arab world generally do not welcome the existence of rights-based 
organizations or advocacy-based pressure groups, especially where these CSOs seek to criticize 
government policies and actions and to raise awareness among the public and international 
community of government shortcomings or violations of international agreements. Moreover, 
many of the human rights principles promoted by rights-based CSOs – such as gender equality 
and freedom of speech and belief – face strong opposition from some active political forces in 
Arab countries.  
The regulatory principles relating to foreign funding are not well established in the Arab 
world. In examining the issue of foreign funding, questions abound: What is the purpose of the 
funding? Why do other people (or organizations or governments) finance projects aimed to 
improve the situation of the Arab citizen? Why do they spend their own funds to support our 
basic rights?  
In considering the issue, it is important to keep in mind the following facts. First, CSOs 
must be creative in using foreign funds, avoid wasting funds, and work toward greater financial 
independence in the long run. Second, although Arab governments depend heavily on foreign 
aid, it is impossible to challenge the hypocrisy of these governments for receiving foreign aid 
while simultaneously criticizing or burdening the receipt of foreign aid by CSOs. Third, the 
development and stability of society in the Southern Mediterranean region and the Arab world is 
directly connected with stability in Europe. Improving the political and economic environment 
will lower the rate of illegal immigration to the United States and Europe, will assist in 
countering the danger of extremism, and will open new markets.
2
  
                                                 
1
 Mohamed ElAgati is Executive Director, Arab Forum for Alternatives, www.Afaegypt.org. 
This paper is made possible with the generous support of the American people through the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government. 
 
2
 Negad Elboraie, A Manual for Funding, United Group, Cairo, w.d., p.3. 
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A. Types of Restrictions on Foreign Funding 
1) Law No. 84 on NGOs (2002) 
The current governing law, Law No. 84 (on Non-Governmental Organizations or NGOs) 
(2002), allows NGOs to receive foreign funds, superseding Law No. 32 (on Civil and Voluntary 
Associations) (1964), which forbade organizations from receiving any foreign funding and 
prohibited participation in the activities of any foreign organization.
3
 Nonetheless, Law No. 84 
contains several obstacles and restrictions to foreign funding, at both the legal and practical level. 
Law No. 84 on NGOs (2002) is predicated on control.
4
 It is based on the desire of the 
Government to keep the issue of foreign funding under its complete control.  
Article 17 grants NGOs the right to receive funding from legal entities or individuals, but 
conditions this right on obtaining the approval of the Ministry of Social Solidarity. The Law 
grants the Ministry wide discretion in reviewing requests for approval. Moreover, there are no 
application procedures defined in the Law, and no criteria upon which to guide Ministerial 
decision-making. The Law does require the Ministry to respond to requests for approval within 
60 days, but there is no clear recourse where the Ministry fails to act in a timely fashion, as is 
often the case.
5
 The implementing regulations to Law No. 84 do not clarify these questions.  
Significantly, Law No. 84 distinguishes between (1) funds sent from abroad (including 
from Egyptians living abroad) and identified as ―foreign funding,‖ which requires advance 
approval, and (2) funds sent from within Egypt (including from foreign organizations registered 
in Egypt) and identified in the law as ―local funding.‖ The latter category – ―local funding‖ – is 
not subject to advance approval; instead, NGOs must simply notify the Government of the 
funding received. In practice, however, the Ministry of Social Solidarity also requires that NGOs 
apply for approval to receive this category of ―local funding‖ – that is, funding from foreign 
organizations registered in Egypt.6 This practice contravenes Article 65 of the Law, which 
guarantees the right of NGOs to receive funds from foreign agencies that have obtained 
permission to operate in Egypt.  
In addition, the Law also states that an NGO‘s budget, if it exceeds 1000 EGP ($180), 
must be approved by the Ministry of Social Solidarity, further complicating the procedure for 
obtaining foreign funding. Because the threshold is so low, virtually all NGOs are subject to this 
requirement, which was highly criticized by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in 2002.
7
 The rule is even more disturbing when considered alongside the 
penalty for non-compliance, which includes imprisonment of up to six months and/or a fine of 
2000 EGP (Article 76). 
                                                 
3
 Abdel Mawla Ismail, Tyranny of the Law, and the Retraction of the Egyptian Civil Society, Land Center 
for Human Rights, Cairo, 2002, p.6. 
4
 Press release issued by the Cairo Center for Human Rights Studies, 1 May 2009.  
5
 Mohamed ELAGATI, Undermining Standards of Good Governance: Egypt ’s NGO Law and Its Impact 
on the Transparency and Accountability of CSOs, ICNL, 2006.  
6
 Press release, ibid  
7
 http://www.awan.com/pages/oped/100612 
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2) Proposed Amendments to Law No. 84 
After nearly two years of work on three draft laws, the Ministry of Social Solidarity 
announced that no new law will be produced, but that instead a committee will work on 
modifying the existing law. The members of the committee were appointed by the Ministry, and 
include two experts, two Ministry officials, two from the General Union of Associations, and an 
NGO representative (reportedly a representative of a service delivery NGO formed by the 
Government, and therefore more truly a GONGO representative).
8
 The General Union of 
Associations is an entity that organizations are free to join and is run by a board of members 
appointed wholly by the Minister. It is well known that the Union does not include independent 
organizations.  
The Government's declared efforts to revise Law No. 84 come at a time when the 
Government is suppressing civic organizations and stifling the freedoms of association and 
speech as well as other forms of social and political activity.
9
 Efforts to amend the Law go hand 
in hand with attempts to abolish all forms of social and political activity. The clear power 
imbalance between the State and citizens facilitates the Government's attempts to suppress the 
movements seeking to promote freedom and democracy. A contributing factor is the decline in 
external pressure exerted on the Arab and Muslim world due to the fight against terrorism. Most 
tellingly, for the first time since the establishment of human rights organizations in Egypt, the 
Government closed down two major organizations, the Center of Trade Unions and Workers 
Services (established in 1992), and the Association of Human Rights Legal Support (established 
in 1994), based on an amendment made to Article 97 of the Law‘s implementing regulations 
issued by the Ministry of Social Solidarity in 2005. According to this amendment, instructions 
carried out by the Ministry to dissolve any association could take effect immediately.
10
 
To date, the Government has refrained from officially announcing the proposed changes 
to the current Law. Egyptian NGOs and a ―freedom of association coalition‖ have demanded 
several times that the Ministry of Social Solidarity publish the proposed amendments to the NGO 
law, but to no avail – a clear violation of the principle of transparency and accountability. Some 
members of the committee, especially Mr. Abdul-Aziz Hegazi, former Prime Minister and 
current Chair of the General Union of Associations, have attended seminars and workshops, 
where suggested modifications to the Law were discussed. Moreover, there have been leaks 
about the planned restrictions that the Government plans to impose on ability of Egyptian NGOs 
to raise funds.  
In addition, several modifications to the rules governing the General Union of 
Associations,
11
 which are contained in the Law No. 84, have been proposed, which would: 
 make membership mandatory for NGOs and automatic upon registration as a 
legal entity;  
 transform the fully appointed board of directors to a board with both appointed 
and elected members; and 
                                                 
8
 Interview with NGO activist. 
9
 Press release, ibid  
10
 Essam Eldin Sharaf, Towards a democratic law to the liberalization of civil work in Egypt, by the Cairo 
Center for Human Rights Studies, Ibid, p.23. 
11
 The Union rules are contained in part 3, chapter 2 of the Law No. 84 on NGOs (2002).  
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 empower the Union to receive projects from funding agencies and nominate 
organizations that can receive the funding and implement the projects. 
It is not clear if the nomination would be considered obligatory or merely a suggestion 
that the donor agency could ignore. Practical experience indicates, however, that even if the 
nomination were not obligatory, it would be difficult to ignore. This policy approach would place 
the needs of funding organizations over and above those of general society since all projects 
would in this case originate from the donors themselves. This also runs counter to the accepted 
wisdom that organizations should apply for projects based on their own principles and agendas. 
Moreover, this approach would further jeopardize the independence of civil society. Although 
these amendments have not been formally announced, they reveal the Government's intentions to 
restrict the limited freedoms now available to CSOs.  
3) Implementation Practices 
Barriers to foreign funding arise not only from legal requirements, but also from 
regressive implementation practices.  
A significant extra-legal implementation practice relates to the involvement of security 
services in the foreign funding determinations. The Law clearly does not require the approval of 
the security services. NGO representatives, however, report that the Ministry of Social Solidarity 
does not approve foreign funding applications without their approval. Some also added that the 
process often involves coordination between the chiefs of security departments in different 
governorates. Many believe that the approval of security departments is a green light for the 
Ministry to officially approve the funding. Reportedly, reservations made by security 
departments in some ministries make obtaining the approval of the security department in the 
Ministry of Social Solidarity impossible.
12
 One NGO representative commented as follows: 
The administrative authority sends it [the request for approval of foreign funding] to the 
Directorate of Social Solidarity, Financing Section to investigate the foundation 
requesting the funding. It also writes a report for the Ministry. The Ministry sends the 
report in turn to the Security Department in the Ministry to obtain its approval (National 
Security Department - State Security) and after 60 days – that's the law – a decision is 
made, although usually months pass before securing approval. Of course these practices 
are not based on the law.
13
 
A second key area of manipulation is the time period for reviewing and deciding on 
foreign funding approval requests. As previously mentioned, there is no recourse for NGOs 
whose requests have not been answered within the 60-day time period. In practice, the Ministry 
may delay issuing a response for up to one year. Such delays not only impact on the 
implementation of a specific project, but may also threaten the NGO‘s existence, where it 
undermines the NGO‘s ability to pay wages and fulfill its obligations.  
NGO representatives have also noted that the delays in securing approval for funding can 
render project implementation untimely and inappropriate, and even lead to the termination of a 
project. For example, an NGO was scheduled to launch a project in January 2009, but only 
secured approval at the end of July, seven months after the beginning of the implementation 
                                                 
12
 Essam Eldin Sharaf, ibid, p.23. 
13
Quotation from interviews with CSOs. 
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period. Other project contracts signed in May 2009 were approved only at the end of January 
2010, more than seven months after the beginning of the implementation period. 
14
  
A third implementation barrier relates to inspections. The Law vests the Ministry with 
full authority over financial auditing. Based on this authority, the Ministry has increased the 
number of inspection committees; these committees spend long periods of time reviewing the 
records of the NGO, especially in the governorates. For example, in Al Menia governorate, an 
NGO was subject to a very detailed inspection for six months, through various overlapping 
committees. In addition, the Law on Local Governance gives authority to governors to conduct 
inspections of NGOs, which increases the burden on NGOs, and hinders NGOs in conducting 
their work efficiently and implementing their programs effectively. As one NGO noted: 
For example, we launched the campaign of "freedom of association." We used to conduct 
seminars and organize protests in front of the Ministry of Social Solidarity; then 
afterwards, or even during the protests, we received a phone call, informing us of an 
inspection by the Ministry and the Central Auditing Organization (CAO), though the 
CAO is not authorized to do so. Furthermore, there was security interference and threats 
of suspending the activities of the campaign.
15
 
Similarly, frequent government requests for documents, data, and reports may also 
amount to a constraint against NGOs. The practice can overwhelm the NGO and drain its 
resources every time it undergoes the process of applying for foreign funds. The requested 
documentation includes items that are not supported by the law. According to one NGO: 
We face many problems as a result of the multiple bodies overseeing foreign funding. As 
an organization, our activities are known and specific. I should not need to introduce the 
organization every time I apply for funding to the Ministry of Social Solidarity. 
Moreover, there are multiple steps to the process; every time I am compelled to secure 
new approval from the security department, which takes so much time. A few years ago, 
during our participation in the Coalition of NGOs organized to change the previous NGO 
Law, I began to face many problems from the Ministry of Social Solidarity, which 
rejected a number of applications submitted to get approval for funding.
16
 
4) The Impact of Foreign Funding Restrictions 
In recent years, with the increase in the number of CSOs and the range of their activities, 
the issue of funding has emerged as one of the most controversial issues within civil society. The 
limited possibilities for local funding, whether from governmental or private sources, have 
forced human rights organizations in Egypt to seek foreign funding. The receipt of foreign 
funding, however, has subjected CSOs to accusations from the Government and from 
independent media agencies that the funding was granted in order to implement hidden foreign 
agendas. As a result, Egyptian CSOs are facing serious challenges relating to financial 
sustainability and the continuity of their activities.
17
  
                                                 
14
 Quotation from interviews with donor organizations. 
15
Quotation from interviews with CSOs. 
16
Quotation from interviews with CSOs.  
17
 Abdallah Kahalil & Vivian Mourad, Human Rights Organizations and Society Development, paper 
presented to the National Council for Human Rights, Cairo, 2007, p.1. 
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To provide illustrative examples of how foreign funding restrictions and financial 
auditing can be used to strike at the very existence of human rights CSOs in Egypt, here are three 
brief case studies:  
 Egyptian Human Rights Organization 
The head of the organization, Mr. Hafez Abu Saada, a human rights defender, was 
detained in December 1998 when the organization published a report on human rights violations 
against a minority group in ―Al kosheh‖ village, where a Coptic Christian majority exists. He 
was released on bail after six days, following efforts by human rights organizations to raise 
awareness of the arrest both inside and outside Egypt. The charges against him were initially 
related to receiving unauthorized funds and the publication of false information. On February 13, 
2000, the Attorney General‘s Office announced that the case will be transferred to the Supreme 
Court, according to the Military Decree No. 4 (1992).
18
 The case was later dropped due to lack of 
evidence. It seems that the purpose was not prosecution, but rather to undermine the reputation 
of the organization and civil rights associations in general.  
 Ibn Khaldoun Center  
 
Mr. Saad Al Deen Ibrahim is the President of the Center and a human rights activist. He 
was arrested and accused of receiving funds without government approval, the publication of 
false information, and obtaining money by fraud. He was sentenced to seven years in prison. Dr. 
Ibrahim was taken from his home in Cairo on June 30, 2000, and placed under detention in the 
Torrah Farm Detention Facility, until he was released on August 10, 2002. The charges that Dr. 
Ibrahim faced related to projects funded by the European Union in Egypt; his arrest and 
detention therefore contradict the agreement signed by the Egyptian Government in February 
1998 as a part of the European-Mediterranean partnership. According to Article 7 of the MEDA19 
agreement, signed by the Egyptian Government, the European Commission, and the European
Investment Bank: ―The beneficiaries of programs financed by the European Commission and the 
European Investment Bank could be: private associations, organizations, corporations, agencies, 
charity agencies and non-governmental organizations.‖ An Egyptian court held that since the 
contracts between Ibn Khaldoun Center and the European Union are civil contracts and not 
grants, they do not require official approval. Moreover, the semi-annual financial reports related 
to the project did not give any reason for suspicion.20 
 
 Egyptian Center for Legal Aid 
 
The Legal Aid Center submitted a request to receive foreign funds but did not receive a 
reply from the Ministry within the time limit required by law. The board of the Center 
considered the absence of a reply to constitute acceptance and began implementing the project. 
On September 24, 2007, the Cairo Governor issued a decision terminating the Center, as 
explained in the ―Al Khbar‖ newspaper (owned by the Government) through an article entitled 
―Closing down the office of legal human rights association for receiving foreign funds.‖ The 
                                                 
18
 http://www.amnesty.org.ru/library/Index/ARAMDE120162001?open&of=ARA-EGY 
19
 The MEDA program is the principal financial instrument of the European Union for the implementation 
of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 
20
 http://www.amnesty.org.ru/library/Index/ARAMDE120162001?open&of=ARA-EGY  
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news story explained that termination resulted from not obtaining permission from the Minister 
of Social Solidarity to receive foreign funds, and for other logistical discrepancies. The Center 
issued a press release refuting these accusations. After a hearing, the administrative court 
declared on October 26, 2008, that the decision taken by the authorities was unjustified, and that 
there was no evidence for the finding of any violations, and that the decision to terminate the 
organization was taken without any legal or factual basis.21  
B. Justifications 
1) Declared Justifications 
The Egyptian Government promotes false information regarding the funding received by 
civil society. According to the Government, civil society groups exist to harm national security, 
with the financing of millions of dollars from European and American institutions.
22
 This 
accusation greatly influenced the votes of Members of Parliament in favor of new legislation 
imposing more restrictions on NGOs, especially relating to the acceptance of foreign funding or 
joining networks and international institutions.
23
 Indeed, Parliamentary discussion of the draft 
legislation was based on the principle that foreign funding has negative effects on national 
security.  
The Egyptian Security Department views the NGO sector as a threat to be dealt with 
rather than as a partner to be supported. From the Security Department perspective, NGOs 
working in the rights field are a threat to national security, NGOs active in the economic and 
social fields are a threat to social stability and cohesion, and those operating in the cultural field 
represent a threat to public morality; confronting these dangers is therefore critical to preserve 
and promote national security. 
Most recently, and perhaps most disturbingly, Mr. Abdel-Aziz El-Hegazi, former Prime 
Minister and current Chair of the General Union of Associations, accused CSOs – and 
particularly those working in the field of human rights – of threatening national security and 
fostering increased corruption. He stated that he does not believe that human rights activities 
have any value, and demanded that security services tighten their grip over the NGO sector. 
NGOs signed a statement expressing strong disapproval of these statements, especially as they 
came from the lips of the Chairman of the General Union of Associations, a body which is 
currently leading efforts to draft expected amendments to the Law on NGOs. Moreover, the 
statements come alongside new leaks about the planned restrictions that the Government plans to 
impose on the work and ability to raise funds of Egyptian NGOs. 
2) Underlying Motivations 
The NGO sector, through its involvement in all manner of social, economic, and cultural 
rights issues, upsets the powers that benefit from the status quo. The oppression of civil society, 
especially private organizations and institutions, is an integral part of the state system, which 
includes the oppression of political parties, unions, and social movements. Just as the system 
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 http://www.ahrla.org 
22
 Despite the propaganda surrounding foreign funding, the Minister of Social Solidarity urged the U.S. 
Ambassador and the Head of the European Commission delegation in Egypt to increase their funding!  
23
 Negad Elboraei, After 25 years did the foreign funding help in the democratic change, United Group, 
2004, p.2. 
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restricts pluralism in the political party domain, it has restricted NGOs. Restrictions that include 
advance governmental approval for activities and financing tend to reveal the bureaucracy and 
security concerns dominating the mentality of legislators.
24
  
In the view of some, the Egyptian Government is seeking to reduce the role of NGOs in 
Egypt and to paralyze the human rights movements. Some NGOs have a well-developed 
structure inside and outside Cairo and the different governorates, and are able to engage the 
people in addressing their problems. Such activity is suspect in the eyes of the Government and a 
reason to curb the role and work of these organizations.
25
 
C. Responses and Lessons Learned  
Navigating the existing legal framework. NGOs and private organizations seek to 
overcome the legal obstacles and constraints by various means. One option is to avoid registering 
as an NGO under Law No. 84 (2002) with the Ministry of Social Solidarity and instead to 
register as a branch of a foreign institution, as did the Cairo Center for Human Rights Studies, or 
as a law firm or company, as did the Hisham Mubarak Law Center. A second option is to 
conclude contracts for projects in the form of civil service contracts, under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Investment and Taxation Agency, as is the practice for the Ibn Khaldoun Center. 
Third, where organizations are registered as NGOs, they often scrutinize the names of projects 
and expense items in their records to mask anything that may indicate involvement in pressure 
campaigns or anything else that may give rise to governmental concern. Most NGOs also seek to 
maintain positive links with governmental contacts and involve them personally in some of the 
NGO‘s activities. 
In addition, NGOs have also sought foreign assistance to overcome the conflicts with 
administrative bodies. Funding agencies sometimes become involved in the matter whether they 
want to or not, especially in cases involving the seizure of funds they have released or when they 
are forced to defend their reputation.
26
 
Improving the legal framework. A key strategic response must be to develop and improve 
the legal framework, so that it enables political participation, the devolution of power, and the 
creation of a secure environment for the promotion of democracy, freedom of association, 
freedom of expression, etc. In the absence of such a legal framework, it will be difficult to 
achieve positive changes to the NGO Law in particular or for civil society more broadly.  
In part, the goal of legislative reform must be to motivate the private sector to support 
and fund independent civil society directly. The need to request approval for foreign funding 
must be replaced with a requirement simply to provide reports on funding. Mandatory public 
disclosure of funding information (making budgetary information available on websites or in 
official newspapers) could also strengthen public trust.
27
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 Editor: Medhat ELZAHED, Future of Civil Society in Egypt, Development Support Center and Elfostat 
Center, Cairo, 2003, p.58 
25
Quotation from Interviews with CSOs. 
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NGO Transparency. NGOs should seek to comply with high standards of transparency 
and accountability. It is their duty to declare resources and exchanged items and make the 
information available to all.  
The Role of Funding Institutions. The role of funding institutions must be to support local 
CSOs in their struggle and to deal realistically with the Government, while refraining from 
imposing further obstacles against CSOs, such as requiring complex accounting systems or 
registration under repressive laws. 
Funding institutions should not bow to pressure from the State. Interference from all 
parties should be resisted. In other words, funding institutions should remain independent and 
certainly not collude with ―governmental nongovernmental organizations‖ established as 
competitors to independent civil society. 
Donors should recognize the importance of an enabling legal framework, which should 
not only guarantee fundamental freedoms, but also build the basis for greater trust between the 
sectors and meaningful NGO/government cooperation in addressing development needs. In 
addition, donors should be cognizant of the capacity weaknesses within governmental 
departments and ministries, and prioritize programs that seek to increase the capacity of 
governmental staff to deal effectively with NGOs.
28
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Restrictions on Foreign Funding of Civil Society 
Ethiopia 
Debebe Hailegebriel
1
 
 
A. Types of Restrictions on Foreign Funding 
 
The newly enacted Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP) has a unique legislative 
history as a subject of fierce debate and contention between the Ethiopian Government, on the 
one hand, and Ethiopian civil society and other interested parties, on the other hand. The 
controversies surrounding the legislation are multi-dimensional and relate to various aspects of 
the Proclamation. The focal point, however, of much of the controversy has been the restrictions 
on foreign funding for civil society organizations (CSOs) in Ethiopia. 
1. The Nature of the Legal Restriction  
 
The Proclamation contains restrictions on foreign funding that are fundamental to the 
definition, identity, and operational mandate of CSOs. Based on this standard, the Proclamation 
recognizes three forms or types of CSOs, which may be established as either charities or 
societies. These are ―Ethiopian Charities or Societies,‖ ―Ethiopian Resident Charities or 
Societies,‖ and ―Foreign Charities or Societies.‖ The legal definitions of these categories are 
provided under Article 2 of the CSP as follows:2  
1. Article 2(2): ―Ethiopian Charities‖ or ―Ethiopian Societies‖ shall mean those charities or 
societies that are formed under the laws of Ethiopia; all of whose members are Ethiopians; 
generate income from Ethiopia; and are wholly controlled by Ethiopians. Here it should be 
noted that the law includes an exception to the general rule concerning the generation of 
income from within Ethiopia. Accordingly, organizations can still be considered ―Ethiopian 
Charities or Ethiopian Societies‖ ―if they use not more than ten percent of their funds which 
is received from foreign sources‖3 (emphasis added). The 10% restriction relates to the use of 
foreign funds and not to the amount of foreign income the organization is receiving.  
 
2. Article 2(3): ―Ethiopian Resident Charities‖ or ―Ethiopian Resident Societies‖ shall mean 
those charities or societies that are formed under the laws of Ethiopia, and that consist of 
                                                 
1
 This paper is made possible with the generous support of the American people through the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government. 
 
 
2
 See Article 14 (2,(3) and (4) of the Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP) No. 621/2009. 
3
 "Income from Foreign source" means ―a donation or delivery or transfer made from foreign source of any 
article, currency or security. Foreign sources include the government agency or company of any foreign country; 
international agency or any person in a foreign country‖. See Article 2(15) of the CSP. 
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members who reside in Ethiopia, and that receive more than 10% of their funding from 
foreign sources.  
 
3. Article 2(4): ―Foreign Charities‖ shall mean those charities that are formed under the laws of 
foreign countries or which consist of members who are foreign nationals or are controlled by 
foreign nationals or receive funds from foreign country sources.4 As one can observe, the 
criteria in this provision are outlined in the alternative, using the word ―or‖ to indicate that if 
one of the distinguishing elements applies, then the organization is considered a ―Foreign 
Charity.‖ Accordingly, an organization receiving funds from a foreign source could be 
classified as foreign charity even if none of the other criteria apply. This raises the question 
of the precise contours between ―Ethiopian Resident Charities‖ and ―Foreign Charities.‖ It is 
worth noting that the classification of ―Ethiopian Resident Charities‖ and ―Ethiopian 
Resident Societies‖ was introduced in the draft CSP as a compromise to labeling Ethiopians 
as ―Foreign.‖  
 
The foregoing provisions indicate the significance and centrality of funding to the 
classification of charities and societies. These provisions make clear that the corporate 
citizenship of CSOs is not determined only by the law under which they are incorporated or the 
national composition or citizenship of their members. Rather, the decisive factor for entitlement 
to, or deprivation of, Ethiopian corporate citizenship is also the actual or anticipated source of 
funding. In other words, for a CSO to acquire Ethiopian corporate citizenship, it is not sufficient 
to be incorporated under Ethiopian law; in addition, the amount of funding received by the CSO 
from foreign sources must not be more than 10% of its overall funding. If it acquires more than 
10% of its funds from foreign sources, then it is denied Ethiopian corporate citizenship. 
The definitional distinction between Ethiopian Charities or Societies and Ethiopian 
Resident Charities or Societies acquires heightened significance, since it serves as the basis for 
eligibility for involvement in human rights and governance issues. As stated above, the CSP 
determines the nationality of a given CSO based on its source of income, and at the same time 
makes Ethiopian nationality (or corporate citizenship) a requirement for engaging in governance 
and advocacy activities.5 Organizations that receive more than 10% of their income from foreign 
sources are effectively excluded from working on the advancement of human rights, promoting 
the rights of children and the disabled, gender equality, nations and nationalities, good 
governance and conflict resolution, as well as the efficiency of the justice system.  
2. Early warning signals for the legal restriction 
 
The enactment of legislation incorporating foreign funding restrictions as well as other 
restrictive provisions has been under consideration since 2003. Especially after the conflict 
between the prominent human rights CSOs and the Government on matters related to the May 
2005 National Election, such a legislative initiative from the Government seemed imminent. 
However, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), in its official explanatory document of the Draft 
                                                 
4
 Please note that the law does not provide for the establishment of ―Foreign Societies.‖ 
5
 See Article 14 (5) of the CSP which reads, ―Those who can take part in activities that fall under Sub- 
Article 2(j) the advancement of human and democratic rights, (k) the promotion of equality of nations, nationalities 
and peoples and that of gender and religion, (l) the promotion of the rights of the disabled and children‘s rights, (m) 
the promotion of conflict resolution and reconciliation and (n) the promotion of the efficiency of the justice and law 
enforcement services shall be only Ethiopian Charities and Societies.‖ 
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Proclamation, provided a depoliticized explanation about the need for the new legislation. 
According to the MOJ, the initiative for drafting the new Proclamation sprang from the Business 
Process Reengineering (BPR) study, which was geared toward overhauling the operational 
structure and procedures of the Ministry.  
Immediately after the 2005 National Election, the tone of the Government toward CSOs 
changed. The Government began denying not only the role and contribution of CSOs in the 
economic and democratic process but also the foundational principles of the sector. The Prime 
Minister and other government officials repeatedly asserted that only ―mass-based organizations‖ 
such as women, youth, trade unions, etc. can play roles both in the democratization and 
economic development of the country. On the contrary, government officials blamed NGOs for 
being ―rent seekers‖ and for contributing to the economic crisis of Africa. The ruling party, the 
Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), has clearly indicated its hostile 
position towards NGOs since the 2005 National Election. In its policy document, the EPRDF 
questions the role of NGOs in the development process, and describes NGOs as patronage 
networks distributing ―policy rents,‖ receiving big salaries and benefits without bringing 
concrete results, spending 60% of their budgets on administrative matters, strengthening a rent-
seeking political economy, and thereby negatively affecting the development of the country.6  
According to EPRDF policy document, which can also be considered a government 
policy document:  
NGOs are not organizations established by citizens to protect their rights. These 
organizations are rather established by individuals mainly for personal benefit, 
accountable to, and advancing the interests of foreign agencies. Their leaders are not 
accountable to the staff of the organizations and the beneficiaries. As result, they cannot 
have a democratic nature and role.… Therefore, the government has to confront the ―rent 
seeking‖ nature of NGOs, for example, by considering those organizations receiving 15% 
of their income from foreign sources as foreign organizations and denying them 
recognition as a means of expression of freedom of association as well as democratic 
forums. 
3. Impact of the Legal Restrictions 
 
The restriction on foreign funding is already having an effect on both the operation and 
existence of CSOs, and particularly advocacy-based CSOs. Donors have become hesitant to 
engage in long-term project agreements because of the uncertainty and restrictions of the CSP. 
Consequently, some CSOs have already been obliged to reduce the number of their staff and/or 
close branch offices.7 
The restrictions on access to foreign funding and operational areas will likely have an 
unprecedented effect not only on the development of CSOs but also on the democratization 
process. As things now stand, foreign funding is the only source of funding for almost all CSOs 
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 Revolutionary Democracy and Struggle for the Development of Democratic Rule, EPRDF, 2006. 
7
 It has been reported that Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), Ethiopian Women Lawyers 
Association (EWLA), and Action Aid and Christian Relief Development Association (CRDA) are some of the 
organizations engaged in lay offs and closing branch offices. EHRCO has decided to close nine branch offices and 
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in Ethiopia. Due to the poverty of the nation, there is no substantial indigenous funding that can 
compensate for the loss of resources engendered by the restrictions. Consequently, the 
restrictions will likely create a severe financial crisis for CSOs, which might result in their being 
crippled. Alternatively, human rights CSOs may opt to abandon their activity in such areas and 
turn to relief provision and related non-sensitive areas of work. 
Moreover, the role of CSOs as watchdogs promoting human rights and good governance 
will be affected by this legislation. As stated repeatedly, generating over 90% of their budget 
from local sources will be a challenge for local CSOs and, hence, their survival will be at risk. 
The law heavily curtails the involvement of CSOs in activities that are key to empowerment and 
sustainable development. In other words, the CSP discourages the rights-based approach to 
development, which is essential to holding government accountable for its actions.  
This legislation will also affect the contribution of development partners who seek to 
support the country‘s development by working with both Government and CSOs. Consequently, 
the CSP may reduce (temporarily or permanently) foreign aid, particularly foreign aid channeled 
through NGOs. The CSP also contradicts international instruments such as the Paris Declaration, 
which calls for a rights-based approach to development and the participation of CSOs in the 
formulation and assessment of national development strategies.8  
Recently, 42 community-based organizations (CBOs) operating in the Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples‘ Region (SNNPR) were shut down and banks instructed to freeze their 
assets. The official reasons given for such actions by the Government include the engagement of 
the organizations in promoting harmful traditional practices, mobilizing communities against the 
use of fertilizers, setting up a parallel government, and non-transparent accounting practices. 
Although all of these organizations were registered with the Regional Government of SNNPR 
and not with the Federal Government, there is an argument that these organizations fall under the 
jurisdiction of the new CSP because of their reliance on foreign sources of income.9 According 
to Article 3(1)(b) of the CSP, organizations established as Ethiopian Resident Charities or 
Societies, and therefore receiving more than 10% of their income from foreign sources, are 
subject to the CSP.  
B. Justifications 
1. Declared Justifications   
The underlying ideological justification for the restriction on foreign funding of CSOs 
emanates from the Ruling Party‘s position on promoting Revolutionary/Developmental 
Democracy in all aspects of public life. The Party (EPRDF) considers the free flow of foreign 
funding to CSOs as a means for perpetuating parasitism and rent-seeking, which the Party 
considers as the most prevalent evil in Ethiopian public life. The Party further expounds that the 
fact that a CSO is wholly established and managed by Ethiopians is not enough to make it an 
Ethiopian CSO unless it also generates its funding from local sources. A CSO receiving a 
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 See Paragraph 14 and 47 of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, Ownership, Harmonization, 
Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability, High Level Forum, February 28 to March 2, 2005. 
9
 Please recall that organizations that are receiving more than 10% of their income from outside are 
considered as Ethiopian Residents‘ Charities or Societies. All of them were funded by the Christenson Fund and 
under the management of the Fund‘s Program Officer for the African Rift Valley Region. 
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substantial portion of funding from foreign sources could be an instrument for the illicit 
advancement of the interests of foreign powers. This means that the sources of funding of a CSO 
should determine its identity and legal standing in the Ethiopian legal system. Therefore, the 
EPRDF considers it appropriate to impose restrictions on the level of foreign funding (i.e., a 
maximum of 10%) on those CSOs that engage in such sensitive areas as human rights, good 
governance, gender equality, children‘s rights, the rights of the disabled, conflict resolution, and 
the efficiency of the justice sector.  
The official justification is also related to a unique understating of the very nature of the 
constitutional right to freedom of association. The official position is that the right to freedom of 
association is a democratic/political right and not a human right. Consequently, it is officially 
propounded that since this right is not a human right, it does not belong to all human beings. 
Rather it is said to belong to citizens alone; as such, the enjoyment of this right is said to be 
limited only to citizens. The logical result of this position is that since freedom of association is a 
right that exclusively pertains to citizens, foreigners cannot exercise it either directly by 
establishing a CSO, or indirectly by funding local CSOs. The overall tone of the justification is 
that these restrictions are necessary to ensure that those CSOs involved in the designated 
sensitive areas truly represent national interests and are not vulnerable to manipulation by 
foreign elements through foreign funding. 
The Government has expressed the rationale for the enactment of the CSP in the law 
itself and other relevant documents. Accordingly, we may highlight the following stated 
objectives:
10
 
 to ensure the realization of citizens' right to association enshrined in the Constitution of 
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia; 
 to aid and facilitate the role of charities and societies in the overall development of 
Ethiopian people; 
 to provide varieties of measures to be taken against CSOs in case of fault; 
 to ensure the accountability, transparency, and consistency of CSOs to the public; 
 to provide the legal basis for the relationship between CSOs and sector administrators; 
and 
 to determine the amount of money CSOs spend for administrative purposes and project 
activities (core objectives). 
2. Underlying Motivations 
The most revealing indicator underlying the enactment of the CSP is the generally 
skeptical attitude adopted by the State regarding the role and participation of CSOs in the 
national political space. The Government displays a hostile attitude towards ―rights watchdogs‖ 
and human rights organizations, which it brands as funnels for civil and political discontent and 
mouthpieces of the Opposition. In the context of political party debates and rights-based CSO 
activities during the May 2005 election, the Government grew more inimical toward CSOs. 
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 For objectives mentioned under a and b, please see the Preamble of the PCS whereas the rest are taken 
from the Minutes of the Legal and Administrative Affairs of the House of Peoples‘ Representatives of Ethiopia, 
December 24, 2008. 
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Some CSOs have also been active in monitoring and exposing human rights violations. 
Moreover, the Government has shown a tendency to consider the advocacy-based NGOs as petty 
fault-finders who capitalize on the weaknesses and mistakes of the Government to promote their 
own interests. In line with this perception, the Government holds that the main cause for such 
―belligerence‖ on the part of the CSOs is the financial support received from abroad. 
In addition, the Government accuses some of the human rights CSOs and their leaders of 
abandoning their impartiality and aligning themselves with the Opposition. Consequently the 
Government resorts to vindictive measures toward the CSO leaders, whom it has labeled as 
―angry elites‖ in league with Opposition leaders. The restrictive legislation also seems to be a 
manifestation of these vindictive measures. 
3. Evaluation of the Justification 
The central point underpinning the official arguments of the Government appears to be an 
attitude of aversion towards CSOs as alternative forms of social organization and political 
participation. In claiming a share of the nation‘s political space, the existence of such structures 
may be perceived as threatening to the Government‘s hold over the political space. The 
Government seems to consider itself as the sole genuine actor in public life. The argument is 
flawed in that it is based on the wrong perception of CSOs and their role in society; the 
Government should consider them as partners and should support their development. 
The second aspect of the Government‘s arguments appears to be xenophobic hostility 
toward the involvement of foreigners in matters related to human rights and governance. The 
Government emphatically asserts that foreigners cannot exercise the right to freedom of 
association in Ethiopia. The fact that the right to freedom of association is found in the section of 
the Ethiopian Constitution dealing with democratic rights cannot by itself deprive this right of its 
status as a human right. Such fundamental human rights as child rights, women‘s rights, and the 
right to property are also found in this section. It would be outrageous to argue that these rights 
are not human rights because they are found in a certain section of the Constitution. Moreover, 
the restriction on the involvement of the international community in human rights and related 
matters in Ethiopia by providing funds for local human rights CSOs contradicts Ethiopia‘s 
obligations vis-à-vis the global concern for human rights. 
4. Legal Grounds to Challenge the Justifications 
As stated above, government justifications for restricting the rights of CSOs are more 
political than legal. The argument that freedom of association is a ―democratic right‖ and not a 
human right to be respected to everyone
11
 runs counter to Article 31 of the Ethiopian 
Constitution, which guarantees freedom of association for everyone regardless of their 
nationality or source of income.
12
 Further, the same provision entitles everyone to associate for 
any cause or purpose. Thus, the CSP restricts the rights of individuals to engage in advocacy 
activities based on their source of income, in violation of this constitutional guarantee. The 
Constitution is the supreme law of the land and, therefore any law, customary practice, or 
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 The Explanatory Note of the Draft Charities and Societies Proclamation, Ministry of Justice, 2008, p. 11. 
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 Article 31 of the FDRE Constitution reads, ―Every person has the right to freedom of association for any 
cause or purpose. Organizations formed, in violation of appropriate laws, or to illegally subvert the constitutional 
order, or which promote such activities are prohibited.‖ 
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decision of an organ of state or a public official that contravenes the Constitution shall be of no 
effect.
13
  
Unlike most countries, the power of interpreting the Constitution is given to a political 
body called the House of Federation.
14
 This House is professionally supported by the Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry, which is empowered to receive applications ―where any Federal State law 
is contested as being unconstitutional and such a dispute is submitted to it by any court or 
interested party. In such cases, the Council shall consider the matter and submit it to the House 
of the Federation for a final decision.‖15 Therefore, one option is challenging the constitutionality 
of the CSP in these fora at the domestic level. 
 It should also be noted that Ethiopia is party to various international and regional human 
rights instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. Taking the matter to these international and 
regional fora is another option.  
C. Responses and Lessons Learned 
(1) Responses  
(a) Participation in the Drafting Process 
The draft Proclamation was presented for discussion with civil society organizations as 
well as other interested bodies. A number of consultative meetings were held with 
representatives of CSOs and concerned government officials. This included two roundtable 
discussions between the Prime Minster and CSO representatives, and several other meetings with 
the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). Although some provisions in the draft Proclamation were changed 
as a result of this dialogue, it is difficult to say that civil society input had any meaningful impact 
on the final shape of the Proclamation. Most of the revisions were more technical and cosmetic 
than substantive. Government officials remained stubborn and resistant to genuine and 
constructive dialogue.  
(b) Collective Responses of CSOs 
The CSOs responded to this legislation in a coordinated manner by establishing a special 
Taskforce that pursued continuous dialogue with the Government. Members of the Taskforce are 
drawn from various segments of civil society: development, advocacy, religious, and networks. 
The Taskforce prepared commentaries on the different draft versions of the law and submitted 
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 See Article 9 of the FDRE Constitution. 
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 The Federal Government has two houses: the House of Peoples' Representatives and the House of the 
Federation. The House of Peoples' Representatives is the highest authority of the Federal Government which is 
made accountable to the people. Members of the House of Peoples' Representatives are elected by the people for a 
term of five years. On the other hand, the House of the Federation is composed of representatives of Nations, 
Nationalities, and Peoples. Each Nation, Nationality, and People is represented in the House of the Federation by at 
least one member who is elected by the State Councils (Regional Governments). This House is given the power, 
among others, to interpret the Constitution, decides on the rights self-determination of including secession, provide 
solutions for conflicts among the different regions, and determine division of revenue between the Federal 
Government and Regional States and subsidies that the Federal Government may provide to the States. Looking at 
the composition of its members and the procedure by which they are elected, many people consider this House as a 
political body and question its independence in interpreting constitutional issues. 
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 Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation No 250/2000, Article 6(2).  
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these to the Government. It organized forums wherein government officials and experts as well 
as CSO representatives came together and discussed the draft legislation. It also served as means 
of communication between the international community and CSOs. After the adoption of the 
Proclamation, the Taskforce has continued its activities with a revised mandate.  
(c) The Response of the International Community 
The international community played a significant role in exerting influence on the 
Ethiopian Government. High delegations from countries including the United States and the 
United Kingdom made frequent visits to Ethiopia to express their concern over the legislation, 
and held high-level meetings with various officials, including the Prime Minister and Ministry of 
Justice. The CSO legislation offered one of the rare instances in Ethiopia when the international 
community came together with a unified voice and expressed its concern.  
 Many doubt, however, whether these efforts made any impact on the final outcome of the 
Proclamation. Moreover, it appeared that some members of the international community 
preferred an approach of ―wait and see‖ to pressuring the Government during the drafting 
process. The concern of the international community was countered by appeals to ―non-
interference‖ in domestic affairs by the Ethiopian Government: ―We need your money but if you 
try meddling in our internal affairs, you can take your money away.‖ In addition, the 
Government challenged members of the international community by claiming that some CSP 
provisions were taken from other laws, such as the UK Charities Act.  
Certain international organizations, such as the International Center for Not-for-Profit 
Law, Human Rights Watch, and CIVICUS, played crucial roles in providing comments and 
position statements on the draft CSP. These organizations played a significant role in providing 
technical support and attracting the attention of other actors towards the challenges posed by the 
draft law.  
 After the adoption of the CSP, the donors group
16
 designed a strategy called ―POST 
PACKAGE STRATEGY‖17 which has two major components: Law Enforcement Monitoring 
System and CSO Adaptation Facility. Under the first component, the plan is to monitor the 
application of the law, challenges CSOs may encounter, and the impact of the law on donor 
assistance and citizens‘ rights. To this end, a monitoring tool will be developed, and the findings 
of the monitoring exercise will be used to support the advocacy and policy dialogue with the 
Government.
18
 DFID has taken the lead role in implementing the Monitoring Component. 
Although the implementation of this activity was planned to begin in October, and preparatory 
work has been completed, it has proved challenging to secure the permission of the Government. 
Reportedly, the Government has now accepted the project in principle, but the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) is still expected to write a formal letter to the 
Charity and Society Agency (CSA) and the donor community.  
 The second component includes four strategies: 
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 Among the donors group the following are actively participating in the process of supporting the CSOs 
and expressing their concern on the legislation; USAID, DFID, CIDA (ECCO), Irish Aid, SIDA, etc. 
17
 The Strategy called as Post Package Strategy just to indicate the continuation of the support of the 
international community even after the adoption of the CSP. 
18
 Interview with Mr. Shimelis Assefa; Governance Officer, CIDA and member of the Civil Society 
Support Group of Donor Assistance Group. June 27, 2009, Addis Ababa. 
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1. CSO Adaptation Facility 
 Help CSOs to adapt to the legal environment  
 Raise awareness of CSOs on the content and nature of the law 
2. Provide technical assistance to CSOs 
 Engage in capacity building activities in areas such as fundraising, income 
generation, cost share, etc. 
 Provide funding for capacity building and adaptation strategies 
3. Link the issue of CSOs with other initiatives such as Protection of Basic Service (PBS), 
EC Civil Society Fund, etc. 
 Roles and contribution of CSOs 
 Media outreach 
 Documenting and distributing best practices of CSOs 
4. Policy dialogue towards better legal environment 
 Lobbying 
 Networking 
Various donors have expressed their interest in supporting the Civil Society Task Force, 
and some donors, such as Irish Aid and CIDA, have already begun releasing funds. The Civil 
Society Support Group (CSSG), which is composed of Irish Aid, CIDA (ECCO), DFID, 
Norwegian Embassy, and SIDA, has already started working with the CSA and agreed to have 
regular meetings in which concerns can be discussed. In addition, Pact Ethiopia, in close 
consultation with USAID and other members of the CSSG, is working on the Adaptation 
Facility, particularly on Domestic Resource Mobilization (DRM), Strategic Plan Development, 
and awareness-raising on the CSP. 
(d) CSOs’ Individual Responses 
The challenge of the new law relates to the very existence of some CSOs, particularly 
those working on advocacy and human rights issues. Even before the adoption of the CSP the 
number of these organizations was insignificant.
19
 The majority of CSOs in Ethiopia were and 
are religious and development (service delivery) organizations. Those Ethiopian CSOs engaged 
in restricted activities are now considering adaptation strategies individually and collectively. It 
appears that the majority of these CSOs are planning to be registered as ―Ethiopian Resident 
Charities or Societies,‖ abandoning work on advocacy and human rights areas. Very few, 
perhaps not more than three organizations, will be registered as ―Ethiopian Charities or 
Societies‖ and focus on governance and human rights issues. 
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CSOs registered at the Federal level.  
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(2) Lessons Learned 
The CSOs and the international community did their best to avert the current situation, 
and are still working for a better legal environment. On the other hand, the Government, and 
particularly the ruling party, is determined to curb the activities of advocacy CSOs in Ethiopia 
through the legislation regardless of the pressures it faces at the international and national levels. 
Considering the active roles CSOs played in the 2005 National Election and in view of the 
upcoming (2010) National Election, the relationship between the CSOs and the Government 
remains strained, and there is no chance of amending the legislation in the near future. 
 One of the major challenges for CSOs in addressing the draft legislation was their 
inability to mobilize the public at large and the media. By contrast, the Government did much to 
attract public attention and to highlight all the evils of CSOs.  
 Many also agree that the sector itself contributed to the enactment of such a draconian 
law. Some of the major internal contributing factors to the adoption of the legislation include the 
following:
20
 
 Weak accountability and transparency of CSOs to their constituencies and the public;  
 Weak or no self regulation system;  
 Weak institutional development;  
 Absence of internal democratic administration;  
 Programs and projects are mostly fund-driven; 
 Lack of focus and commitment on organizational objectives; and  
 Poor networking and collaboration culture.  
(3) What Next?  
The CSOs and the international community should work in close cooperation toward 
alleviating the existing situation, particularly before advocacy CSOs perish in Ethiopia. The 
international community must use its leverage and exert all necessary influence on the 
Government, which so heavily relies on the financial support of foreign countries. Donors to the 
Ethiopian Government must ensure that their development agreements include the participation 
of CSOs as much as possible. The international community can facilitate constructive dialogue 
between the Government and CSOs on amending the legislation. They should provide due 
attention and extend their support to CSOs that are likely to be affected by the legislation.  
 Similarly, CSOs must continue their collective effort for the amendment of the legislation 
and establish a relationship with the Government that is based on trust and confidence. CSOs 
may want to challenge the constitutionality of the law both at the national and international 
levels. They should also engage in ongoing dialogue with the Government at the expert and 
political levels for the amendment of the law. Collectively they should support each other in 
efforts to adapt to the new legislation. Attention should also be given to the establishment of a 
strong self-regulatory system which ensures the independence, accountability, and transparency 
of CSOs. 
                                                 
20
 The Role of NGOs in Protecting Democratic Values, the Ethiopian Experience: The Challenge of 
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Restrictions on Foreign Funding of Civil Society 
Russia 
Aleksej Bogoroditskii
1
 
 
While Russian legislation still contains numerous challenges in regards to activities of 
non-commercial organizations (NCOs), the Russian Federal Law on Non-commercial 
Organizations was amended in 2009,
2
 bringing significant improvements to the regulatory 
environment for NCOs. Among other issues, the newly amended law has ushered in the following 
changes: 
 Small NCOs that do not receive foreign funding and have no foreign founders will be 
exempt from formal reporting of annual revenue totaling less than 3 million rubles, or 
approximately US $100,000; 
 All NCOs may make required reports on their activities publicly available by either 
posting the reports on their website or publishing the report in selected media; 
 Mandatory government audits of NCOs will no longer take place annually, but rather 
every three years—the same as for commercial enterprises; 
 If an NCO does not submit all of the documents required for registration or if there are 
mistakes in the submitted documents, in lieu of an automatic denial of registration, the 
registration process may be suspended for up to three months, until the applicant 
completes or corrects the application. The registration body will proceed with registering 
an NCO once the application file is complete.  
 In considering a registration application, the registration body may only request 
documents specified in the law; and 
 Refusal to register a foreign NCO representative office may no longer be based on 
criteria such as ―threats to the unique character, cultural heritage, or national interests 
of the Russian Federation.‖  These criteria have been removed from the law. 
The election of the President Medvedev has fueled hope that the legal framework for civil 
society will continue to improve, eliminating other obstacles affecting NCOs, including barriers 
to foreign funding of NCOs discussed in this report.  As the report makes clear, the funding 
constraints for NCOs were primarily introduced in 2006, prior to the election of President 
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2
 In June 2009, the State Duma adopted amendments to Russian Federal Law No. 7-FZ of January 12, 
1996, ―On Non-Commercial Organizations‖ (NCO Law) that came into force on August 1, 2009.   
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Medvedev; indeed, the focus of this report is predominantly on that particular time – the events 
surrounding the lead-up and immediate aftermath of the legislative changes introduced in 2006.  
By focusing on these constraints – which are largely still in place – the article seeks to shed light 
on the political narrative surrounding the introduction of the constraints and thereby provide 
insight, which may be instructive for those in other country contexts.
3
     
 
I. Types of Restrictions on Foreign Funding of Civil Society 
A. The Nature of the Legal Restriction 
The main obstacles precluding non-commercial organizations (NCOs) from obtaining 
foreign funding are less related to legal restrictions per se, and more to the consequence of 
official government policy and the selective application of legal provisions. Special regulations 
pertaining to the registration, reporting, control and liquidation of NCOs provide a toolbox of 
legal provisions subject to selective application. In examining the nature of the legal restrictions, 
this section considers (1) the negative perception of foreign-funded NCOs; (2) legal barriers 
affecting representative offices of foreign organizations; (3) the government list of approved 
foreign grant makers; (4) legal and practical barriers affecting foreign-funded NCOs; and (5) the 
taxation of foreign financing. 
(1) Negative Perception of Foreign-Funded NCOs 
The Russian Government encourages negative attitudes toward foreign donors who fund 
NCOs and NCOs receiving foreign funding to work in the field of human rights protection, 
monitoring of the environment, law enforcement and migration, supporting volunteer initiatives, 
etc. This, in turn, furthers the societal perception of international NCOs and foreign-funded 
NCOs as an enemy. Russian human rights activists note the presence of ―negative rhetoric on the 
part of authorities in regard to independent NCOs. This attitude frequently borders on outright 
animosity toward organizations obtaining foreign funding.‖4 It has also been noted that ―NCOs 
funded from foreign sources are subjected to more frequent inspections and are required to 
submit additional reports, etc.‖5 
(2) Legal Barriers Relating to Foreign Representative Offices 
The Russian Government has established special regulations pertaining to the registration 
and reporting of subsidiaries and representative offices of foreign and international NCOs, which 
create certain difficulties for carrying out their activities on the territory of Russian Federation. 
(Federal Law N 18-ФЗ of 01/10/2006 ―On introduction of amendments into certain legislative 
acts of the Russian Federation‖) The special regulations include:  
 At the time of registration, foreign NCOs must submit a notary certification, 
receipt of Apostille, and documents relating to the founders of a foreign NCO, 
translated into Russian. 
                                                 
3
 These introductory paragraphs were contributed by ICNL; Sections I-III, which follow, were authored by 
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5
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 Foreign NCOs must submit reports to the Ministry of Justice, on a quarterly basis, 
relating to the amount of income, its anticipated spending, and purposes of 
spending; and on an annual basis, reports on planned programs (no later than one 
month before the start of the implementation of the program in the Russian 
Federation). It is also required to inform the Ministry of Justice about any changes 
in the program no later than 10 days after making such a decision.  
 Foreign NCOs have no right to use the simplified tax system, and therefore cannot 
benefit from the simplified tax-finance reporting (subsection 18 of section 3 of 
Article 346.12 of the Tax Code). 
 Government agencies have been vested with expanded authority to control the 
activities of branches and subsidiaries of foreign and international NCOs, 
including the right to suspend certain programs, but are not subject to clear and 
reasonable criteria for the application of such measures and restrictions.  
(3) Government List of Approved Foreign Grant Makers 
In order to give grants to Russian NCOs on a tax-exempt basis, foreign donors must be 
included on a government list. The adoption of the RF Government Decree № 485 of June 28, 
2008 (―On the list of international organizations whose grants (free of charge assistance) 
extended to Russian tax-payers shall be exempt from the taxation levied against the revenues of 
Russian grantees‖) decreased the number of foreign donors whose grants are free from taxation 
from a total of 101 to a mere 12. All private donors were excluded from the government list. 
Significantly, the 2008 Decree also failed to establish criteria for securing a place on the 
government list. Additionally, foreign organizations that were removed from the list are now 
liable to pay taxes to the state budget. In response, a number of donors and NCOs opted to enter 
into donation agreements, or into contractual relations (or fee-for-services agreements). 
(4) Legal and Practical Barriers Relating to Foreign-Funded NCOs 
As mentioned above, the regulatory barriers relating to foreign-funded NCOs are less the 
result of specific rules applicable to foreign-funded NCOs and more the result of selective 
application of law. Russian NCOs receiving foreign funding face unfriendly attitudes on the part 
of state officials and business representatives alike when addressing the issue of financing social 
projects – primarily because foreign-funded NCOs are suspected of ―hostile‖ activities. The state 
takes special steps to control the activities of foreign-funded NCOs through the following 
regulatory methods: 
 Additional inspections, formal and otherwise. When preparing oversight plans, 
the authorized agency, as a rule, tends to give priority to inspecting foreign-
funded NCOs;
6
 
 Additional reporting to the authorized agency, despite the fact that these reports 
duplicate the reports filed with tax authorities.  
 In practice, NCOs experience many difficulties when they try to implement 
projects/activities which are funded from foreign sources. For example, NCOs 
may have difficulty renting a public hall or conference room, or obtaining a 
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permit to conduct a meeting/demonstration, or securing the participation of 
government officials in an event as a speaker. More generally, government 
agencies are often unhelpful and may use bureaucratic excuses to frustrate the 
performance of NCO activities.  
 Additionally, government agencies often hinder NCOs in the implementation of 
projects by launching coordinated inspections and by demonstrating negative 
attitudes toward NCOs.  
(5) Taxation of Foreign Financing 
In addition to the government list of foreign donors described above, whereby foreign 
donors must be included on a government list in order to give tax-exempt grants, Russian law 
envisions a mechanism of advance registration for technical assistance projects where NCO-
implementers are seeking tax benefits. (Decree of the RF Government № 1547 ―On establishing 
the Commission on the international technical assistance‖ of December 25, 1998) The 
Commission on International Technical Assistance under the Ministry of Economic 
Development is responsible for registration of technical aid programs. Irrevocable technical aid 
constitutes assets and goods provided free of charge to Russian legal and/or physical persons by 
foreign countries, their federal or municipal bodies or international and foreign organizations, 
which is certified through registration of a project or a program on technical assistance. 
Technical assistance can be provided for two primary purposes: to support economic and social 
reforms and to conduct disarmament. The law requires implementers to register programs and 
projects only where implementers (NCOs) are seeking tax benefits.  
In practice, however, the mechanism is not functional, due to excessive bureaucracy and 
a lack of transparency in the decision-making process. Tellingly, employees of the Commission 
themselves confirmed the lack of a number of norm-setting documents which are supposed to 
regulate certain procedural issues of the registration process.
7
 As a result, NCOs must pay taxes 
– and in particular, VAT – within the framework of assistance projects. 
B. Early Warning Signs of Restrictions 
The concern with foreign funding of NCOs was first raised in then-President Putin‘s 
Address to the Federal Assembly in 2004:  
There are thousands of public associations and unions in our country which are engaged 
in constructive activities but not all of the organizations work for the benefit of people‘s 
interests. For some organizations, obtaining funding from influential foreign funds has 
become the top priority, while for others this priority implies serving dubious vested and 
commercial interests. Meanwhile the most urgent issues facing the country and its 
citizens remain neglected.  
In May 2005, Nickolai Patrushev, Director of FSB, in his report to Parliament, suggested 
toughening the legal regulation of NCO activities: ―An inadequate legislative basis and the lack 
of efficient mechanisms of state control lay the foundation for carrying out intelligence gathering 
under the cover of charitable and other activities.‖ 
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In December 2005, Alexander Yakovenko, Deputy Foreign Minister, asserted the 
following: ―There is little wonder that Russia‘s foreign policy is perceived in a warped and 
distorted way abroad. This happens because Russian and Western media tend to quote NGOs 
generously funded by foreign capital.‖  
At the time of the adoption of the new legislation on NCOs in January 2006, then-
President Putin commented that ―the Government will support NCOs but shall see to it that their 
funding is transparent, which should guarantee their independence; otherwise they would dance 
to the tune of their foreign puppeteers.‖8  
In 2007, Putin maintained the same line: ―There are those who craftily use pseudo-
democratic phraseology for the purpose of returning to the not-so-distant past: some – in order to 
continue plundering the national wealth, rob our people and the state with impunity – the way 
they used to do it, while others do it striving to deprive our country of its economic and political 
independence. The flow of resources from abroad earmarked for direct interference into our 
internal affairs is steadily growing.‖9 
C. Impact of Legal Restrictions 
Most of the legal barriers described above became law with the enactment of the Federal 
Law № 18-ФЗ on April 18, 2006. Certain regulatory measures aimed at the partial liberalization 
of the NCO legislation are currently being prepared, but they fail to address the need to improve 
the climate for foreign funding of NCOs in Russia.  
Since 2006, the number of NCOs seeking foreign funding has decreased. The number of 
NCOs and civic activists has declined and there is an exodus of young people from the civic 
sector. In addition, the prestige of charitable and civic activities has plummeted in the eyes of the 
general public. Furthermore, there is a decline of international exchange, mutual internships and 
implementation of new social technologies.  
In sum, the Government has managed successfully to reduce foreign influence on the 
social and political processes of the territory of the Russian Federation. 
II. Justifications 
Stricter regulatory control over NCOs and NCO activities has been justified by a range of 
supporting rationales, including the following:  
 The need to enhance the efficiency of the registration process and supervisory 
oversight of NCO activities;  
 The need to increase the transparency and accountability of NCOs, and in 
particular, the transparency of NCO funding and the use of resources;  
 The need to prevent the use of NCOs for money laundering and tax evasion;  
 The need to prevent interference in the affairs of the state, and to guard against 
attempts to exercise foreign influence on the internal affairs in Russia through 
foreign-funded NCO activities; and  
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 The need to protect national security and to undertake measures aimed at fighting 
terrorism and extremism. 
In justifying the restrictive regulations introduced in 2006, the Russian Government 
relied most heavily on the legislative goal of enhanced transparency and increased efficiency of 
registration and supervision. Statements by politicians and national security officers, however, 
belied an underlying motivation linked with a view of NCOs as a subversive threat to the state. 
Indeed, NCOs were perceived to have played subversive roles in the ―colored revolutions‖ in 
neighboring countries, and the new restrictions were seen as necessary, at least in part, to guard 
against similar attempts by NCOs in Russia.  
Foreign-funded NCOs in particular were viewed as politically affiliated and threats to the 
national security and national sovereignty of the Russian Federation. For example, according to 
one official of the national security system, ―NCOs, tied to their foreign partners, are addressing 
one and only one issue on the territory of the RF: they are undermining the constitutional form of 
government and the very statehood of the RF.‖10 According to his colleague, ―American and 
British agents are carrying out their activities behind the façade of non-commercial and faith-
based organizations striving to give charitable grants to talented Russian citizens.‖11 
The governmental goal to enhance transparency and accountability of NCOs is 
legitimate, and likely complies with international standards. But the selective application of 
regulatory requirements vis-à-vis certain types of NCOs runs contrary to the standards of human 
rights established in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
and also contradicts the standards proclaimed by the Council of Europe and the Constitution of 
the RF. Moreover, such a regulatory approach is incompatible with the very spirit of democracy 
and freedom.  
III. Responses and Lessons Learned 
A. Responses  
By the time amendments to the legislation on NCOs were adopted in 2005-2006, the 
Russian Government had taken considerable steps toward creating a public-private partnership, 
which, in practice, meant creating a system of informal control over civic initiatives of ―the 
opposition NCOs‖ and engaging loyal NCOs in the system of management of the 
societal/government processes. As a consequence, the civil society community failed to take a 
consolidated stand in relation to the new legislation. Evaluation of the proposed amendments was 
critical, as a rule, but nonetheless varied from extremely pessimistic to moderately critical. The 
range of opinion depended, to a great extent, on the proximity of the NCO to the authorities and 
on the accessibility of government funding. Still, NCOs exerted considerable pressure and 
succeeded in removing the most odious and radical amendments from the draft law.  
After the law was enacted in 2006, and during its implementation, NCOs managed to 
combine their efforts around monitoring of the implementation of the law and assessment of the 
impact of the 2006 legislation. The results of the monitoring research were presented to the 
country‘s leadership. Separate assessments of the situation of civil society in Russia were 
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conducted by the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. These efforts, taken together, 
helped lead to ―untightening the screws‖ and the eventual adoption of amendments to the law, 
which became effective in August 2009.  
B. Lessons Learned 
Based on the experience of the past several years, NCOs have drawn the conclusion that 
the framework of formal institutions, such as public chambers and other forms of civil 
assemblies, are not necessarily conducive to the protection of the rights of NCOs, but rather 
serve the interests of the state in controlling civic initiatives. In light of this, it would seem more 
effective to develop informal networks and coalitions uniting NCOs for the purpose of collective 
protection and lobbying for the rights of NCOs. Moreover, there is a role for the international 
diplomatic community and local networks and coalitions may seek to draw on the support of the 
international community.  
C. What’s Next?  
Two responsive strategies have been pursued and continue to be pursued by NCOs 
operating in the Russian Federation. First, NCOs have monitored and will continue to monitor 
how the law is being applied and the impact it is having on the sector. Second, NCOs have 
promoted and will continue to promote legislative initiatives in the interests of civil society at the 
national and regional levels. 
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Restrictions on Foreign Funding of Civil Society 
Sri Lanka 
Rohan Edrisinha
1
 
 
The political and legal environment in which civil society organizations function in Sri 
Lanka has become increasingly difficult in recent years. Today there is a strong likelihood that 
legislation will be introduced to facilitate greater governmental control of nongovernmental 
organizations through various means, including tighter control of the receipt of foreign funding. 
Influential bodies within successive governments have routinely threatened the introduction of 
laws and regulations restricting foreign funding available to NGOs. The political narrative of Sri 
Lanka, however, at present suggests that the restrictions spring from political rather than 
economic motivations. 
THE PRESENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
NGOs generally seek legal incorporation through one of five laws or mechanisms: 
1. Registration under the Societies Ordinance of 1891; 
2. Registration under the Companies Act 2007;  
3. Registration under the Cooperative Societies Act of 1992; 
4. Registration under the Voluntary Social Service Organisations Act of 1980; or 
5. Legal incorporation by an Act of Parliament sponsored by a Member of Parliament 
through the mechanism of a Private Members Bill. 
Most of these laws and mechanisms set forth requirements and conditions that are 
binding on NGOs acquiring legal status under them. These include requirements relating to 
funding, the management and auditing of financial receipts, etc. This is an important point that is 
often ignored by advocates of greater regulation or control of NGOs—that there are regulatory 
procedures and mechanisms already in place. Before further restrictions are imposed to regulate 
NGOs, reasons should be adduced as to why the prevailing legal regime governing NGOs is 
found to be inadequate. One needs to consider the option that perhaps the existing laws could be 
amended to overcome deficiencies, if any. 
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT 
As stated above, recent attempts to intimidate and control NGOs are motivated by a 
complex political context that is created by a variety of factors. These include a growing 
authoritarianism in general, the tsunami of December 2004, the insecurities of the majority 
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community, and since 2005-2006, the election of a Government that essentially adopted a 
militaristic response to the island‘s civil war. 
a) Authoritarianism 
Since the early 1990s authoritarian political regimes have attempted to intimidate and 
harass prominent NGOs that were perceived to pose threats to incumbent Presidents and regimes. 
In 1990, for example, President Ranasinghe Premadasa appointed a Presidential Commission to 
investigate alleged malpractice, fraud and proselytism. It was widely accepted that the main 
motivation for the appointment of the Commission was Premadasa‘s fear of the political 
aspirations of the Sarvodaya Movement and its well-known leader, A. T. Ariyaratne. Since 2005, 
there have been several initiatives to intimidate NGOs engaged in human rights and conflict 
resolution-related activities that have challenged governmental policies. 
b) The Tsunami of 2004 
The tsunami and the massive influx of foreign assistance that was often channeled 
through international NGOs (INGOs) and local NGOs generated a greater sensitivity to the use 
and accountability of foreign funds. While some of these concerns were legitimate and raised 
valid questions as to the effective and responsible management of resources, the political groups 
that were hostile to NGOs for ideological reasons and reasons of self-interest exploited many of 
these apprehensions to further their ongoing concern to restrict the freedom of association of 
NGOs. The arrival of many groups with religious affiliations and the donation of funds by 
religious organizations from the West provided further ammunition to the argument that such 
funds were being used for ―unethical conversions,‖ particularly of Buddhists and Hindus. 
c) The Insecurities of the Majority Community 
A combination of factors – including ethnic conflict, the military success of the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) resulting in their de facto control of parts of the 
northern and eastern provinces of the island, attempts by the Governments of Sri Lanka between 
2000 and 2006 to reach a negotiated political settlement with international facilitation, and the 
growing internationalization of the island‘s ethnic conflict – generated insecurity and a defensive 
reaction on the part of the island‘s majority community, which is largely Sinhalese and Buddhist. 
This group, often referred to as a majority with a minority complex, began to view NGOs – 
which often depended on foreign funding for their activities – as agents of Western countries and 
entities that had their own political and ideological agendas that were viewed as hostile to 
indigenous values and the interests of the majority community.      
       d)  The Presidential Election 2005 
The election of Mahinda Rajapakse to the office of President in November 2005 marked 
a significant shift in the government‘s policy to the ethnic conflict, the LTTE, and the role of the 
international community. President Rajapakse depended on two small political parties for his 
electoral victory: the Janatha Vimukthi Peramna (JVP) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). 
These two parties had a disproportionate influence on and access to the new President. This, 
together with a growing frustration with what was seen as a maximalist and intransigent LTTE 
on the part of many Sri Lankans and members of the international community, enabled the 
Rajapakse government to adopt a more hawkish and militarist response to the LTTE. The 
Government intensified the war effort employing strong military offensives that often violated 
international humanitarian legal norms, leading to bloody conflict and large-scale loss of lives. 
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Finally, in May 2009, the Government defeated the LTTE and brought the whole country under 
its effective control. 
The political factors outlined above all contributed to a significant shift in the attitude of 
the government to NGOs and their freedom and autonomy. NGOs that had been at the forefront 
of campaigns for constitutional reform, conflict resolution through negotiation and political 
accommodation, media freedom, and human rights, by and large, worked closely with the 
Kumaratunga Administrations from 1994 to 2005.  Though there were strains at various times, 
there was mutual self-interest and a similarity of broad goals on the part of government and such 
NGOs. The election of the Rajapakse Administration, with the presence of the two small ultra-
nationalist parties, created a sharp divide between the government and the groups of NGOs 
described above. 
DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1994-2005 
Despite the relatively positive relations that existed between NGOs and civil society 
groups on the one hand, and the government on the other, various legislative and regulatory 
changes were introduced during this period that weakened the freedom and autonomy of NGOs. 
a) Introduction of the Voluntary Social Service Organisations (Amendment) Bill 1998. 
This Amendment Bill was introduced to the Voluntary Social Services Act (VSSA) of 
1980 in extraordinary circumstances. Civil society groups lobbied successfully against the 
Amendment and received assurances from the Minister of Social Services that it would not be 
enacted. However, the Amendment remained on the Order Paper of Parliament. On a chaotic day 
when the Opposition had walked out of Parliament, the Government enacted all the Bills listed 
on the Order Paper, including the VSSA Amendment Bill. The Bill provided that where a Board 
of Inquiry appointed by the Minister reports that ―there is evidence to support an allegation of 
fraud or misappropriation against a voluntary association,‖ the Minister may appoint an interim 
board of management in place of the existing board of directors of the association. The Centre 
for Policy Alternatives and several civil society activists challenged the constitutionality of the 
Amendment on the grounds that it violated the freedom of association. But the legal challenge 
was dismissed at a preliminary stage on the basis that the Sri Lankan Constitution prohibited 
judicial review of legislation. 
b) Introduction of Registration and Supervisory Requirements 
Various regulations were promulgated in 1999, including a series through Gazette 
Notification No. 1101/14 of 15 October 1999, in which various requirements with respect to 
financial management and administration of NGOs registered under the Voluntary Services Act 
were introduced. There was uncertainty as to whether these regulations applied to all NGOs, 
including those not registered with the NGO Secretariat under the Voluntary Social Service 
Organisations Act. Since the Act refers to NGOs as those associations engaged primarily in 
social service activities, many NGOs engaged in research and advocacy work on issues such as 
governance and human rights took the view that these new requirements did not necessarily 
apply to them. 
 Soon after the tsunami of December 2004, various additional regulations were introduced 
as a prerequisite for registration with the NGO Secretariat. There were requirements that a local 
NGO must have a minimum of Rs 10 million while an INGO should have a minimum of US $1 
million. After approval by the Secretariat, the application is forwarded to the Ministries of 
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Defence and Finance for final approval.  At the implementation stage too, various government 
officers in the districts exercise coordination with and supervisory functions over NGOs engaged 
in activities that are primarily socioeconomic in nature. 
c) Introduction of Tax on Foreign Funding Received by NGOs 
One of the proposals in the Appropriation Bill or Budget for 2005 was the introduction of 
a tax on foreign funding received by certain NGOs.  The Inland Revenue (Amendment) Act of 
2005 provided that 3% of the aggregate amount that was received by an NGO would be deemed 
the profit and income subject to tax. Here too the definition of NGO in the Act indicated that the 
provisions of the Act would apply to NGOs in the socioeconomic sector. An additional 
controversial feature of the new law was that it gave the Minister of Finance the power to enable 
the Commissioner General of Inland Revenue to reduce or remove entirely such tax in certain 
circumstances.  
 The justification offered by the Government for the introduction of the tax was confused. 
An official from the Inland Revenue Department who was interviewed stated that the 
justification was the need to regulate NGOs and the concern with inadequate regulation of 
NGOs.    
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2006 
a) Continuation of Tax on Foreign Funding. 
The Inland Revenue Act, 2006 (as amended in 2007 and 2008) basically continued the 
policy of taxation described above. 
b) Appointment of a Select Committee of Parliament to Investigate NGOs 
A motion was made by Nandana Gunatileke, a JVP MP, in August 2005 to appoint a 
Select Committee of Parliament to investigate the financial management and accountability of 
NGOs that received foreign funding, and the impact of NGO activities on the sovereignty and the 
territorial integrity of the country. The committee was appointed on 17 January 2006 under the 
chairmanship of Mr. Gunatileke. 
Though the number of members on the Committee was increased from 19 to 26, it was 
clear that the representatives of the mainstream political parties were not very interested in the 
Committee‘s proceedings. The leadership and initiative came from the JVP and the JHU – the 
Sinhalese Nationalist parties that wielded considerable influence in the new Rajapakse 
Government. The Committee focused its attention on a few NGOs that had played an active role 
in supporting the Norwegian facilitated peace process that took place between 2000 and 2005. 
Apart from requiring these and other NGOs to furnish the Committee with large volumes of 
materials, including records, organizational details, accounts, reports, publications, and details 
about staff, some organizations were summoned before the Committee and questioned, often in 
the presence of media personnel sympathetic to the politicians providing leadership to the 
Committee. 
One of the striking features of the report of the select Committee was that it seemed to 
lack appreciation of the scope of freedom of association and speech and expression in a 
democratic society. The Committee was critical of NGOs that advocated federalism on the basis 
that the President had been elected in November 2005 on a platform that promised to preserve 
the unitary character of the Constitution, and that the NGOs were acting in a manner 
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―contradictory to the mandate given by the people of the country.‖ Furthermore, many NGOs 
working in conflict affected areas were censured for engaging in activities prejudicial to national 
security. 
The Committee proposed a comprehensive new legal framework for the regulation and 
supervision of NGOs and the repeal of most of the existing legislation. It proposed the 
establishment of a NGO Commission to monitor and supervise NGOs. The Committee also 
proposed restrictions on the grant of visas to foreign staff, the creation of a National NGO Fund 
to assist NGOs that render a service to society, created inter alia, by receipts from a percentage 
of funds received by NGOs.  
A Draft Bill on NGOs has been prepared. As is the practice in Sri Lanka, this draft is not 
accessible to the public. The Bill has been prepared with little or no discussion with relevant 
stakeholders and therefore it is not clear how many of the Select Committee‘s recommendations 
have been incorporated.  
c) A Sustained Attack on NGOs in State Media 
The appointment of the Select Committee of Parliament to investigate NGOs was 
accompanied by a sustained and aggressive series of attacks on prominent NGOs and their 
leadership. The Sinhalese nationalist leaders who were influential in the Rajapakse Government 
led the attacks which received widespread publicity in the state media and elements of the 
private media that were sympathetic to the Sinhalese Nationalist position.  
The NGOs working in the areas of governance, human rights, and conflict resolution 
were the main targets. The main criticisms leveled against them were that they were engaging in 
activities prejudicial to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country; promoting a pro-
Western, Judeo-Christian, and hence alien agenda; supporting Tamil separatism; and acting as 
traitors by making it difficult for the government to wage an effective war against terrorism. 
NGOs and their leaders were accused of being traitors if they advocated federalism or a 
negotiated settlement to the ethnic conflict or respect for international humanitarian law and 
human rights.    
CONCLUSION 
The challenges faced by NGOs with respect to their freedom and autonomy are more 
political than legal or regulatory. While the existing legal and regulatory regime has become 
more repressive in recent years, restrictions have been directed primarily at NGOs engaged in 
developmental work with a socioeconomic focus. Loopholes in the law such as the definition of 
NGOs have enabled NGOs in the areas of human rights, governance, and conflict resolution to 
operate reasonably freely. The threats that these organizations have faced in recent years have 
been of an extra-legal nature. This dangerous development, coupled with the decline of the rule 
of law in the country, has made this period a particularly difficult one for these NGOs as well. 
What promises to be a comprehensive Bill which deals with NGO regulation and which 
consolidates and ―improves‖ the existing law seems to be in an advanced stage of preparation 
and could be presented in Parliament soon. It may be possible to challenge the Bill on the 
grounds of incompatibility with fundamental rights and freedoms. However, the politicization of 
the judiciary in recent years and its conservative approach to constitutional interpretation and 
deference to the legislature suggest that one cannot have too much confidence in the 
Constitutional Court (Supreme Court) of the country. 
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 While there needs to be a robust defense of the freedom of association of NGOs in the 
political and legal arenas, there must also be a campaign to challenge the governmental discourse 
on sovereignty, which is essentially a statist as opposed to a people-based discourse; and a 
reaffirmation of the universalist and international dimensions of human rights and 
constitutionalism while also relating such concepts to local culture, religion, and history. NGOs 
should also demonstrate willingness to have reasonable and effective regulation that promotes 
accountability, transparency, and responsibility while preserving autonomy, which is not easy to 
achieve in a society that has become increasingly politicized as a result of the decline in 
independent institutions. Recent political trends suggest that the campaign to discredit and 
control NGOs will intensify both through legal and extra-legal means.  
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Restrictions on Foreign Funding of Civil Society 
Venezuela 
Marcos Carrillo
1
 
 
Introduction 
 In order to understand the reality of the legal restrictions on foreign funding affecting 
civil society organizations in Venezuela, it is necessary to study not only the already enacted 
legislation but also the Draft Law on International Cooperation (hereinafter, ―ICL‖) that could be 
enacted in 2010, which reflects not only the Government‘s intentions but also the government 
practice towards CSOs over the past few years. 
I. Types of Restrictions on Foreign Funding 
 
A. Prohibitions Against Foreign Funding 
Current legislation: Currently there are no direct legal restrictions targeting donors or 
recipients of foreign funding. Nonetheless, Venezuela is under an exchange control regime that 
indirectly may affect foreign funding. Thus, any cooperation must be accomplished in 
Venezuela‘s local currency, Bolívares.  
The ICL draft, however, establishes restrictions targeting foreign funding. Indeed, the 
object of the law is to determine the legal regime for international cooperation. (Article 1) The 
ICL applies to all activities carried out in the framework of international cooperation, including 
the reception, transfer, and interchange of goods, services, assets, public and private resources, 
human, financial, and economic matters, from other countries toward Venezuela and from 
Venezuela to other countries. (Article 2) Relevant restrictions include the following: 
 Article 18 of the ICL draft makes NGO ―inscription in the Integrated Registry System [created 
by this same law] a prerequisite for proper recognition by the State to engage in international 
cooperation activities with counterparts in other countries.‖ If the ICL is enacted, inscription in 
the Integrated Registry System would also be required to access the fiscal incentives 
contemplated in Venezuelan tax regulations. (Currently, it is not necessary for CSOs to be 
registered before a governmental body created specifically to control CSOs; CSOs must only be 
registered in the public registry like any other legal entity.) 
 In accordance with the first transitional regulation of the ICL draft, in the six months 
following the publication of the ICL, organizations that engage in any activities related to 
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international cooperation must adjust their operational guidelines to those established by 
and emanating from the decentralized Institution in Charge of International Cooperation.  
 Article 6 if the ICL subordinates the areas of international cooperation ―preferable to 
those established in the National Plan for Development.‖ Hence, the areas of international 
cooperation will be determined by the National Plan.  
 Article 7 establishes the priorities of international cooperation, which must be related to 
―energy, educational, cultural, scientific, technological, social, economic, financial, 
environmental, commercial, sporting and criminal matters, as well as support for 
emergency situations.‖ It is important to stress that among these priorities the promotion, 
protection, or defense of human rights is not included. Hence, foreign funding for these 
areas is clearly restricted.  
Barriers can also appear through unwritten government practices. They have included ―de 
facto‖ prohibitions to register new human rights NGOs or to register changes in their charters. 
Also, cases of direct governmental retaliation and prosecution against members of NPOs that 
exercise the right of freedom of speech or advocacy have been reported. The ICL could give the 
Government clear and direct legal support for such conduct. 
B. Advance Government Approval 
Current legislation: Apart from the exchange control restrictions, which are applicable 
not only to CSOs but to every legal or natural person, government approval is not required to 
engage in international cooperation. There have been cases, however, of human rights CSOs 
whose registration has been obstructed by unwritten government practice. 
ICL draft: Article 3 defines international cooperation as ―all the range of actions, 
activities and procedures, conducted by countries, international organizations, NGOs and other 
types of organizations that engage in activities related to international cooperation, destined to 
transfer resources and capacity to support social, human and economical development. In this 
sense international cooperation is the means by which the Venezuelan State receives and 
transfers human resources, goods, assets, services and technology, with the objective of 
complementing and contributing to development efforts.‖ Article 10 establishes that ―…the 
President will be able to create a decentralized institution which will be in charge of organizing, 
directing, controlling, coordinating and evaluating all activities related to international 
cooperation of which the Venezuelan State is part.‖ Reading these two norms together, it can be 
concluded that not only government approval will be necessary but also there will be complete 
control of the Government over any aspect of IC. 
C. Penalties for Receipt of Foreign Funds without Official Permission 
Current legislation:  
The Ley de Ilicitos Cambiarios (Illicit Currency Exchange Law) establishes penalties for 
any legal person – including a CSO – that violates exchange control laws. Activities considered 
to violate the Illicit Currency Exchange Law include the purchase or sale, or any conduct that 
implies receiving or granting, any foreign currency in any amount surpassing 10,000 USD 
carried out without Banco Central de Venezuela (Venezuelan Central Bank) intervention. Such 
conduct is subject to a penalty consisting of payment in Bolivars of the amount equivalent to 
twice the amount of the operation that is being sanctioned. If this amount surpasses 20,000 USD 
or its equivalent in any other currency, the sanction will involve a prison sentence for 
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 12, no. 3, May 2010 / 43 
 
a period of between two and six years, plus a fine amounting to twice the quantity of the 
operation that is being sanctioned.
2
 
Where a CSO needs to buy foreign currency, and fails to declare the received foreign 
currency, or declares it in a period other than that which is permitted by law, the CSO will be 
subject to a fine. If the person or entity then fails to prove the legality of the exchange, CADIVI 
(the governmental body, within the Ministry of Finance, that is in charge of the exchange control 
regime) is entitled to confiscate the monies received in a suspicious or presumably illegal way.  
In case a CSO requires foreign currency, it must file a request at CADIVI. Those who fail 
to use granted money for the alleged purposes will be considered to deviate or improperly use 
the assigned money and will also be subject to a fine consisting of the payment of twice the 
amount of the operation, activity, or conduct that is being sanctioned.  
It must be observed that Ley Orgánica Contra la Delincuencia Organizada (Organic 
Law Against Organized Crime) does not limit or define the meaning of ―illicit activities,‖ giving 
an ample margin of discretion to the governmental authorities to define what an illicit activity 
may be. 
In 2004 two members of the NGO Súmate were prosecuted for receiving international aid 
from the National Endowment for Democracy (a U.S.-based organization), which was allegedly 
conspiring against the State‘s integrity. The prosecution was based on the following: 
 Article 128 of the Criminal Code states that whoever in complicity with a foreign nation 
or with external enemies, conspires against the State‘s integrity or institutions, or 
whoever by whatever means commits a hostile act, will be sanctioned with imprisonment 
for a period that ranges from 20 to 30 years.  
 Article 129 of the Criminal Code states that whoever, inside or outside Venezuela, 
attempts to threaten the country‘s independence or its geographical integrity will be 
punished with imprisonment for a period that can range from 20 to 26 years. This 
sanction will also apply to whoever requests by any means the intervention of a foreign 
government to overthrow the Venezuelan Government. 
 Finally, Article 132 of the Criminal Code states that anyone who, inside or outside the 
national territory, conspires to destroy the country‘s republican form of government, will 
be sanctioned with imprisonment for a period ranging from 8 to 16 years. This sanction 
will also be applied to those who request international intervention in Venezuelan internal 
affairs, or to those who through advertisement in the media encourage a civil war or 
defame the President or any diplomatic or consular officials with regard to the carrying 
out of their functions in the country in which the defamation is committed. 
ICL draft: As stated above, Article 18 of the ICL draft establishes that NGO inscription in 
the Integrated Registry System (established in this same law) is mandatory and is a condition for 
the Venezuelan State to grant NGOs recognition as entities entitled to engage 
in international cooperation activities with counterparts in other countries, and also a necessary 
condition to access the tax incentive program contemplated in Venezuelan tax regulations. 
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Although the ICL draft does not establish a penalty, general criminal law could be applied to the 
failure to comply, as explained in the preceding paragraphs.  
D. Routing Funding through Government 
Current Law: Under current law, there is no requirement to route funding through 
government ministries or through a designated fund. Due to exchange control, of course, 
everything related to foreign currency has to be supervised by Venezuela‘s Central Bank (Banco 
Central de Venezuela). 
ICL draft: Article 3 of the ICL draft defines international cooperation as a means by 
which the Venezuelan State receives transfers and exchanges human resources, property, assets, 
services, and technology from cooperative sources either internal or external, with the objective 
of complementing and contributing with national efforts in development matters. Based on this 
definition, it can be concluded that the State is the only subject of international cooperation.  
That said, Article 10 of the ICL draft establishes that regardless of the functions assigned 
to other ministries, the President will be able to create a decentralized institution that will be 
dependent on the ministry with competence in international cooperation (which is not specified 
in the draft and therefore will be appointed discretionally by the President), which will 
have administrative and financial autonomy and will be in charge of executing and supporting 
policies, plans, programs, and projects related to international cooperation carried out 
by the State, through lending and administering resources that are destined to activities related to 
international cooperation. This institution will also be in charge of developing activities related 
to the organization, direction, control, coordination, follow-up, and evaluation of everything 
related to International Cooperation in which the Venezuelan state is a part. Hence, it can be 
concluded that not only will government approval be necessary but also there will be a complete 
control by the government over any aspect of IC, all of this in accordance 
with Presidential orders. The funds coming from international cooperation would have to be 
directed through this entity. 
Likewise, Article 13 of the ICL draft establishes that the Fund for International 
Cooperation and Assistance will count on resources from legacies, donations, and other assets 
received by the State from other governments, international organizations, and other 
institutions that are destined to support cooperation. This Fund will also be integrated by all other 
assets and resources received in accordance to the law.  
E. Mandatory Coordination of CSO Activities with Government Agencies 
Current Law: Currently there is no mandatory coordination of CSO activities with 
government agencies. 
ICL draft: Article 8 of the draft ICL is clear about this issue, stating that ―International 
Cooperation policies, as an expression of the States‘ foreign policy, will aim at coordinating and 
integrating efforts among international organizations, NGOs, both national and international, and 
all institutions, organizations, foundations or not-for-profit organizations, whether public or 
private, and civil society; with the common goal of incentivizing human development, social 
justice and social welfare.‖ 
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F. Taxation on Foreign Funds 
Current Law: The current ICL (1958)
3
 establishes conditions that are favorable for CSOs 
and NGOs receiving funds from Venezuela as well as from abroad. 
 ICL draft: In order to have access to tax exemptions or incentives, registration at a special 
designated governmental registry will be necessary under Article 18 of the ICL draft. 
II. Early Warning Signals for the Legal Restriction 
In 2000 the Minister of Internal Affairs and Justice, Luis Miquelena, challenged the 
legitimacy of CSOs in an act that signaled a turning point in the relations between the National 
Government and CSOs. The case happened as follows: The Venezuelan Constitution establishes 
that three of the members of the Consejo Nacional Electoral – CNE – (National Electoral 
Council) must be nominated by civil society. When certain well-known members of civil society 
were nominated, the Minister challenged their legitimacy, alleging that their organizations did 
not elect them. Thus, the Government bypassed the Constitutional order and appointed people 
unrelated to civil society organizations. 
Also in 2000 the Tribunal Supremo de Justicia – Supreme Court of Justice – issued three 
decisions related to CSOs:  
 Defensoría del Pueblo vs. Comisión Legislativa Nacional 30-6-00; 
 Veedores de la UCAB vs. CNE 23-8-00; 
 William Dávila y otros vs. Ministro de Finanzas. 21-11-00. 
 
The decisions set forth a restrictive view of civil society, according to which the foundation of 
civil society must be national security, in accordance with Article 326 of the Venezuelan 
Constitution. In relation to foreign funding one of the decisions (William Dávila) established that 
―[T]he Civil Society recognized by the Constitution is the Venezuelan Civil Society .… Thus, as 
national associations, the CSO representatives can be neither foreigners nor organizations 
directed, affiliated, funded, financed or supported, directly or indirectly by states, movements or 
groups influenced either by other states or by international associations, groups or movements 
with political or economic aims for their own benefit.‖4 
In 2004 the General Prosecutor prosecuted two members of the NGO Súmate (María 
Corina Machado and Alejandro Plaz), accusing them of receiving international aid from an 
international organization that was conspiring against the State‘s integrity.  
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Ministro de Finanzas Sala Constitucional del 21-11-00.  
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In 2006, the first draft of the ICL appeared, without previous consultations with CSOs, 
and was approved in the first discussion by the National Assembly. During the period 2006-2009 
there have been recurring references by Congressmen to the necessity of controlling CSOs.  
III. Impact of the Legal Restriction 
The Draft ICL has been approved in the first of two National Assembly discussions and it 
will officially enter into force when approved in the second discussion, which could happen in 
2010. 
As of 2010, there is a marked tendency toward government centralization in Venezuela. 
There have been laws passed directed at subordinating States and municipalities to the National 
Government.
5
 Specifically, state and municipal authority in areas of work related to health, 
education, and security have been reduced and turned over to the National Government. This 
tendency toward centralization, although not directly targeting NGOs, may very well affect the 
available resources for their funding. In fact, if the Executive Branch increases control over these 
resources, the states and municipalities will have less budget capacity for NGO funding, which 
ultimately will diminish the diversity and independence of funding for NGOs.  
IV. Justifications 
 
1. Stated Justifications 
The sponsor of the ICL was the National Assembly, specifically the Commission on 
Foreign Affairs. 
The official Government justifications include the following:  
 Official government documents and declarations have stated that the Draft ICL is aimed 
at ―protecting national sovereignty and the Latin American identity as a means of 
bringing welfare and dignity to all persons that have been excluded or affected as 
a consequence of the foreign imposition of an unfair and exclusive liberal policy model.‖6 
 NGOs must be accountable to the State. 7 
 The Government must control NGOs just as it does any other legal persons.8  
 
Nevertheless, no other legal persons are subjected to double registration or subordinated to 
Government policies unless they need special permission for certain activities, such as acquiring 
foreign currency at preferential rates (due to the exchange control regime), import or export of 
merchandise, contracting with the State, and dealing with particular substances, amongst others. 
In these cases legal persons must be also registered before the competent office. 
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7
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2009. 
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2. Underlying Motivations 
The ICL has been framed in a political context that seeks to restrict citizen‘s rights and 
liberties. The ICL draft is based on a theoretical conception that inverts the natural relations 
between the State and its citizens, by promoting citizen submission to governmental will. 
According to the justifications of the ICL given by Congressmen, a further motivation for this 
statute is the desire to limit foreign influence in domestic affairs. To appeal to the nation‘s 
sovereignty is one of the most commonly used arguments to restrict rights in Venezuela today. 
Consider the following statements:  
 ―Lots of them [CSOs] receive money from the National Endowment for Democracy and 
other institutions linked with the CIA to carry out conspiratorial activities.‖ –Saúl Ortega, 
former President of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the National Assembly. 
 ―Organized groups – from civil society – must avoid promoting terrorism or getting 
involved with drug traffic.‖—Saúl Ortega, former President of the Foreign Affairs 
Commission of the National Assembly, June 1, 2006. 
 ―The ICL will establish control of CSOs‘ funding.‖—Roy Daza, current President of the 
Foreign Affairs Commission of the National Assembly, May 12, 2009. 
 ―From a political point of view it is always important to control international 
cooperation….‖—Roy Daza, President of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the 
National Assembly, May 6, 2009. 
 ―We cannot accept that lackey and obsequious organizations, that attend different 
interests from those of the State, distort the meaning of the law.‖—Congressman Carlos 
Escarrá, April 17, 2009. 
 ―Of course we are going to control NGOs, because that is what the Venezuelan people 
want. Here we have to control the activities of a group of organizations, hidden behind an 
NGO and human rights defenders façade, that receive funds from the USA for political 
aims and to conspire against the Venezuelan Government.‖—Declarations given by Iris 
Varela, Venezuelan Congresswoman, April 17, 2009. 
 
3. Evaluation of the Justification 
The ICL is contrary to what is established in the Venezuelan Constitution regarding the 
freedom of association, since the Constitution recognizes not only that ―every person has the 
right to associate with lawful ends in conformity with the law,‖9 but also that ―the State is 
obliged to facilitate and permit the exercising of the right of freedom of association.‖10 In other 
words, it is a Constitutional mandate that all laws drafted must promote the exercise of rights 
such as freedom of association and under no pretext act in breach of the Constitution. 
Specifically, the ICL would violate the constitutional right to freedom of association, in that it 
would oblige NGOs to register with the Integrated System Registry as a condition for the State to 
grant NGOs proper recognition as entities entitled to engage in international cooperation 
activities with their counterparts in other countries (and as a condition to access the tax 
incentives contemplated in Venezuelan tax regulations).  
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 See Article 52 of the Venezuelan Constitution. 
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In order to challenge the ICL, the following legal or policy or factual arguments might be 
available:  
 Article 52 of the Venezuelan Constitution establishes the human right of freedom of 
association in the following terms: ―Everyone has the right to associate with licit ends, in 
conformity with the law. The State will be obliged to facilitate the exercise of this right‖ 
(emphasis added). It is worth noting that the previous constitution did not include the 
latter State obligation.
11
  
 Under the Venezuelan Constitution, government regulation, under normal circumstances, 
must seek to promote or foster CSOs, rather than to control them through State actions.
12
  
 In addition, the ICL also violates or threatens basic rights of the Venezuelan Constitution, 
such as the right to meet publicly or privately, without obtaining permission in advance, 
for lawful purposes and without weapons;
13
 the right to express freely one‘s thoughts, 
ideas or opinions without censorship;
14
 the right to freedom of conscience;
15
 and the right 
of association for political purposes, through democratic methods of organization, 
operation, and direction.
16
 
 The ICL also may violate rules established in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
o Article 22.1 states that ―Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association 
with others.…‖ Furthermore, Article 22.2 states that ―No restrictions may be 
placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law 
and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public 
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.‖  
o The mandatory and duplicative registration envisioned by Articles 17, 18, and 20 
of the ICL is a restriction that probably does not meet the standards of Article 22 
of the ICCPR. 
o The ICL would establish the Fund for International Cooperation and Assistance, 
which would receive and channel all the international cooperation received by 
Venezuelan NGOs; this requirement also would probably amount to a limitation 
that violates Article 22 of the ICCPR.  
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 The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) also protects the right of freedom 
of association and other rights. 
o Article 16 of the ACHR protects the right of freedom of association. According to 
Article 16, the right of freedom of association ―shall be subject only to such 
restrictions established by law as may be necessary in a democratic society, in the 
interest of national security, public safety or public order, or to protect public 
health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.‖ The ICL does not respect 
these standards. 
o Article 3 of the ICL runs counter to Article 13 of the ACHR. Article 3 regulates 
the transfer of ―resources and skills‖ to support development, whereas Article 13 
of the ACHR explicitly includes the right ―to seek, receive an impart information 
and ideas of all kinds.‖ 
V.  Responses and Lessons Learned 
 
1. Responses  
(a) Participation in the Drafting Process 
It is both a constitutional right and an obligation for the National Assembly to include 
civil society participation in the discussion of draft laws (Article 211 of the Constitution). In 
2006, both a representation of universities and a representation of NGOs requested to have 
formal meetings with the Commission of International Affairs of the National Assembly. The 
university group was formally received by the President of the Commission and a group of 
advisors, but the meeting with the NGOs was suspended. None of the suggestions made either by 
the universities or the NGOs have been included in the draft law so far. 
(b) Collective Response of CSOs 
CSOs responded by rejecting the draft law, and supported their arguments on 
constitutional law and human rights grounds. The position taken by CSOs was to reject the draft 
law firmly, yet to seek to build bridges with the National Assembly in order to suggest changes. 
CSOs adopted a strategy along four lines: 
1. A media campaign; 
2. A campaign directly addressed to NGOs‘ beneficiaries; and 
3. Lobbying international donors. Communication with Congressmen from the 
Government party has been virtually impossible. 
4. Drafting an alternative statute and eventually propose its discussion by the National 
Assembly. 
(c) Response of International Community 
A group of important donor country representatives have met several times with 
representatives of CSOs in order to coordinate responsive action. Donor representatives have 
played a very important role in lobbying the Government; the lobbying efforts have been very 
effective, since they have helped to delay the promulgation of the draft law. European countries 
in particular have made an important effort. The Venezuelan Government is very concerned with 
maintaining a good international image.  
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The Inter-American Commission for Human Rights, in its 2006 report on the Situation of 
the Defense of Human Rights Activists in the Americas, urged States to refrain from promoting 
laws and policies relating to the registration of human right organizations that use vague or 
imprecise definitions, as this restricts their establishment and operation. The Commission also 
urged States to refrain from restricting the financing of human rights organizations; 
States should permit and facilitate CSOs to access foreign funds, in the context 
of international cooperation in transparent conditions.
17
 Its 2010 report on Venezuela evaluates 
in detail the situation of Human Rights in general and of freedom of association in particular. 
Amnesty International also made comments referring to the draft ICL and said that 
Venezuelan authorities should ensure that the draft law complies with international law relating 
to human rights that guarantees the right to defend human rights, freedom of association, and 
freedom and expression.
18
 
2. Lessons Learned 
In order to confront unjust laws and actions towards CSOs by strong governments, it is 
important for CSOs to: 
(1) Be organized; 
(2) Solidify CSOs national and international networks; 
(3) Promote cooperation among CSOs; 
(4) Have a clear, solid, and insistent media strategy; 
(5) Lobby international donors and organizations as well as the Government (if possible); 
and 
(6) Strengthen links between beneficiaries and CSOs. 
3. What Next?  
The most recent official information about the status of the draft ICL was given on 
October 7, 2009, by the President of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the National Assembly, 
Mr. Roy Daza, in a radio interview. He said that they were going to discuss and approve the ICL 
soon, but did not specify a date. The priority at the present time is to discuss and approve the 
Foreign Service Act. Informal sources insist that the ICL could be approved before the end of 
2010. 
Some activities have proven effective in challenging the ICL and should be carried out in 
the future as well. For example: 
 A group of NGOs has developed a national and international lobbying campaign in order 
to raise awareness of the consequences of the ICL. This campaign has been effective and 
must continue and be strengthened so it can reach a greater number of organizations and 
countries.  
                                                 
17
 Taken from http://www.aiven.org/profiles/blogs/la-propuesta-de-ley-sobre.  
18
 Taken from http://www.aiven.org/profiles/blogs/la-propuesta-de-ley-sobre.  
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 In addition, several seminars have been staged in the countryside and in the capital in 
order to inform not only NGOs but also NGO beneficiaries of the consequences of the 
ICL. 
 Highly qualified professionals in different spheres must closely monitor this issue. 
 It is necessary to strengthen NGOs and coordinate actions among NGOs. 
 It is important to engage other segments of civil society, including pressure groups, 
syndicates, associations, churches, etc. 
Eventually, if the law is ultimately passed, responsive strategies may include:  
 Challenging the ICL as unconstitutional before the Constitutional Chamber of the 
Tribunal Supremo de Justicia; and 
 Challenging the ICL before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, since the 
Judiciary in Venezuela is clearly biased in favor of the Government. 
Finally, CSOs should promote and inform about forms of self-regulation, encouraging 
transparency and accountability.  
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Maintaining Firm Control: 
Recent Developments in Nonprofit Law and Regulation  
in Vietnam 
 
Mark Sidel
1
 
 
 
Introduction 
Vietnam remains committed to controlling the development of a nonprofit sector while 
gradually, and carefully, enabling some nonpolitical, service-oriented, charitable and research 
groups to carry out work that serves the interests of both citizens and the state. In recent years, 
the Vietnamese Party and government have pursued these policy goals through measures taken 
by government and security authorities, and by key decisions on the regulatory environment for 
the nonprofit sector.  
This commentary outlines the key developments in nonprofit regulation in Vietnam over 
the past several years, particularly since a major debate on a Law on Associations ended in 2006 
with a decision by Party and government officials to block adoption of the Law while continuing 
strict control and management of the emerging Vietnamese nonprofit community.  
  In recent years, Vietnam‘s diversifying voluntary sector has expanded to fulfill social 
needs from which the Vietnamese state is retreating and to play some research and advocacy 
roles in Vietnamese society. The emerging voluntary sector, broadly defined, now includes 
Party-related mass organizations, business, trade and professional associations, policy research 
groups, social activist and social service groups, religious groups, clans, charities, private and 
semi-private universities, social and charitable funds, and other institutions. 
  The state has sought to control and to encourage the growth of social organizations, at 
least partly to compensate for the inability of the state to keep pace with social needs in the 
reform period. At the same time, the state retains management and control over the sector at a 
level more detailed and specific than in many other countries, with special attention to a small 
number of organizations that are perceived to be potential political challenges or to harbor those 
who might emerge as potential challengers in political or policy terms. For the vast majority of 
the thousands of formal and informal organizations now active throughout the country, the 
Vietnamese state generally acquiesces in and even encourages their day-to-day activities, while 
retaining a detailed regulatory structure and making clear that the state and Party remain in 
control of the pace and direction of growth in nonprofit activity. 
                                                 
1
 Professor of Law, Faculty Scholar, and Lauridsen Family Fellow, University of Iowa; President, 
International Society for Third Sector Research (ISTR). I welcome comments on this paper and can be reached at 
mark-sidel@uiowa.edu. My thanks to a number of friends and colleagues in Vietnam for discussions on the themes 
addressed here, and to ICNL for commissioning the paper on which this commentary is based. While writing this I 
have served as consultant to the United Nations Development Programme (Vietnam) and the Vietnamese Ministry 
of Justice, but this paper reflects only my own views and not those of any institution or individual other than myself. 
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During Vietnam‘s reform period that began in 1986, Party and government regulation of 
social organizations remained governed by regulatory documents enacted in 1957, during a 
period of strict control by the Party and state. Those 1957 regulations on associations severely 
limited rights to assemble and the ability of civic organizations to form, and the regulations 
adopted in the decades that followed continued that policy. Throughout this period the Party and 
state made special efforts to control groups that were perceived as potential political threats. In 
the early 1990s one such example was a veterans group called the Club of Former Resistance 
Fighters, which demanded better conditions for veterans and began to take their demands into the 
political realm. The key methods of control from the 1950s to the 1990s – and continuing to this 
day – have been the long and difficult processes of approval to establish a social organization or 
association, and the continuing control and supervision of organizations that have been approved 
for establishment. 
There were some counter-tendencies as well, toward greater flexibility, generally for 
groups that the Party and state had to give more flexibility to. In 1992, for example, the then-
relatively liberal Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment was permitted to open a 
more flexible regulatory window for some research groups to seek a fully legalized, formal, 
state-recognized, and registered status. A number of urban voluntary organizations, including 
some of the most important policy research, social service, and social activist organizations then 
operating, were able to legalize under the 1992 Science and Technology Regulations and their 
successor, Decree 81 which now provides a protective regulatory umbrella for hundreds of 
science and technology research NGOs to exist.  
Economic and social organizations, social and charitable foundations (funds), and other 
voluntary groups were also formally recognized as legal entities in the 1995 Civil Code. And in 
1999 the government adopted a decree on social and charity funds that cautiously encouraged 
private charitable funding while maintaining strict state control over their formation and 
operations, using the traditional mechanism of dual control by a government management 
agency and by a government ministry or agency working in the particular substantive field of the 
fund (such as health or education).  
  Efforts to draft a national Law on Associations – a legislative topic of intense interest 
both to those who wanted to control the sector and those who wanted to facilitate it – began in 
the early 1990s, to replace the highly restrictive 1957 regulations on associations. Those efforts 
continued in various stages for nearly fifteen years, until a major debate erupted over the Law on 
Associations in 2005 and 2006 that provides the backdrop to recent developments in nonprofit 
law in Vietnam. 
I.  The 2003 Decree on the Organization, Operation and Management of Associations 
and Implementing Regulations (Decree 88) 
  In 2003, the Vietnamese government promulgated new, detailed regulations governing 
the formation and operations of associations and related groups. Since 2003, Decree 88 has 
served as the guiding regulatory document for nonprofits in Vietnam, supplanted only in April 
2010 by a revision of Decree 88, now called Decree 45, that maintained firm control over the 
registration, monitoring, and operation of associational groups while tweaking the regulatory 
framework and providing some special privileges for a small number of large, state-affiliated 
umbrella groups. The new Decree 45 is discussed further below.  
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  Decree 88, in force from mid-2003 to July 2010, both restricts and facilitates 
associational activity with an emphasis on control. Vietnamese associational experience with 
Decree 88 helped to fuel growing conflict between the control orientation of the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, which is responsible for management of the sector, and the increasing efforts of 
national associations to maintain distance from government ministries. The 2003 Decree on 
Associations, like earlier regulation, explicitly excluded the mass organizations under the Party 
from its scope. These organizations – the Vietnam Fatherland Front, Labor Confederation, Ho 
Chi Minh Communist Youth League, Vietnam Peasants Association, Vietnam War Veterans 
Association, and the Vietnam Women‘s Union – have long been governed directly by the Party 
through their own statutes.  
  The 2003 Decree provided long and complex processes for organizational formation 
(thereby discouraging most organizations from forming); broad prohibition clauses barring a 
wide range of activities and maintaining exceptionally wide Party and government discretion 
over associations; highly detailed organizational requirements; approvals needed for a wide 
range of organizational changes, including board and staff; restrictions on branches and on bank 
accounts; and, in some ways most important, retention of the tradition ―dual management‖ 
system of associational governance by the state. The 2003 Decree also presaged a controversy 
over the scope that associations have to comment on Party and state policies, providing that 
associations may provide ―advice and criticism on matters within the association‘s scope of 
activities.‖  
  In short, the 2003 Decree on Associations was a document for retained state control. In 
response to demands from associations and legal drafters, the 2003 Decree also included 
provisions for time limits on state discretion in certain stages of the formation process. Since its 
adoption, Decree 88 has been regarded by the Vietnamese associational sector as overly 
restrictive to the sector, preventing a range of organizations from registering and expanding their 
operations through maintenance of a highly detailed and restrictive system of approval (cho 
phep) rather than moving toward a registration system that provides associations with more 
flexibility. The Ministry of Home Affairs would seek to retain all of these provisions at the next 
stage, the drafting of the formal Law on Associations; in turn many in the associational sector 
would seek to weaken some of these management and control mechanisms. And the Ministry 
would seek to retain and strengthen these controls when the 2003 Decree was redrafted in 2008 
and 2009, as discussed below. 
II.  Toward a Law on Associations, and the Aftermath of Debate on the Law 
  The drafting of the Law on Associations had begun in the early 1990s, but it gathered 
steam again beginning in 2003 and 2004. It was a very difficult process. As the National 
Assembly, Vietnam‘s national legislature, pointed out, 
although [the Law on Associations] had been included in the legislative work programme 
[in 1995], up until now we have not yet promulgated any law that details the formation of 
associations – which is one of the fundamental rights of citizens provided in the 
Constitution. We might say that this is a difficult law …. Moreover, the … development 
of associations and social organizations in Vietnam is very complex, [in keeping with] 
the level of social development. So new factors in the sphere of associations and social 
organizations continue to appear….   
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After a lengthy process of drafting by an inter-agency group headed by the control-
oriented Ministry of Home Affairs, the draft Law on Associations was released by the Office of 
the Government in Hanoi in late 2005 for comment, setting off a firestorm of reaction from 
national associations representing intellectuals and business sectors. A wide range of associations 
opposed the draft Law because it maintained the most widely criticized elements of Decree 88 
(2003) and added some new, negative features. These included 
 the ―dual management‖ form of state management and control structure by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs (as the key registration and supervision agency), and 
professional line ministries (for professional aspects of associational work);  
 a complex, lengthy process for the formation of associations and other social 
organizations that was now termed ―registration‖ rather than ―approval‖ but retained 
most of the characteristics of the 1957 and 2003 approval systems, including wide 
state discretion;  
 the exclusion of the six key Party-related mass organizations from the Law, 
prompting strong calls from other national associations either for preferential 
treatment for them as well, or for inclusion of the mass organizations in the draft 
Law; 
 Geographic restrictions on associations that provided that only one association in 
each field could be legally formed in each locality; 
 Very broad prohibited purposes and activities for associations; 
 A very limited scope for advocacy and participation in public affairs, limited to 
(depending in part on the translation) ―publiciz[ing] the objectives of the 
association.‖2 
   In late 2005 and early 2006, this debate reached a point previously unknown in modern 
Vietnamese legislative history, when a team of specialists convened and supported by the 
Vietnamese Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA) wrote their own 
alternative draft Law on Associations in response to the difficulty in forcing changes in the 
official draft. This appears to have been the first time in modern Vietnamese history that 
opposition to a government-drafted law had reached a level that a ―rebellious‖ alternative law 
was formally drafted and made available for discussion. 
The VUSTA alternative draft law, which relied in part on comparative legal provisions 
from outside Vietnam, provided different approaches on most of the issues under debate. It 
contained a simplified formation and registration procedure much closer to a registration (dang 
ky) model than an approval model. It further provided for a single system of state management, 
with specified roles for state management; a reporting mechanism for associations; and some 
differentiation among associations (registered and unregistered; public benefit and non-public 
benefit).  
The alternative draft also made specific provisions for the legal treatment of ―unions‖ or 
―federations‖ of associations (like VUSTA and the Vietnam Union of Literary and Arts 
                                                 
2
 See Sidel and Vasavakul, Report to the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA) 
on the Draft Law on Associations (2006). 
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Associations); provided for a national register of associations; would have broadened the rights 
of associations, particularly relating to advocacy and participation in public affairs; introduced 
the concept of particular privileges for a category of public benefit organizations; and provided at 
multiple points in the draft for more time limits for administrative action and some greater 
opportunities to challenge administrative action. 
In 2006, the Party and government watched this unfolding and expanding conflict and – 
particularly in the wake of the ―color revolutions‖ in Europe, which were unfolding at the same 
time – decided not to allow a Law on Associations to go forward. The Law was shelved in 2006 
and is not scheduled to be reconsidered for at least several more years. The recent replacement of 
Decree 88 (2003) on associations by Decree 45 (2010) on associations, discussed further below, 
is likely to push this schedule back yet again. 
 Party and state control of associations and other social organizations tightened after the 
―color revolutions‖ and the debate on the Law on Associations. From 2006 to 2010, the Party 
and government continued to rely on the relatively strict control mechanism of the 2003 Decree 
on Associations. But developments accelerated in 2009 on several fronts as the Vietnamese 
social organization sector continued to grow and the Vietnamese Party and state sought to 
maintain control over the sector. These developments involved further tightening control over 
advocacy organizations, focusing on a particularly critical and influential research group; on 
developing new regulations for the registration and operations of foreign NGOs in Vietnam; and 
on revising the much-maligned 2003 Decree on the Organization, Operation and Management of 
Associations in the absence of a law on associations. 
III. New Draft Regulations on Registration and Activities of Foreign NGOs in Vietnam  
In 2008 and 2009, the Vietnamese government drafted a new Decree on the Registration 
and Operation of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations in Vietnam. The new Decree – 
which had not yet been promulgated as of spring 2010 – was intended to revise the much earlier, 
1996 regulations governing foreign NGOs in Vietnam, Decision No. 340/TTg and the 
Regulations on the Operation of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations in Vietnam (24 May 
1996). ICNL provided comments on the draft Decree on the Registration and Operations of 
Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations to the drafters.
3
  
The new draft Decree provoked some concern among foreign NGOs in Vietnam. In 
addition to some more specificity than the earlier 1996 regulations, it contained broad terms on 
prohibited activities for foreign NGOs, as well as a number of other vague and general terms that 
could lead to a substantial lack of clarity and predictability in foreign NGO activities in Vietnam. 
The draft Decree also broadly prohibited a full range of profit-making activities. 
The draft Decree also did not take into account Vietnam‘s obligations under the Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BIT) that the government has signed with a number of foreign states, which 
may govern some aspects of its relations with foreign NGOs. ICNL urged the government to 
look into the specific NGO- and associational-related obligations it has undertaken in connection 
with those BIT agreements. For example, a number of BITs provide that once foreign 
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 An English translation of the draft Decree is available at 
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organizations have been permitted to enter, they must be accorded specific kinds of treatment. In 
some cases the terms of these BITs clearly include NGOs or associations.  
To cite several examples, the Vietnam-Australia BIT covers ―any corporation, 
association, partnership, trust or other legally recognised entity that is duly incorporated, 
constituted, set up, or otherwise duly organised‖ in Australia or Vietnam,4 thus including, it 
appears, Australian NGOs within its scope. For such organizations, the BIT regulates treatment 
of movement of personnel, transparency of law, compensation for losses, transfer of funds, 
settlement of disputes, and other matters. There are similar provisions in other BITs Vietnam has 
signed, including with the United Kingdom
5
 and other countries.
6
 Vietnam, like most countries, 
has not yet recognized that the BITs it has signed may be applicable to foreign NGOs or 
associations. 
The new draft decree also contained virtually no provisions on importation of goods and 
commodities by foreign organizations. ICNL recommended that this be clarified, primarily by 
raising into this new draft Decree the relatively clear and detailed provisions on importation of 
goods and commodities stipulated in the 1996 Guidelines for the Implementation of the 
Regulations on the Operation of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations in Vietnam.  
ICNL also noted that although some of the laws and regulations governing the 
registration and activities of foreign NGOs and their personnel in Vietnam are available on the 
website of the People‘s Aid Coordinating Committee (PACCOM) (Vietnam Union of Friendship 
Organizations, VUFO),
7
 not all are available. ICNL recommended that the government post all 
laws, regulations, and other legal documents (including all administrative guidance) relating to 
foreign non-governmental organizations in Vietnam on its own websites, including the VUFO-
PACCOM website and that it make available all such legal documents (including administrative 
guidance) in Vietnamese and in English for web posting by the Hanoi-based NGO Resource 
Centre. The current haphazard availability of these legal documents is not beneficial to the 
functioning of the foreign NGO sector in Vietnam and is not fully transparent. 
 A number of other problems emerged in the new draft Decree on Registration and 
Operation of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations in Vietnam, and some of those were 
pointed out by ICNL in its comments on the draft. They included: 
 Defining ―funds‖ and ―foundations‖: The definition of ―social funds‖ and ―private 
funds‖ in the Article on the scope of regulation and application (Art. 1(2)) refers to ―social funds, 
private funds‖ in English, and to ―quỹ xã hội, quỹ tư nhân‖ in Vietnamese. Assuming that this 
Decree applies to foreign foundations and their registration and operations in Vietnam, ICNL 
noted that it might be best to make clear the extent of the application to foreign foundations. 
 The breadth and generality of prohibited activities: Article 4 of the draft Decree 
on prohibited undertakings is very wide and general and would give the authorities very broad 
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discretion to define and punish activities, as they certainly desire. In particular, ICNL noted the 
dangerous breadth and generality of Article 4(1) (―Activities of religious and/or political nature 
or detrimental to the national interests, security and defense and/or the national solidarity of 
Vietnam‖), and Article 4(4) (―Activities detrimental to social morals, fine habits and customs, 
national traditions and identity of Vietnam‖).  
ICNL noted that a number of these terms – such as ―detrimental to the national interests,‖ 
―security,‖ ―national solidarity,‖ ―social morals,‖ ―fine habits and customs,‖ and ―national 
traditions and identity‖ – fail to provide foreign NGOs with the certainty and predictability 
needed, containing terms whose possible application is not foreseeable or predictable, and it 
urged the drafters to seek more precision in defining prohibited activities in order to give non-
governmental organizations clarity and confidence as to which activities are permitted and which 
are prohibited.  
 The prohibition on profit-making activities: The draft Decree also declares (in 
Article 4(2)) that prohibited activities include ―profit-making activities.‖ That term is not defined 
in the draft Decree, and can lead to widespread uncertainty among foreign NGOs as to what 
kinds of revenue-generating activities may be permitted and what are prohibited. A key issue 
here is how the government wishes to regulate the distribution of profit or revenue amassed by 
NGOs.  
For example, would the sale of local or minority handicrafts or other products, at a price 
above the cost of production, with the proceeds applied to an NGO‘s charitable activities in 
Vietnam, be considered ―profit-making‖ and thus prohibited? Would the sale of tickets to a 
benefit concert or dinner, at a price that gives the foreign NGO funds to conduct its activities 
beyond the costs of the concert, dinner, or other event, be ―profit-making‖ and thus prohibited, 
even if all such proceeds were used for the organization‘s charitable and humanitarian purposes?  
ICNL suggested that the draft Decree either define this term more clearly and in more 
detail or remove it, noting that this provision in an earlier draft of the draft Decree had provided 
more useful specificity: In that draft, the prohibition was against ―Các hoạt động nhằm mục đích 
thu lợi nhuận mà không phục vụ mục đích từ thiện, nhân đạo của các dự án tại Việt Nam‖ 
(―Profit-making activities which do not serve the charitable or humanitarian aims of a project in 
Viet Nam‖). 
 The problem of tax avoidance: Under Article 4(3) of the draft Decree, prohibited 
activities include those related to ―tax avoidance.‖ This term is not defined in the draft Decree 
and, in the absence of any detailed provisions on the taxation of foreign non-governmental 
organizations in the draft, ICNL expressed concern that normal or appropriate attempts by 
foreign NGOs to access normally accorded tax exemptions could be defined as ―tax avoidance‖ 
by overly eager administrative authorities through the exercise of too much discretion.  
In addition, tax avoidance is in a very different category from ―money-laundering‖ and 
―terrorism,‖ the two other prohibited activities listed in Article 4(3). ICNL suggested that ―tax 
avoidance‖ be dropped from Article 4(3) and that clear tax provisions be added to the draft 
Decree, particularly with respect to the importation of goods and commodities.  
 Multiple approval processes for foreign NGOs: In some sections of the draft 
Decree, there was substantial reference to multiple approval processes for foreign NGOs‘ 
programs and projects (―approved by competent authorities of Vietnam‖), at provincial and other 
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local levels, at ministry levels in Hanoi (sometimes multiple ministries), and through the 
Committee for Foreign NGO Affairs, also in Hanoi. ICNL suggested that a streamlining of these 
approval processes would be useful. 
 Simplification of time limits for response on application and requirement of 
written notice of decision: ICNL noted that the draft Decree simplifies the time limits for 
response on applications and requires that the competent agency issue a written notice of 
decision. The 1996 Regulations specified that the competent authority ―inform‖ the NGO ―of the 
result‖ (thông báo kết quả) within 30 days (for an operating permit), 60 days (for a project 
office), and 90 days (for a representative office), not specifically requiring a written notice to the 
applicant NGO. The new draft Decree stipulates a time limit of 45 days for all types of 
applications, requiring the competent authority to ―issue a written notice of the result to the 
applicant organization.‖  
 Termination of operations: The draft Decree provides in Article 17(1) for 
termination of operations of a foreign NGO ―upon receiving a notice and/or decision of the 
competent authority….‖ It is not clear from the draft Decree whether Vietnamese law provides 
foreign organizations with a right to appeal such administrative decisions, or to request an 
opportunity for the administrative decision maker to remedy an error. If so, ICNL recommended 
that this Article should be revised to provide for those protections, and, if not, those protections 
should be considered. And the draft of Article 17(2) provided that upon termination, foreign 
NGOs shall wind up their affairs within sixty days – too short a period for most NGOs to 
terminate activities and end significant programs.  
 Importation of goods and commodities: The draft Decree provided in Article 24 
that importation of ―necessary office equipment and supplies, vehicles and spare parts, [and] 
personal belongings‖ is subject to ―current regulations of Vietnam.‖ ICNL called that provision 
vague and general and, in particular, noted that it did not reference or include the tax exemption 
provisions of the Guidelines for the Implementation of the Regulations on the Operation of 
Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations in Vietnam (7 August 1996) (Implementation 
Guidelines), which provide implementing guidance for the 1996 Regulations.
8
 ICNL 
recommended that a revised version of the 1996 tax guidance be incorporated into the new 
Decree. 
 Implementation and execution: The draft Decree (Article 31) stipulated that 
Decision No. TTg (May 1996) and the related Regulations on the Operation of Foreign Non-
Governmental Organizations in Vietnam would be superseded by the new draft Decree. At the 
same time a number of other legal and administrative documents have been issued under or 
related to Decision No. 340/TTg and on the registration and operations of foreign NGOs in 
Vietnam since 1996. These include the August 1996 Implementation Guidelines referred to 
above; Decision No. 64/2001/QD-TTg on the Issuance of the Regulations on the Management 
and Utilization of Aid from International Non-Governmental Organizations;
9
 and other legal 
documents. 
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 An English text of the Implementation Guidelines may be found at http://www.ngocentre.org.vn/node/69 
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ICNL recommended that the government make clear whether the August 1996 
Implementation Guidelines remain in effect, perhaps through direct reference to those and to 
other implementation guidelines in the draft Decree. Separately, and for the clarity of foreign 
NGOs and donors, the government may wish to address the continued applicability of Decision 
No. 64/2001/QD-TTg on the Issuance of the Regulations on the Management and Utilization of 
Aid from International Non-Governmental Organizations, or to clarify whether a revision of 
Decision No. 64/2001/QD-TTg is underway. 
As of May 2010 the draft Decree on the Registration and Operation of Foreign Non-
Governmental Organizations in Vietnam had not yet been issued, and there appeared to be no 
clear timetable for its promulgation. 
IV. Cracking Down on Particular Organizations, and on Policy Commentary and 
Criticism by Independent Groups: Decision 97 and the Vietnam Institute of 
Development Studies (VIDS) 
Since its founding in 2004, the Vietnam Institute of Development Studies (IDS) angered 
some senior officials in the Party and government for its wide-ranging discussions of 
development policy and commentary on government policy. But the Institute was difficult to 
attack directly, since the board was composed of some of Vietnam‘s leading intellectuals and 
technocrats and the Institute operated under the implicit sponsorship of former Prime Minister 
Vo Van Kiet. The Institute had been formed directly by these individuals under the relatively 
liberal regulations for forming science and technology research organizations, not under the 
Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA) or another umbrella.  
In 2008, Vo Van Kiet died, and later in 2008 and in 2009 the Party and government 
began moving against IDS. In July 2009, the Prime Minister issued Decision 97/2009/QĐ-TTg 
limiting the areas in which in which individuals (like those who established the Institute of 
Development Studies) were allowed to form science and technology research, service, and other 
organizations. Though Decision 97 provided a long list of areas available for organizations to 
work in, it was most notable for the areas it omitted, making it, in effect, illegal for independent 
organizations (organizations established by individuals without the umbrella provided by Decree 
81 or Decree 88) to work in those spheres.  
Those prohibited areas included, for example, economic policy, public policy, political 
issues, and a range of other sensitive areas. Permitted areas of work included a range of fields 
and subfields in the natural sciences (including mathematics, computer science and information, 
physics, chemistry, mechanics, and other scientific fields, including ecology), social sciences 
(including psychology, economics and business, and sociology, but not including economic 
policy), the humanities (including history, philosophy, linguistics, literature, cultural studies, 
arts, cinema, radio, and television, but not political issues or public policy), engineering and 
other technical fields, health and medicine, agriculture, science and technology services, and 
information (including intellectual property and technology transfer). 
Beyond the prohibition of work in some areas, Decision 97 also sought to limit the rights 
of such organizations to engage in commentary and criticism of government policy. Such 
organizations, the Decision provided (Article 2(2)), ―may only conduct activities within the areas 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.isgmard.org.vn/Information%20Service/Legal%20docs/General/Decision-64-2001-QD-TTg-
NGO%20ODA-v.pdf. 
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under the List promulgated with this Decision. If they have feedback (phản biện) on the line, 
guidelines, or policies of the Party or the State those views must be provided to Party or State 
agencies with jurisdiction over such issues, and may not be released publicly….‖ 
This was part of a broader set of steps to limit the ability of associations and other groups 
to express commentary or criticism of Party and state policies, a set of restrictions on the right to 
provide such views or commentary (phản biện). Such restrictions and making commentary and 
criticism dependent on Party and state discretion are also reflected in the revision of Decree 88 
on the Organization and Management of Associations, discussed below. 
Decision 97 also required national and local government agencies responsible for 
licensing science and technology groups (like the Institute of Development Studies) to review, 
revoke or re-register all such organizations, explicitly requiring such authorities to revoke 
organizations that do not comply with the Decision. The Decision took effect on September 15, 
2009.  
The Institute of Development Studies was one of the few such individually formed 
groups undertaking work in areas outside those permitted under Decision 97. It was clear in 
Hanoi that Decision 97 was directed against the Institute, as well as against the expression of 
policy views and commentary by other groups as well in its restriction of that right.  
Facing this challenge, and knowing that the goal of the Decision was to terminate the 
Institute, the Institute challenged the validity of the Decision but also chose to go out of business 
of its own accord in September 2009 rather than have the government declare it invalid.
10
 The 
director of the Institute, the well-known economist Nguyen Quang A, directly challenged the 
government‘s authority to issue the Decision without an opportunity for comments and public 
notice, and threatened to bring the issue to the National Assembly.  
What followed was correspondence on the validity of the Decision between Professor A 
and the Minister of Justice, who affirmed the legality of the Decision in the view of his 
Ministry.
11
 That dialogue did not change the result – the Institute remained shuttered, and 
Decision 97 remained in effect – but the sight of a Vietnamese intellectual forcing the 
government, through the Minister of Justice, into such direct correspondence on a sensitive issue 
was perhaps unprecedented in modern Vietnamese politics. 
The result, however, is unfortunate for the development of more independent policy 
commentary groups and think tanks in Vietnam. In effect, groups have been barred from work in 
certain important policy fields, and policy commentary itself has been reduced by Decision 97 to 
commentary that the Party or government itself requests and that is within the specific ambit of 
the work of the commenting organization. Decision 97 applies to the independently established 
research groups, but the Party and state‘s policy seems clear, and broader – to discourage the 
independent commentary activities of some analytical policy groups. 
                                                 
10
 For news reports on the closure of IDS, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8257061.stm; 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=8576667; 
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/09/15/afx6885790.html. 
11
 For this correspondence and much more on the Decision 97 controversy, see http://boxitvn.blogspot.com/ 
and http://bauxitevietnam.info/. The description of these events in this paper is an abbreviated version of a longer 
discussion by the author. 
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V. Updating and Maintaining Control in Associational Regulation: Decree 45 (2010) on 
the Organization, Activities and Management of Associations 
 In the absence of a Law on Associations, and in response to calls from government 
regulators for a more detailed regulatory document, from associations, the World Bank and other 
donors for a firmer regulatory footing, in 2009 the Ministry of Home Affairs completed a draft 
revision of the 2003 Decree on the Organization, Activities and Management of Associations 
under which most Vietnamese associations are registered (in addition to Decree 81 on science 
and technology research groups). The Ministry quietly released the draft revision for comments 
in the fall of 2009 preparatory to the promulgation of the new Decree, as required by Vietnamese 
law, and a number of critical commentaries were submitted by Vietnamese groups. The revised 
Decree 88, now Decree 45 (2010), was promulgated on April 21, 2010, and takes effect on July 
1, 2010. The new Decree 45 (2010) continues to govern the registration, operations, activities, 
and management of a wide range of associational groups at the national, provincial, municipal, 
and sub-provincial level.
12
 
Some of the key points of the new Decree 45 (2010), and the issues with this revision of 
Decree 88 (2010), are as follows:
13
 
 Establishing a new category of associations, the ―associations with special 
characteristics.‖ Decree 45 (2010) establishes a new category of associations, termed 
associations with ―special characteristics‖ (Hội có tính chất đặc thù, in Articles 33-35). These are 
the major national umbrella organizations of associations that were not clearly stipulated in the 
earlier Decree 88. These umbrella groups (such as the Vietnam Union of Science and 
Technology Associations (VUSTA) and others) have long sought privileged legal protection akin 
to the special status given the mass organizations under the Party, like the Vietnam Women‘s 
Union and the Peasants‘ Union. This new category would replace a set of organizations that was 
defined in the Vietnamese Civil Code and replace it with a term and category of organization that 
is unrecognized in the Civil Code.
14
 
 Privileges of the ―associations with special characteristics.‖ Decree 45 (2010) 
would give these associations with ―special characteristics‖ privileges that include ―participation 
in formulating mechanisms and policies‖ directly related to their associational work, and 
participation in ―consulting, providing feedback, and examining‖ various policies, programs, 
projects, and plans of government agencies ―on issues within the sphere of activities of such 
associations in accordance with regulations of the Prime Minister.‖ Decree 45 (2010) also 
                                                 
12
 For the Vietnamese text of Decree 45 (2010), see http://legal.khaitri.vn/Index.asp?n=74655, 
http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/library/dlogin.php?file=Vietnam/Decree45.pdf, and other sites. 
13
 There are numerous other differences between the new Decree 45 (2010) and the original Decree 88 
(2003), but space permits only a discussion of some of the key issues here. The author is preparing a longer paper 
outlining virtually all the significant differences. 
14
 See Một số góp ý cho Nghị định mới về Hội (Some suggestions for the new Decree on Associations) (10 
November 2009). The author of this commentary has not been publicly identified. The associations with special 
characteristics include the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA), Vietnam Lawyers 
Association (VLA), Vietnam Union of Literary and Arts Organizations (VULAA), and a number of others. The 
mass organizations (to which Decree 45 (2010) does not apply), including the Vietnam Fatherland Front, Vietnam 
Confederation of Trade Unions, Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth League, Vietnam Peasants Union, Vietnam 
Veterans Association, and Vietnam Women‘s Union. Decree 45 (2010) also does not apply to religious groups. 
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provides that the government will continue to provide budget funding to these groups (Arts. 34 
and 35).
15
  
The issues of the associations with ―special characteristics‖ have provoked more 
discussion in Vietnam than perhaps any other aspect of the new Decree 45 (2010). In effect, this 
would satisfy demands by these umbrella groups for special recognition by creating a multi-
tiered stratification of associational entities – with Party-related mass organizations (such as the 
Women‘s Union) at the top, outside this Decree; the ―special purpose‖ groups in a special 
category within Decree 45 (2010); and the rest of the associational sector in a third group with 
fewer privileges and rights. The problems in this approach have been outlined by Professor 
Hoang Ngoc Giao, a Vietnamese academic with long experience on these issues.  
―Receiving subsidies from the State in this way, this kind of organization may continue to 
be subservient to and suffer the influence of state agencies.... When civil society is 
stratified in this way, [this part of the sector] can be increasingly ‗administrativized‘ and 
‗statified‘ in their activities ... making it more difficult for them to play a positive role in 
the development of the country.‖  
In addition, the decision as to which groups have this special status, and how they obtain 
it, is left by the revised Decree to the discretion of the Prime Minister.
16 
 Continuing, significant obstacles and multiple steps and approvals to establishing 
associations: Some Vietnamese commentators perceive few positive changes in Decree 45 
(2010) to the complex and bureaucratic requirements for establishing and operating an 
association that were stipulated in the original Decree 88 (2003). In particular, formation of an 
association under Decree 45 (2010) requires a certain number of founding members; and the 
Minister of Home Affairs will continue to provide detailed regulations and thus wield wide 
discretion over the conditions for establishing associations. According to one prominent 
Vietnamese commentator, this provision ―gives too much discretion to the Minister of Home 
Affairs. There is no mechanism to supervise those regulations of the conditions for forming an 
association ... and additional new regulations making it much more difficult to form 
associations.‖17 
The new Decree 45 (2010) continues to provide that the process of formation and 
registration of associations will be highly regulated by the Ministry of Home Affairs, local 
governments, and other government agencies. Some procedures have changed from Decree 88 
(2003), but firm control remains. In general terms, formation and registration of associations will 
now require a minimum number of individuals to formally seek approval, ranging from one 
hundred signatories for national associations to fifty individuals at the provincial level, to twenty 
at the county level and at least ten at the township level (Art. 5). An establishment committee is 
                                                 
15
 Professor Hoàng Ngọc Giao, Một số nhận xét về Dự thảo Nghị định thay thế Nghị định 88/2003/NĐ-CP 
Quy định về tổ chức, hoạt động và quản lý hội (Some considerations on the Draft Decree to substitute for Decree 
88/2003/ND-CP on the organization, activities, and management of associations) (11 November 2009). 
16
 Hoang Ngoc Giao, supra note 15. See also Some suggestions for the new Decree on Associations, supra 
note 14, which reflects the view that the associations with special characteristics would, for most purposes, have no 
additional real powers beyond ordinary associations, though the Decree stratifies organizations and could create 
major differences among them. 
17
 Hoang Ngoc Giao, supra note 15. 
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still required, with minimum numbers for the membership of that committee at the national, 
provincial, and lower levels (Art. 6(1)-(3)). That establishment committee must then be formally 
recognized by a national, provincial, or lower level government ministry or bureau, depending on 
the scope of the association (Art. 6(5)). The extension of authority to provincial and lower levels 
of government is an attempt to relieve the central government of some burdens for local groups, 
but also to bolster control of associational formation throughout the vertical networks of the 
state. The government‘s decision on recognizing an establishment committee must be taken 
within twenty days, and if the committee is rejected then written reasons must be provided (Art. 
6(5)). The government‘s decision on whether or not to approve the formation of an association, 
after the establishment committee has submitted the many and detailed required documents 
(Arts. 7, 8), must be taken within sixty days, and written reasons are to be given if the approval is 
refused (Art. 9). In addition, the establishment committee must be recognized by the ministry or 
other agency working in that professional arena, a continuation of the ―dual management‖ 
system of the past. No standards are provided for that recognition, nor for dealing with groups 
that cross over various fields of work and whether such groups must seek recognition from all 
the relevant ministries.
18
 
Thus the government has, at the very least, two formal steps in which it can decline to 
approve the formation and registration of an associational entity, along with other requirements 
for formation that may discourage some groups from applying. If approval is granted, the 
assocation has ninety days from the date of approval to hold its establishment congress (Art. 10) 
with specified requirements (Art. 11) and reporting to the government (Art. 12) on that meeting. 
The government retains approval rights over the organizational charter approved at that meeting 
(Art. 13), and the Decree requires pre-reporting to the government before annual meetings of 
associations (Art. 24). The over-regulation of associational formation does not end there: After 
the relevant government agency or agencies have agreed to permit the formation of an 
association and after the organization of its founding meeting, the bylaws (charter) of the 
association must also be approved by the relevant agency or agencies. As a prominent 
Vietnamese commentator points out acerbically, ―having had the decision to [permit] the 
formation of an association, the bylaws must still be reviewed to determine if they violate the 
law or not! This can only be another means to delay formation, without any standards being 
provided to government officials to guide their discretion.‖19 
 Continuing constraints on speech and advocacy. The new Decree 45 (2010) 
continues the process of limiting associational speech and advocacy rights. For example the 
earlier Decree 88 (2003) provided associations with the right to ―protect the lawful rights and 
interests of the association and its members.‖ Decree 45 (2010) subtly limits that right by 
providing associations with the right to ―protect the lawful rights and interests of the association 
and its members that are consistent with the guidelines and purposes of the association.‖ (Art. 
23(4)).  
The earlier Decree 88 (2003) allowed associations to engage in ―consultations and 
feedback on issues within the association‘s scope of activities at the request of organizations and 
individuals,‖ itself a limitation of the feedback and commentary role to issues ―within the 
association‘s scope of activities.‖ The new Decree 45 (2010) permits organizations to 
                                                 
18
 Hoang Ngoc Giao, supra note 15. 
19
 Hoang Ngoc Giao, supra note 15. 
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―participate in programs, projects, research topics, consultations, feedback and social assessment 
at the request of government agencies….‖ (Art. 23(7)). This provision is intended to limit the 
commentary, advocacy, and feedback role to circumstances in which such views have been 
requested by government agencies. 
 Continuation but perhaps also some blurring of the much-maligned ―dual 
management‖ of associations by multiple government agencies. One possible improvement in 
the new Decree 45 (2010) – though how this will develop in practice is not at all clear – is that 
the new Decree fails to clarify to what degree full ―dual management‖ of associations by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs and the relevant professional ministry at the national or local levels 
continues or not under the new regulations. Government control remains very strong, to be sure, 
including over formation, approval of charters, activities, leadership, merger, dissolution, 
changes of names, and other issues. And ―dual management‖ certainly persists in some ways, for 
example in the requirement that the professional line ministry or agency is required to approve 
the establishment committee for an association seeking permission to form and register (Art. 
6(5)).  
But particularly in the post-establishment, post-registration phases of organizations, the 
lines of authority between the Ministry of Home Affairs (as registration and supervision agency) 
and professional line ministries or lower-level government agencies remain somewhat unclear in 
Decree 45 (Arts. 14, 37). The continuing strength of ―dual management‖ will need to be assessed 
in the months and years ahead. Dual management of associations has long been criticized by the 
Vietnamese associational sector as imposing significant burdens on associations and keeping 
them highly dependent on the state, and on professional line ministries and local bureaux 
unprepared to undertake such supervision. Vietnamese organizations will be watching the 
possible evolution of dual management very carefully indeed.  
 As noted above, Decree 45 (2010) on the Organization, Activities and Management of 
Associations was just released in late April 2010. Only some of its key provisions are discussed 
above, and further judgement on Decree 45‘s impact will need to await further analysis and the 
practice of government management and control in Vietnam. 
VI. New Regulations on the Management and Use of Foreign Non-Governmental Aid: 
Decree 93 (2009) and Circular 7 (2010) 
 
The government promulgated the Regulations on the Management and Use of Foreign 
Non-Governmental Aid in October 2009, officially known as Decree 93/ND-CP,
 20
 followed by a 
detailed Circular providing implementing rules on this topic at the end of March 2010.
21
 The new 
                                                 
20
 The official English translation of the Regulations on the Management and Use of Foreign Non-
Governmental Aid in October 2009 (Decree 93/ND-CP) are at the Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam (Cong Bao), November issue 01-02, 2009, reprinted at 
http://www.linvn.org/cms/upload/FCKFile/file/Workshop/2009-
%20Decree%2093,%20replace%20Decision%2064,%20eng.pdf. The Vietnamese original text of the Regulations is 
available at http://www.linvn.org/cms/upload/FCKFile/file/Workshop/2009-
%20Decree%2093,%20replace%20Decision%2064,%20vnese.pdf, among other sites.  
21
 The implementing rules, Circular 7, are at 
http://www.linvn.org/cms/upload/FCKFile/file/Workshop/2010%20-
%20Circular%2007,%20receiving%20foreign%20aid,%20vnese.pdf . 
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Regulations on the Management and Use of Foreign Non-Government Aid replace simpler 
regulations first promulgated in 2001 (Decision 64).  
The new Regulations and implementing rules maintain and enhance state control over 
foreign non-governmental aid to Vietnam in expected ways, with more detailed provisions than 
in the past. The process of implementation will be crucial to understanding the full force and 
implications of these new Regulations, and that process is just beginning. 
The new Regulations cover ―non-refundable aid provided for not-for-profit purposes by 
donors for Vietnam to achieve development and humanitarian objectives.‖ (Art. 1(1)) ―Donors‖ 
whose work is covered by these Regulations include ―foreign non-governmental organizations 
and other foreign organizations and individual, including foreign investment groups and 
companies and overseas Vietnamese community that respect and observe Vietnamese law and 
have goodwill and directly provide non-refundable aid to support Vietnam‘s socio-economic 
development and humanitarian objectives.‖ (Art. 1(2))  
Eligible recipients include Vietnamese government, Party, legislative and other state 
agencies, mass organizations under the Party and government, officially recognized associations 
and other non-state actors, and organizations established under Decree 88, Decree 81, and other 
documents governing the burgeoning non-governmental (or ―less-governmental) community in 
Vietnam, as well as businesses ―providing public products and services‖ as defined by 
government regulation (Art. 1(4)). 
The Regulations reassert government management and control over foreign non-
governmental aid; require that such aid ―comply with Vietnamese law and commitments with 
donors which have been approved by competent authorities‖; notes that where ―donors‘ aid 
regulations or conditions differ from Vietnamese law,‖ Vietnamese law prevails; requires the 
government and Vietnamese institutions to refuse aid that ―affect[s] political security and social 
order and safety or infring[es] upon interests of the State or lawful rights and benefits of 
organizations or individuals.‖ (Art. 2) 
The Regulations go on the prescribe approval mechanisms for programs, projects and 
other forms of aid in Vietnam, generally restricting approval agencies to central Party and 
government units and provincial people‘s committees (Art. 4) and not permitting the conclusion 
of program or project aid documents until the designated government agencies have approved 
such activities (Art. 6). Tasks are set for approval agencies and aid management agencies (Art. 
8), as well as requirements for approval (Art. 9). Appraisal and approval mechanisms are 
stipulated (Arts. 10-12), with the Ministry of Planning and Investment playing a key role in this 
area. Approval levels are set for different amounts and types of aid at the levels of the Prime 
Minister; ministries and other government agencies; provincial people‘s committees; and the 
Fatherland Front (for some forms of emergency aid) (Art. 13).  
Additional provisions govern the administration of foreign non-governmental aid, also 
with an emphasis on state overall control over the process (Arts. 17-19). No detailed provisions 
are made for the tax treatment of donor aid, only a stipulation that ―taxes on FNG aid amounts 
comply with current law regarding taxes on aid….‖ (Art. 20). Several articles government 
monitoring and evaluation of aid implementation (Arts. 24-28), with an emphasis on reporting to 
state agencies, particularly the Ministry of Planning and Investment, Ministry of Finance, and the 
interagency Committee on Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations (Arts. 29-41). 
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Conclusion 
 The Vietnamese Party and government are intent on establishing a differentiated regime 
of nonprofit regulation that encourages the growth of some service-oriented and some other 
groups that are viewed as contributory, while always under government observation and 
supervision. At the same time, the government has focused particular attention and stricter 
regulation on organizations that it views as a threat in one way or another – organizations that 
carry out independent and public commentary and criticism of Party and state policies, for 
example, and of course dissident organizations. The state also strictly regulates the religious 
sector, an arena outside the scope of this article.  
Recent developments in Vietnam indicate clearly that the Party and state are working to 
implement this differentiated regime of nonprofit regulation. The Party and state decided not to 
proceed with a Law on Associations, in part because of concern for the flexibility and autonomy 
the law might provide to nonprofit groups. The government has revised the primary regulatory 
document governing the nonprofit sector through the issuance of Decree 45 (2010) on 
associations, and through that process has made made some control provisions more strict. The 
Party and state have sought to limit commentary and criticism of policy, for example, both 
through regulation on the commentary process and by closing a key policy think tank. And the 
government has sought to provide new regulation of the foreign NGO sector as well. On the 
ground, the numbers and the range of activities of associations, science and technology research 
groups, other social organizations, clubs, and other entities continues to grow. These 
developments, and the Party and government‘s implementation of its mandate to control and 
manage this rapidly expanding sector, will bear close watching in the months and years ahead. 
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Article 
The NGO Law: 
Azerbaijan Loses Another Case in the European Court 
 
Mahammad Guluzade and Natalia Bourjaily
1
 
 
 
Introduction 
On 9 October 2009, Azerbaijan lost a case in the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) under Article 11 of the European Convention on Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Convention). The case, Tebieti Mühafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov v. 
Azerbaijan, addresses the dissolution of a registered public union.
2
 This is the fifth time since 
Azerbaijan‘s ratification of the Convention in April 2002 that the ECHR has issued a decision 
against Azerbaijan on a case involving the freedom of association under Article 11 of the 
Convention. The purpose of this article is to provide a review of certain problems with 
Azerbaijani legislation relating to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that were identified in 
the case Tebieti Mühafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov v. Azerbaijan, and to recommend how to 
improve Azerbaijani legislation based on international law and best practices.  
History 
Since 2002, citizens of Azerbaijan have submitted hundreds of applications to the ECHR. 
Many citizens faced problems with registering an NGO with the Ministry of Justice, as the 
authorized registration body. Domestic courts have not been supportive of NGOs and their 
founders in the lawsuits against the registration body. Frustrated founders have submitted several 
appeals for ECHR consideration relating, in particular, to problems with NGO registration. The 
ECHR swiftly resolved these cases with Azerbaijan losing all four considered cases: 
Ramazanova v. Azerbaijan,
3
 Ismailov v. Azerbaijan,
4
 Nasibova v. Azerbaijan,
5
 and Aliyev and 
others v. Azerbaijan.
6
 In all of these cases, the ECHR found Azerbaijan to be in violation of 
Article 11 (freedom of association) of the Convention. These four successful attempts of local 
NGOs to restore justice gave hope to many organizations having similar problems. Many similar 
cases relating to problems with registration of NGOs have also been submitted to the ECHR. As 
a result, the Government of Azerbaijan has improved the process of NGO registration, and has 
begun to settle issues relating to registration in favor of NGOs and their founders.  
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The ECHR appeared to be an especially effective mechanism to address issues with 
realization of the freedom of association in Azerbaijan. We hope the most recent ECHR case 
Tebieti Mühafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov v. Azerbaijan, and the articles and analysis coming in 
its wake, will contribute to improving the legislation relating to dissolution of NGOs in 
Azerbaijan.  
Azerbaijani legislation on dissolution of NGOs 
The Constitution of Azerbaijan delegates the power to dissolve an association exclusively 
to courts.
7
 In accordance with article 59 of the Civil Code of Azerbaijan, a legal entity may be 
dissolved by a court order, if: 
 the legal entity was established with violation of legislation; or 
 the legal entity engages in activities without the required permit (license) or in activities 
prohibited by law, or if it otherwise commits repeated or grave breaches of law, or if a 
public association or foundation systematically engages in activities that are contrary to 
the aims set out in its bylaws, as well as in other cases provided by law. 
The Ministry of Justice, under Azerbaijani law, does not have authority to dissolve an 
NGO, including an association. However, the Ministry of Justice is required to supervise 
activities of NGOs to ensure that they comply with ―objectives of the NGO Law.‖8 When it 
determines that an NGO violates a provision of the NGO Law or other legislation, it notifies the 
organization in writing, instructing it to correct the violations. If an NGO is notified more than 
twice in one year for violations, the Ministry of Justice may apply to court for dissolution of the 
NGO.
9
 An NGO has the right to appeal a Ministry of Justice‘s notification in court. However, in 
practice courts usually side with the Ministry of Justice taking into consideration only the 
Ministry‘s findings and ignoring other facts presented by an NGO, such as whether a violation of 
a law took place in reality. 
Case review  
Tebieti Mühafize Cemiyyeti (TMC or Association), one of the first NGOs registered in 
1995, operated until its dissolution by court in 2002. The local court justified its decision to 
dissolve the Association by arguing that its activities did not comply with the requirements of its 
own by-laws and domestic law. Specifically, it had not convened a lawful general assembly of its 
members from the moment of establishment. Before sending a dissolution request to the court, 
the Ministry of Justice issued several notifications to TMC in which the following violations of 
applicable law were listed:  
1) not all members of the Association had been properly informed about the general 
assembly and thus had been unable to participate in it;  
2) the Association‘s local branches had not been equally represented at the assembly;  
3) current membership records had not been properly kept and it was impossible to 
determine the exact number and identity of members; and 
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4) local branches of the Association had not held any regular local assemblies of 
members, and, as a result, members were unable to directly participate in 
governance.
10
  
Before the ECHR, the Government of Azerbaijan stated that involuntary dissolution was 
the only sanction available under the domestic law against associations engaging in activities 
―incompatible with the objectives‖ of the NGO Law.  
The European Court stated in the in TMC case:  
A mere failure to respect certain legal requirements on internal management of non-
governmental organizations cannot be considered such serious misconduct as to warrant 
outright dissolution. […] The immediate and permanent dissolution of the Association 
constituted a drastic measure disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Greater 
flexibility in choosing a more proportionate sanction could be achieved by introducing 
into the domestic law less radical alternative sanctions, such as a fine or withdrawal of tax 
benefits.
11
 
The ECHR underlined the following shortcomings of the NGO legislation of Azerbaijan 
in the TMC case: 
(i) The circumstances in which involuntary dissolution can be applied are not precisely 
defined; 
(ii) There are no alternative sanctions against associations engaging in activities 
―incompatible with the objectives‖ of the NGO Law; and 
(iii) There are no detailed rules governing the scope and extent of the Ministry of Justice's 
power to intervene in the internal management and activities of associations, or minimum 
safeguards concerning, inter alia, the procedure for conducting inspections by the Ministry or 
the period of time granted to public associations to eliminate any shortcomings detected.
12
  
In this article, we will address each of the shortcomings identified by the ECHR and 
review relevant Azerbaijani legislation in light of international law and best practices. 
(i) The circumstances in which involuntary dissolution can be applied are not precisely defined  
 In Azerbaijan, the legal provisions on involuntary dissolution of public associations are 
worded in rather general terms and may give rise to varying interpretations. For example, Article 
59 of the Civil Code states that involuntary dissolution of a public association may take place if 
―the legal entity … commits repeated or grave breaches of law, or if a public association or 
foundation systematically engages in activities that are contrary to the aims set out in its by-laws, 
as well as in other cases provided by law.‖ 
Remarkably, the list of reasons for involuntary dissolution of NGOs is longer than the list 
for other legal entities. A public association and a foundation, but not a business, must be 
dissolved if it systematically engages in activities that are contrary to the aims set out in its 
bylaws, as well as in other cases provided by law. Taking into consideration that the law does not 
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 Section 16, Tebieti Mühafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov v. Azerbaijan, supra note 2.  
11
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12
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set any limits on the purposes for which an NGO may be established, other than that the primary 
aim shall not be ―generating profit,‖13 NGOs may be set up and operate for any legitimate 
purpose. From the legal perspective, it is irrelevant how the aim of an NGO is defined in its own 
bylaws. The law does not (and may not) set any requirement on how the aim of an association 
may be defined. Therefore, it is common and appropriate that an aim is defined very broadly, 
such as ―achieving public good‖ or ―improving health care.‖ Even if an NGO‘s bylaws set as a 
specific primary aim, for example, an ―increase in literacy,‖ would it be illegal for an NGO to 
engage in activities other than educational activities? Certainly, an NGO should not be punished 
for engaging in legal activities simply because such activities are not explicitly spelled out in its 
bylaws. 
 Moreover, the NGO Law in Article 31.2 obliges NGOs to comply with the ―aims‖ of 
the NGO Law, as defined in Article 1 of the Law. Obeying the ―aim‖ of the law, as defined, not 
only the provisions of the law, is a confusing requirement impossible to consistently implement.   
These confusing provisions allowed the Ministry of Justice to request the dissolution of 
the association for failure to organize its internal management, in contravention of international 
law and best practices.  
We will briefly review the actual violations that were cited in the Ministry of Justice 
notices to the TMC and served as the basis for its dissolution. While states can set limitations on 
the freedom of association, including reasons for involuntary dissolution of an association, the 
list of such limitations must be short and well-defined. Freedom of association is not absolute
14
 
and may under specific circumstances be restricted. Article 11, Paragraph 2 of the Convention 
sets the conditions for possible limitations. Restrictions on freedom of association may be 
allowed only if: 
a) the restriction is prescribed by law; 
b) it pursues a legitimate aim; and 
c) it is necessary in a democratic society. 
All three conditions must be fulfilled cumulatively. Should any one of them not be met, 
the implied restriction will be considered in violation of the Convention.
15
 It is clear that, for 
example, when an association misses its deadline for conducting a members meeting, it does not 
create a danger to a democratic society, and therefore, there is no necessity to restrict the 
activities of the association in order to preserve the democracy. Such a violation of internal 
governance rules may not be used as the basis for involuntary dissolution of an association, as 
such an action is an impermissible restriction of the right to freedom of association.  
In addition, none of the violations listed in the Ministry‘s notification to the TMC serving 
as the basis for dissolution comply with the technical condition of ―being prescribed by law,‖ not 
to mention others. At the time of dissolution of TMC, Azerbaijani law did not regulate such 
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 Article 2.1 of the NGO Law.  
14
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15
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issues as (1) how properly to inform members about participation in a general meeting or 
assembly, as the highest governance body of an association; or, (2) requiring equal 
representation of all association branches at the general assembly; or (3) how to keep 
membership records properly; or (4) setting the requirement for local branches of an NGO to call 
their own assemblies. In fact, Azerbaijani law complied with international law and practice by 
not regulating these issues. It was the intervention by the Ministry of Justice in the internal 
activities of the NGO that the ECHR identified as a problem. The ECHR considered that ―it 
should be up to the association itself to determine the manner in which its branches or individual 
members are represented in its central governing bodies. Likewise, it should be primarily up to 
the association itself and its members, and not the public authorities, to ensure that formalities of 
this type are observed in the manner specified in the association's charter.‖16  
Neither of the violations cited in the Ministry of Justice‘s notification, which served as 
the basis for the local court‘s decision to dissolve TLC, met the legal conditions, and therefore, 
could not serve as the basis for dissolution of TLC.    
(ii) There are no alternative sanctions against associations engaging in activities ―incompatible 
with the objectives‖ of the NGO Law 
 Azerbaijani law contains only one sanction, dissolution, for associations that violate the 
NGO Law or their own bylaws. The issuance of more than two warnings in a year suffices for 
the launch of a dissolution lawsuit before the domestic court.  
In the Tebieti Mühafize Cemiyyeti, case the European Court underlined that ―[…] 
involuntary dissolution was the only sanction available under the domestic law against 
associations engaging in activities ‗incompatible with the objectives‘ of the NGO Act‖ and 
called this sanction ―drastic.‖ Indeed, the Council of Europe Recommendations on the legal 
status of NGOs in Europe provide for dissolution of an NGO only in case of ―serious 
misconduct.‖17 Regrettably, the Azerbaijani NGO Law does not differentiate the seriousness of 
misconduct in the case of infringement of an NGO‘s bylaws or legislation. For these purposes, 
Azerbaijan may benefit from the positive experience of other countries that do provide for 
alternative sanctions, such as fines payable by the manager of an NGO, for NGOs acting against 
the legislative acts described below. 
In regards to international common practices, NGOs, including public associations, and 
their managers are subject to similar sanctions as other entities. The general rule is that if a 
sanction does not apply to a business, for example, for the failure to gather a meeting of 
shareholders, no penalties should apply to NGO for the same failure. Interested persons—
shareholders in the case of a business, and members in the case of an association—may always 
bring a civil lawsuit if their interests or rights have been violated. Other than the dissolution of an 
entity, as a last-resort punishment against the most serious violations, the most common 
sanctions are fines against the management of either a business or an NGO.  
(iii) There are no detailed rules governing the scope and extent of the Ministry of Justice's power 
to intervene in the internal management and activities of associations, or minimum safeguards 
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concerning, inter alia, the procedure for conducting inspections by the Ministry or the period of 
time granted to public associations to eliminate any shortcomings detected.
18
  
As the ECHR noted, the NGO Law has afforded the Ministry of Justice rather wide 
discretion to intervene in any matter related to an association‘s existence.19 The NGO Law does 
not explicitly provide the Ministry of Justice with authority to audit NGOs. Instead, Article 31.2 
states that ―in case of actions contradicting the objectives of the present law, the relevant body of 
executive power [the Ministry of Justice of Azerbaijan] may in writing notify the NGO or 
instruct the latter to remove the violations.‖ Currently, the Ministry of Justice may audit NGOs at 
any time, on any subject, and without any procedural safeguards at all, in order to verify that 
NGOs‘ actions are in compliance with the NGO Law. The Ministry of Justice, for example, may 
participate in the internal events of an association, request any internal documents, and demand 
provision of any information about an NGO or its managers or members. A broad and vaguely 
defined responsibility to watch for ―actions contradicting the objectives of the present law‖ is 
burdensome not just for NGOs, but for the Ministry of Justice itself.  
Azerbaijani NGO Law does not specify the minimum period the Ministry of Justice must 
give to an NGO for eliminating the deficiencies found in its statutory documents or internal 
management. Whereas under domestic law, the procedure for convening the general assembly of 
an NGO required at least two weeks,
20
 the Ministry of Justice in its warning to TMC gave a ten-
day period.
21
  
The mere fact that the Ministry of Justice had special authority to audit such internal 
affairs already contradicts international common practices. It is critical to mention that in the vast 
majority of European countries, the authority in charge of registration of an NGO, and in 
particular, a public association, does not carry any responsibility to supervise the activities of a 
registered NGO. Its responsibilities in regards to a particular NGO end immediately after 
incorporating information about the newly registered entity into the registry of legal entities. 
Other government authorities are responsible for compliance with the law of entities and 
individuals, such as a prosecutors, police, fire inspection, or tax inspection, and carry supervisory 
responsibilities over certain activities of entities and individuals. (However, some specific 
requirements might apply to certain special types of NGOs, especially those eligible for 
substantial tax preferences, such as charitable foundations.)  
Conclusion and recommendations  
As the ECHR concluded in the Tebieti Mühafize Cemiyyeti case, certain provisions of the 
Azerbaijan NGO law have assigned excessive authority to the Ministry of Justice to intervene in 
the internal activities of an NGO, and even to initiate its liquidation through a court when it has 
not violated the law. Such provisions, as illustrated in this article, do not meet international 
standards and best practices. Since the judgments of the European Court have binding force
22
 for 
Azerbaijan and they are treated as grounds for appeal of judicial decisions in both criminal and 
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civil cases (by the relevant decision of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan
23
), 
Azerbaijani authorities should seek a permanent and sustainable solution to the legislative 
deficiencies by introducing amendments to the NGO legislation rather than merely solving the 
problem of one NGO that won a case in Strasbourg. 
In order to implement the decision of the European Court, and to avoid appeals to the 
European court similar to the TLC case, it would be beneficial if the following improvements 
were introduced into Azerbaijani legislation:  
 specify and limit the circumstances under which involuntary termination may be sought 
in court. For example, we would recommend applying the same list of reasons for 
dissolution of an NGO as are applied to business under Article 59 of the Civil Code, by 
eliminating the provision: ―…or if a public association or foundation systematically 
engages in activities that are contrary to the aims set out in its by-laws, as well as in other 
cases provided by law.‖ 
 clarify the competence of the Ministry of Justice in regards to supervision over activities 
of NGOs. Our proposal would be to take away such power from the MoJ, as no such 
supervision is currently applied to businesses. If this is considered inappropriate, we 
would recommend at a minimum (1) to apply to MoJ audits the procedure for 
government audits applicable to all legal entities, setting up procedural safeguards for 
NGOs and making audits more efficient for the Ministry itself; and (2) to set up clear 
objectives for audits. More specifically, we would recommend revising Article 31.2 of 
the NGO Law, replacing the words ―in case of actions contradicting the objectives of the 
present Law‖ with the words ―in case of actions contradicting the Law.‖  
 introduce a timeframe for correction of deficiencies along the lines of the Ministry of 
Justice‘s notification letters (for example, three or four weeks from the day of receiving a 
notification letter); and 
 introduce alternative sanctions for NGOs apart from involuntary dissolution—for 
example, fines imposed on the managers of an NGO, as is applied to other legal entities, 
or withdrawal of tax benefits or other privileges.  
                                                 
23
 Articles 455-456 of the Criminal Procedure Code (2000) and articles 431-1-431-3 of the Civil Procedure 
Code (2000) of the Republic of Azerbaijan.  
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Article 
The Origin of the Species: 
Why Charity Regulations in Canada and England 
Continue to Reflect Their Origins 
Peter R. Elson
1
 
 
Numerous attempts have been made in the last ten years to push for the realignment of 
charity regulation in Canada. These calls for change have consistently included a 
proposed separation of tax policy and charitable regulation and the establishment of a 
Charity Commission-like agency, similar to the regulatory regimes in the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand. Like Australia and the United States, Canada has an 
integrated rather than an independent relationship between tax policy and charity 
regulation. This article argues that institutional origins and their positive reinforcement 
are critical to understanding both long-term regulatory regime development and the 
reluctance by governments to make substantial changes. The origins and evolution of 
England’s Charity Commission and the 1930 amendment to the Income War Tax Act in 
Canada are presented as case studies. If desired regulatory change is to occur in Canada 
or elsewhere, it needs to start with a clear understanding of the context in which the 
original regulatory regime was created and reinforced.  
 
Introduction 
Numerous attempts have been made in the last ten years to push for the realignment of 
charity regulation in Canada.
2
 These calls for change by charity lawyers and third sector 
representatives have consistently included a proposed separation of tax policy and charitable 
regulation and the establishment of a Charity Commission-like agency, similar to the 
independent regulatory regimes in the United Kingdom and New Zealand. Like Australia and the 
United States, Canada has integrated relationship between tax policy and charity regulation. 
While variations within these two forms of charitable regulation exist, the forms themselves have 
been highly resistant to change once they have been established.  
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This article argues that institutional origins and their positive reinforcement are critical to 
understanding both long-term regulatory regime development and the reluctance by governments 
to make substantial changes. The 1930 amendment to the Income War Tax Act in Canada is 
presented as an example of an integrated regulatory regime and then is compared to emergence 
of the independent Charity Commission in England in the early to mid-1800s. The article 
concludes with an analysis of why the origins of regimes hold important lessons for their 
reinforcement and the potential for change.  
First and foremost, the modern regulation of charities takes place with highly 
institutionalized structures, either at the federal/central or provincial/state level. These 
institutionalized structures demonstrate adherence to established or highly organized protocols 
and procedures, which are positively reinforced each time the protocols and procedures are 
exercised.
3
 In the case of charity regulation, protocols and procedures are exercised each time an 
application for registration is reviewed or revoked. That‘s not to say that change does not occur, 
as witnessed in changes manifesting from the Charities Act 2006 in England.
4
  However, even 
England‘s recent changes in charity law did not attempt to change the institutional configuration 
of the Charity Commission as an independent regulator or the HM Treasury as the source of tax 
policy. The premise of historical institutionalism is that contemporary regulatory policies 
constraints are embedded in these institutions and that because institutions are difficult to 
change, the origins of a particular institutional regime takes on added importance.  
In Canada, the 1930 Amendment to the Income War Tax Act established the foundation 
on which all charities in Canada continue to operate. The 1930 amendment collectively 
introduced a universal tax deduction for charitable donations; defined the statutory term for 
charity; established a designated ceiling on income tax deduction for donations; and assigned the 
Department of Revenue as the designated regulator. These amendments to the Income War Tax 
Act still echo through the corridors of charity regulators and voluntary organizations across 
Canada. The immediate contextual importance of this legislation will be demonstrated through a 
profile of events leading to, during, and following its passage in the House of Commons on May 
28, 1930. The longer-term institutionalization of the 1930 Amendment will be demonstrated 
through attempts by the voluntary sector to have statutory changes made by Parliament and the 
Supreme Court of Canada.  
Developments Leading to the 1930 Income War Tax Amendment 
A combination of tight moral control and extensive worker exploitation between the late 
1800s and early 1900s was reflected in the growth of numerous reform movements in Canada.
5
 
                                                 
3
 Pierson, P. (2004). Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
4
 Charity Commission (2009). Charity Commission Consultations. Retrieved August 13, 2009, from 
http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/enhancingcharities/consultations.asp. Charity Commission (2008). Charities 
and Public Benefit: The Charity Commission’s General Guidance on Public Benefit. London: Charity Commission. 
Fries, R. (2006). Charity Commission for England and Wales. International Journal of Not-For-Profit Law, 8(2), 7-
16. 
5
 Andrew Armitage, ―Canadian Social Welfare (1900 - 1988): Chronology,‖ in Social Welfare in Canada: 
Ideals, Realities and Future Paths (2nd edition) (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1988). Samuel A. Martin, An 
Essential Grace: Funding Canada's Health Care, Education, Welfare, Religion and Culture (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, 1985). 
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 12, no. 3, May 2010 / 77 
 
 
This social and moral reform was undertaken by groups such as the Women‘s Christian 
Temperance Union, the Dominion Enfranchisement Associations, and other social gospel 
movements that promoted moral as well as physical well-being. These groups tackled issues 
related to women‘s education, urban public health, and sanitation, and promoted the 
establishment of recreational opportunities in both urban and rural areas.
6
   
As charities were proliferating, so were other means of providing social support. Social 
justice aspirations and religious ideologies were integrated into service provision for much the 
same reason that Jesuit priests were the leading explorers of the early 1600s: the conversion of 
the masses to a particular faith-based life. The Moral and Social Reform Council of Canada is a 
case in point. This alliance of Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian, and Baptist churches and the 
Trades and Labour Congress of Canada worked to get the federal government to enact the Lord‘s 
Day Act in 1906.
7
 Another example is the National Social Service Congress in 1914, which has 
been described by Dennis Guest as a ―display case of religiously motivated, social reform 
thought in Canada,‖ where speakers represented the right wing, the center, and the left wing of 
the social gospel movement.
8
 
Until this point, citizens and religious institutions were the primary drivers of voluntary 
sector activities and organizations. Governments provided funding when they were obliged to do 
so, but otherwise viewed social services as a means to control social unrest rather than a way to 
address social needs.
9
 The prevailing view of the federal and provincial governments at the time 
was that social services and opportunities for employment were there for the taking, and it was 
only moral laziness or illness which stood in the way. (Laziness and moral decay were terms that 
were used to describe the ―undeserving poor‖; widows or those with a mental illness were 
considered the ―deserving‖ poor.) This ―hands off‖ approach by government was pervasive, and 
it was only by political or economic necessity that social action was taken. Income security 
measures resulting from the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 and financial aid programs for 
World War I veterans and their families signalled the first major entry by the federal government 
into the area of social security.
10
   
The proliferation of charities created to help the poor fostered social status for their 
benefactors and moral servitude for their recipients. It also resulted in the creation of local, 
centralized governing bodies such as the public Social Service Commission in Toronto in 1912, 
which was designed to streamline charity work and impose a degree of administrative efficiency 
and accountability, and led, over time, to the creation of the United Way of Greater Toronto.
11
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By the end of the 1920s, similar federated fundraising organizations were formed in major 
centers across Canada.
12
  
According to social work historian Gale Wills,  
There was an assumption early in the Depression that properly organized private charity 
would take the strain off the relief budget, partially because it used philanthropic rather 
than tax dollars, but mostly because of the persistent belief that unemployment was a 
matter of individual circumstances and that ―good‖ [social welfare] casework would 
result in putting people back to work.
13
  
This perspective eroded as the Depression continued, but it still dominated political and 
economic discourse throughout the decade.  
By 1929 the Liberal government was being urged by the opposition Labour party to 
address the severe levels of unemployment and to assist provinces, regardless of provincial 
jurisdiction for welfare as defined by the British North America Act.
14
 Immigration was 
exploding, growing from less than 50,000 per year in the early 1900s to 400,000 per year in 
1913.
15
 It was this massive immigration to Canada that led to the creation of so many ethnic-
centred mutual support and fundraising organizations.
16
 The National Council on Child and 
Family Welfare, for example, took a lead role in supporting the provision of relief across Canada 
and in the process developed strong political, economic, and community connections.
17
 
The proposed personal tax deduction amendment to the Income War Tax Act was thus 
introduced in the context of a growing economic depression, accelerating unemployment, 
massive immigration adjustments, a traditional federal reluctance to provide support in areas of 
provincial jurisdiction, and a pending federal election. The 1930 Income War Tax Act 
Amendment  itself was one of the last pieces of legislation passed by W. L. MacKenzie King‘s 
minority Liberal government before a federal election resulted in the Liberals being defeated by 
the R. B. Bennett-led Conservative Party.  What follows is an outline of how this legislation was 
introduced and debated. 
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Canada’s 1930 Income War Tax Amendment 
A number of amendments to the Income War Tax Act were moved in the House of 
Commons by the Hon. Charles Avery Dunning, Minister of Finance, on May 1, 1930, as part of 
the Ways and Means Motion to implement his recently tabled budget. The amendments included 
provisions 
… 2. That the income of co-operative companies and associations be exempt from 
income tax; and … 3 (b) That donations, to the extent of ten per cent of the net income of 
the taxpayer to any church, university, college, school or hospital in Canada, be allowed 
as a deduction.
18
  
 The subsequent debate in Parliament on the motion evolved not around the justification 
for the deduction, which was readily acknowledged, but the type of charitable organization that 
would benefit.
19
 This limited (i.e., institutional) tax provision was quickly met with vigorous 
opposition from community funds, federated charities, and non-sectarian charities. The Act also 
was seen to favor charities in Quebec, which were all affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church, 
over the non-sectarian charities that dominated in Ontario and the other provinces.
20
 The 
proposed amendment attracted attention in the media, and the notice of at least one well-
positioned business executive. The Toronto Star commented on the proposed income tax 
provisions in its Friday, May 2, editorial entitled ―The Income Tax Concessions‖:  
Among the concession to income taxpayers which Mr. Dunning makes in his 1930 
budget, one of the most interesting is the provision that ―donations to any  church, university, 
college, school or hospital in Canada shall be treated as deductions from income up to a 
maximum of 10 per cent of the net income of the taxpayer.‖ This type of deduction is quite new 
to the Canadian Act, but something of the sort has been many times suggested. … [T]he new 
provision recognizes and encourages a type of contribution which is extremely valuable in every 
community.
21
  
Further in the same May 2 edition of the Toronto Star, the 10 per cent limit on donation 
deductions received special attention. Reporting on the amendment from the perspective of 
churches (the ―Biblical Budget,‖ as it was called), it was reported that for the first time in 
Canadian history the biblical tithe was being used (by Finance Minister Dunning) to encourage 
and help the churches of Canada, irrespective of denomination. The benefit to schools, 
universities, colleges, and hospitals was also noted in the same article, as was the precedent for 
similar tax deductions which had been established in the United States.
22
  
The Toronto Star continued its coverage throughout the month, including another 
editorial on May 6, 1930. Entitled ―No Tax on Philanthropy,‖ the editorial called the tax 
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deductions for donations the most novel feature of the Dunning budget and continued with the 
comment that ―...Unknown to the public a number of organizations engaged in important 
community work urged the Dominion government over a period of years to take the step now 
determined upon.‖23  
The motion to amend section 3 (b) of the Income War Tax Act on tax deduction for 
donations to any church, university, college, school, or hospital was debated in Parliament 
starting on May 24. J.S. Woodsworth, an Independent labour Party MP at the time,
24
 led the 
committee debate with a call to extend the exemption to community funds, or federated 
charities.
25
 Dunning replied that this proposed extension was noteworthy, but still too narrow to 
reflect the wide range of representations he had also received. Opposition Conservative member 
R.B. Hanson stood in the House to advocate for the inclusion of the Victorian Order of Nurses 
and similar organizations:  
If the minister is going to grant this exemption, he should cover the whole field. I  am not 
opposed to the exemption; indeed it was urged upon the government by this party many 
years ago in the house, and I suggest to the minister that if he is adopting the principle, 
the exemption list is not wide enough.… The whole question [of exemptions] should be 
reviewed by the minister.… I have no doubt  that representations have been made to him 
by every institution in Canada.
26
   
Others made similar appeals for the inclusion of charitable and social agencies that 
existed at the time in most major cities.
27
 Their exclusion from a deduction would create an 
undue burden on many worthwhile charities and their inclusion would support the voluntary 
community donations. Dunning, for his part, found merit in the suggestions that had been put 
forward, but was reluctant to proceed, citing the governments‘ lack of experience in knowing 
what the consequences would be. The opposition parties were also adamant that the government 
should not be given discretion to determine eligible charities.
28
   
The eligibility floodgates continued to open, with museums and non-sectarian and 
federated charities being noted as worthy exemptions, complemented by continued references to 
the existing tax provisions in the United States.
29
 Dunning indicated that he too was impressed 
with the wide range of representation he had received, but he declared that he was overwhelmed 
by potential implementation issues. Dunning appealed to the House to be allowed to start with 
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the provisions as outlined in the amendment and then to look to widen the exemptions in the 
future—e.g., in one year—once the government had gained experience.30  
When the Ways and Means Committee continued its debate in Parliament on May 27, 
Opposition leader R.B. Bennett reiterated the government‘s own (biblical) position on the 10 per 
cent of personal income limit for tax deductions for donations to worthy causes, and pointed out 
the discrepancy between this principle and the proposed practice of only allowing donations to 
be deducted it they went to particular types of charities. W. D. Euler, Minister of National 
Revenue, and Finance Minister Dunning both restated their earlier position that the principle of 
allowing tax deductions for donations to charity was important, but the administrative and 
forgone tax revenue costs were unknown and caution was called for. At this point Dunning 
conceded that the use of the term ―charitable institutions … operated exclusively as such and not 
for the benefit of private gain‖ appealed to him, again acknowledging potential unforeseen 
administrative difficulties.
31
  
On May 28, 1930, less than thirty days after the amendment to the Income War Tax Act 
was first introduced, W. D. Euler, Minister of National Revenue, stood in Parliament, and 
acknowledged the value of argument for the inclusion of federated charities, the Red Cross, and 
other organizations. Euler then stated that the government had decided that the clause should be 
broadened, but specific reference to charities by type would only create another wave of protests 
from those excluded. The term Euler proposed to include was ―charitable organization.‖32  
Euler then proposed the following amendment: ―That section 3 (j) be amended by 
striking out the words ‗any church, university, college, school or hospital‘ in lines 24 and 25, and 
substituting therefore the words ‗any charitable organization.‘‖33 Euler continued at this point to 
establish the legal foundation on which charities continue to stand in Canada, by quoting directly 
from Halsbury‘s Laws of England: 
Only those purposes are charitable in the eye of the law which are of a public nature, 
whose object, that is to say, is to benefit the community or some part of it,  not merely 
particular individuals pointed out by the donor. Accordingly gifts which are directed to 
the abstract purposes of relieving poverty, advancing education or religion are 
charitable… ―Charity‖ in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the 
relief of poverty, trusts for the advancement of education, trusts for the advancement of 
religion, and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any 
of the preceding heads.  
Euler continued, ―I submit that this phrase embraces every organization of this kind.‖ Section 3 
(j), he said, would then read as follows: 
Not more than ten per centum of the net taxable income of any taxpayer which has been 
actually paid by way of donation within the taxation period to, and receipted for as such 
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by any charitable organization in Canada operating exclusively as such and not operated 
for the benefit of private gain or profit of any person, member or shareholder thereof.
34
   
Opposition leader R. B. Bennett congratulated Euler for having introduced the 
amendment, expressed his satisfaction that the term ―charitable organization‖ covered ―every 
species of benevolence,‖ and said that the 10 per cent limit also protected the government from 
excessive foregone revenue.
35
 The Bill was then reported, read the third time, and passed 
unanimously by the House of Commons.  
The passing of the 1930 amendment to the Income War Tax Act marked the first time in 
Canada that a universal tax deduction was introduced for any charitable donation; the statutory 
term for charity was defined; a designated ceiling on income tax deduction on donations was 
imposed; and a regulatory body, the Department of Revenue, was assigned to administer the 
Act.
36
 
If Euler‘s reference to the Bible as a basis for capping allowable tax deduction for 
charitable donations to 10 per cent reflected a long religious history, it was no less profound in a 
legal context than his reference to the Halsbury‘s Laws of England. The quote he used from 
Halsbury‘s was a direct passage from the majority judgment in the House of Lords by Lord 
Macnaghten in the 1891 Pemsel case which was, and continues to stand as, the leading judgment 
and interpretation of ―charitable purposes.‖  
Developments Following the 1930 Income War Tax Amendment 
During R. B. Bennett‘s term as Prime Minister from 1930 to 1935, additional 
amendments were made to the Income War Tax Act  so that by 1935 eligible donations included 
not only gifts or property to charities and educational institutions but also donations to the 
―Dominion of Canada or any province or political subdivision thereof.‖37 The Act prudently 
reserved the right for the government to validate the value of the gift or property to prevent 
inflationary assessments, which the government still exercises to determine ―fair market 
value.‖38 
As valuable as the deduction of donations to charities appeared to be at the time, the 
inability of charities to raise the funds necessary to provide services only expanded during the 
years of the Great Depression.
39
 In the 1930s, millions of Canadians were unemployed; on the 
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prairies, farmers were devastated by a seven-year drought.
40
 In a letter to Prime Minister R. B. 
Bennett in 1933, Charlotte Whitton of the Canadian Council on Child and Family Welfare 
predicted that the number of families on relief would be at least 80 per cent higher than at the 
corresponding period the previous year.
41
   
For support, charities turned to local municipalities. But they relied on property taxes for 
their income, and during the 1930s this source of revenue was either limited or in default. 
Increasingly, provincial governments had to assume the responsibility for debt relief. Yet some 
provinces were themselves in financial straits, and so the provinces in turn appealed to the 
federal government for support.
42
  
The federal government responded under pressure from provincial governments to 
address the massive unemployment and years of drought on the prairies by increasing its funding 
for unemployment relief measures and passing an Employment and Social Insurance Act in 
1935.
43
 Meanwhile, relief in the form of soup kitchens, bread lines, clothing depots, and shelters 
for the hungry and homeless were provided by caring individuals, religious groups, and 
voluntary agencies such as the Red Cross.
44
 This economic climate significantly increased the 
number of local organizations and local branches of national organizations to which tax-
deductible donations could be made by those who were more fortunate.  
England’s Charity Commission: Thirty-Four Years in the Making 
While Canada‘s charity regulator emerged in 1930 during the Great Depression, 
England‘s Charity Commission was formally created in 1853 for reasons that were founded in 
progressive educational reform, not economics or unemployment. While a body of 
Commissioners was established with the Statue of Charitable Uses 1601 to ensure that charitable 
gifts were used for their intended purpose, costly legal remedies made the process impractical.
45
 
The industrial revolution in the nineteenth century combined with widespread dislocation and 
poverty and the emergence of a social reform movement brought the Brougham Inquiry into 
being. The Brougham Inquiry, headed by Lord Brougham and launched in 1819, lasted almost 
twenty years and resulted in the prosecution of almost 400 charities. The initial aim of Lord 
Brougham was that the Inquiry would address access to education by the poor, particularly 
educational charities and their benign neglect of general public education. Others associated with 
the inquiry were interested in more general charity abuses such as fraud and misallocation of 
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funds.
46
 The initial proposal was rejected by the House of Commons several times due to the 
influence of powerful universities, churches, and charities that did not want their ―private‖ 
practices examined. Nevertheless, in 1819 the Inquiry into Charitable Endowments, or the 
Charity Commission, got underway. 
47
  
This initiative was by no means the only incident of reforming the general state of 
welfare in England at the time. In 1834 the Poor Law was amended to provide the right for 
administrators to distinguish between ―deserving‖ and ―non-deserving‖ poor, and for the 
institutionalization of workhouses, an initiative driven by middle- and upper-class interests that 
paid for the services provided.
48
  
The Charity Commission was conducted by trained lawyers between 1819 and 1837 in a 
series of four approved commissions, reported semi-annually and surveyed nearly twenty-nine 
thousand charities.
49
  According to historian Richard Thompson, the creation of the inquiry was 
an important step in the evolution of inquiry per se as well as the specific investigation of 
charity.
50
  Without explicitly intending to do so, the Commission became an agent for reform 
without any of the bureaucratic trappings that would follow later. Between 1830 and 1837, 
previously informal reporting and examination processes were tightened up, and the training of 
Commissioners, attribution of reports, standardized corrective action, and a centralized advisory 
board were introduced.
51
 The focus of the Commissioners‘ activities, it must be noted, was on 
conducting inquiries as a legal research unit. It was in this context that its auxiliary function as an 
agency of reform was exercised.  
Systemic action on the part of the authorities in response to these inquiries was often 
buried in a stormy sea of paper and political intrigue, as the Commission itself had no formal 
remedial powers.
52
 Informally though, admonishment, mediation, and trusted advice were most 
often the tools of persuasion, as, when necessary, was legal action through the courts. Each 
renewal of the Commission presented an opportunity for opponents to limit its activities and for 
proponents to push for its renewal.  
The fourth and last issue of the Royal Commission expired in 1837.
53
 When Lord 
Brougham pushed to have the Education and Charities bill adopted there was serious and well-
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connected resistance to the directive nature of education portion of the bill and it was 
―discharged‖ by the House of Lords.54 Expectations on the side of charity reform proponents that 
the Commission would be renewed for a fifth term were abruptly halted and a final report was 
quickly assembled. The final report of the Commission listed eleven faults in charitable trust 
administration. Among these were the expense and difficulty in replacing trustees; the risk of 
making loans based on personal security; the difficulty and legal expense incurred in changing 
the charter of a trust; and charity mismanagement and conflicts of interest. In short, although the 
report did not say so, there was an ongoing need for a new agency to oversee charities. 
There are mixed views on the relationship of the Charity Commission Inquiry (1818-
1837) to the formation of the permanent Board of Commissioners in 1853. Some, such as 
Richard Thompson, hold the view that the relationship was tenuous at best. Richard Mitcheson, 
writing in 1887, draws a much closer link. A Select Committee of the House of Commons was 
established in 1835 to review the incomplete reports that were then available from Lord 
Brougham‘s Commission.55 The Select Committee recommended the appointment of a board to 
superintend and sanction charities, including an audit of accounts, general governance of all 
charities, and legal action when necessary. Meanwhile, scandals associated with misuse and 
misdirected charity funds continued, as did the call for reform and sustained opposition from 
powerful and well-connected churches, universities, and corporations.
56
 This dynamic was not 
restricted to charities; labor laws, poor laws, and a number of other measures were introduced 
and fiercely debated as public opinion, for the first time, started to manifest itself in the political 
sphere.
57
 The Charity Commission Inquiry in 1818 was the first clear example of the fusion of 
social inquiry and the Royal Commission. 
In 1849, a Royal Commission was appointed to once again examine the reports of Lord 
Brougham‘s Commission. By this time all the reports from the earlier Brougham Commission 
were complete. The Royal Commission issued its findings in 1850 and agreed in almost every 
point with those of the Select Committee of 1835. This Commission resulted in the Charitable 
Trusts Act of 1853, which was in fact originally drafted by the 1849 Royal Commission.
58
  
Charitable Trusts Act of 1853 
While the Charitable Trusts Act of 1853 incorporated many of the recommendations of 
the Royal Commission, there were two exceptions of note. First, the commissioners initially had 
no power of audit, although they did require the submission of annual financial accounts. 
Second, the power to divert welfare charity funds to useful purposes was not included, although 
they could authorize the sale or exchange of lands held by a charity.
59
  What the Act did include 
was the appointment of a permanent commission;
60
 powers to conduct inquiries into the 
condition and management of charities; taking action on charitable property, including its 
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transfer to a new trust; and sanction of the commissioners as a condition for any legal action 
against a charity. Judges could make decisions in chambers on certain charities,
61
 including 
authorizing trustees to remove unfit or incompetent officers;
62
 and to the relief of many, the 
practice of making vexatious suits against charities for the sake of costs was curtailed.   
The Charity Commission itself consisted of three permanent members, and a fourth 
member, along with the secretary, held office at the pleasure of the Crown.
63
 The three 
permanent members were paid and had judicial tenure of office, meaning that they operated 
independently and were non-political. The unpaid commissioner was an M.P., although there 
were ongoing questions as to the particular role of this person who acted in part as a buffer 
between Parliament and the Commission. When the work of the Endowed Schools was added in 
1869, the work not only became heavier, it became a political lightning rod for sectarian 
education issues. It would be almost one hundred years before full independence was achieved.
64
 
While amendments to the Act were introduced in 1855 and 1860, the basic role of the 
commission remained: namely, that of inquiry and advice, property transactions, sanctioning 
judicial proceedings and remedial schemes. In 1860 the Commission was given de facto judicial 
powers, restricted to applications made by the majority of trustees where the income of the 
charity exceeded fifty pounds. Appeals to the district or county court were made where the 
income of the charity was less than fifty pounds.
65
 The result of this latter measure was that 
regulation of charities shifted from the courts to the Commission.  
This development didn‘t stop opponents of the Charity Commission from trying to 
circumvent its jurisdiction through private Acts of Parliament and legal rulings. Consequently, a 
further amendment was passed in 1862 decreeing that no Act of Parliament or decree of the 
Court of Chancery related to charities could circumvent the jurisdiction of the Charity 
Commissioners. The power of the Commission was further enhanced in 1869 when the work of 
the Endowed Schools Commissioners was transferred to the Charity Commissioners. This added 
responsibility brought with it a raise in the number of Commissioners from three to five.
66
  The 
power of the Commission was increased again in 1872 with the passing of the Charitable 
Trustees Incorporation Act. In this case the Commissioners were granted the power to grant 
certificates of incorporation. Over time further modifications were made with the intention of 
increasing the discretion and authority of the Commission. Until 1899, that is: in 1899 the 
endowed school work was removed from the Charities Commission and their responsibilities 
returned to the supervision of non-educational charities.  
The presence of the parliamentary charity commissioner in the operations of the Charity 
Commission slowly diminished until the person was rarely seen except at the formal induction.
67
 
This political absence was raised during Lord Nathan Committee on Charitable Trust Law in 
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1952. Subsequently, with the Charities Act 1960, P.M.s became ineligible to sit on the Charity 
Commission and the link to Parliament became the Home Secretary.   
 The work of the Nathan Committee is well known and documented, as is the Charities 
Act 1960 and its successors, the Charities Acts of 1992, 1993 and 2006.
68
 What is less well 
known and appreciated is that the very structure of the Charity Commission has been held intact 
since its initial inception by the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1835, which was 
struck to review the reports from Lord Brougham‘s Commission.  
Findings and Analysis   
The 1930 amendment to the Income War Tax Act was a critical event in voluntary 
sector/government relations in Canada. Paul Pierson points to the path-dependent processes and 
positive feedback mechanisms that can be highly influential at the early stages of policy 
development.
69
 In the overall context of income tax in Canada, 1930 is within the early stage of 
its development. The Income War Tax Act was first introduced in 1917 and no systematic 
provision for charitable deductions had been implements prior to the First World War. The 1930 
amendment to the Income War Tax Act established a path-dependent process that tax deductions 
to charities would be constrained to a limit of 10 per cent of personal income. This measure was 
applied annually to subsequent individual and then corporate tax returns, and has been in place, 
with small variations, to the present day.  The millions of taxpayers who annually apply 
charitable deductions to their income tax forms and the thousands of charitable registration 
applications received by the Charities Directorate of the Canada Revenue Agency continue to 
reinforce this integrated governance structure. 
While there have been periodic increases in the level of charitable deduction allowance, 
there been no attempt to either roll back or eliminate this deduction. The annual use of this same 
deduction by millions of individual Canadian taxpayers and its promotion by eligible charities to 
donors combine to represent a positive feedback mechanism and ongoing reinforcement of the 
tax deduction policy. Charitable deduction regulations were institutionalized through the growth 
of the internal mechanisms established in the Department of Revenue to administer these 
deductions and related regulations, including the centralized registration of all charities in 1967.  
One of the characteristics of path dependency is that the further the government progressed along 
this path, the greater the likelihood it would continue, and the harder it would be for any 
alternative to be considered, which has indeed been the case.   
In England, the basic separation of tax policy and charity regulation has also been 
consistently reinforced. The Charity Commission currently operates under Schedule 1A of the 
Charities Act 1993.
70
 The number of members of the Commission has not expanded a great deal, 
given the vast increase in the volume of its activities. The current Commission allows for a 
minimum of four and a maximum of nine members, including the Chair. Members must 
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collectively have knowledge and experience of the law relating to charities, charity accounts and 
the financing of charities, and the operation and regulation of charities of different sizes and 
descriptions. At least two members continue to require appropriate legal qualifications, while at 
least one must have knowledge of the Welsh context and be appointed following consultation 
with the National Assembly for Wales.
71
 
 The Charity Commission in England continues as a non-Ministerial Government 
Department. It is part of the Civil Service and reports annually to Parliament. The Charity 
Commission is independent of Ministerial influence and independent from the sector it regulates. 
The Charities Act 2006 continued this precedent by restating that: ―In the exercise of its 
functions, the Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any Minister of the 
Crown or other Government Department.‖72 The Charity Commission continues to exercise a 
number of quasi-judicial functions where it uses powers similar to those of the High Court, as 
were specified in the Charitable Trusts Act 1853. Like the original Brougham Commission, the 
Charity Commission operates with the benefit of considerable powers of persuasion rather than 
relying solely on punitive regulatory measures or court action.  
In Canada, the 1930 amendment to the Income War Tax Act has also been legally and 
politically institutionalized. The act itself established the terms under which organizations could 
register for charitable tax status and those terms remain firmly in place. Challenges to the 
Supreme Court of Canada have upheld the right of Parliament to define charitable purposes and 
several political appeals have been rebuffed. In fact, a recent ruling by the Supreme Court of 
Canada reinforced the integrated tax and regulatory relationship by viewing foregone tax 
revenues as a legitimate factor in the consideration of charitable tax status.
73
  
 The 1930 amendment to the Income War Tax Act established the regulatory limit on 
charitable deductions, but unlike the statutory definition of charitable purpose, it has undergone 
several modifications that were directly driven by budgetary tax changes introduced by the 
Department of Finance. Increases in deduction allowances were introduced in 1972, 1995, and 
1996, to 20, 50, and 75 per cent respectively. The latter two increases corresponded to significant 
budget cuts to the voluntary sector which were designed to mitigate the political backlash from 
the funding cuts and foster voluntary sector independence from government grants by providing 
greater access by donor markets. For the same reason the deduction of public traded securities to 
charities in 2006 followed a massive cut in voluntary sector funding.
74
  
It has only been since 2000 that the Charities Directorate of the Canada Revenue Agency 
has initiated any form of ―soft‖ regulation, intermediary sanctions, and general charity education. 
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Even now, charity education is restricted to meeting regulatory requirements rather than any 
general form of governance or operational guidance.
75
   
Conclusion 
The 1930 amendment to the Income War Tax Act is a critical event in voluntary 
sector/government relations in Canada. The statutory and regulatory mechanisms put in place on 
May 28, 1930, have been positively reinforced over time and consolidated and enhanced in 1967 
with the development of the central registration and regulation of charities by the Canada 
Revenue Agency. The explicit desire by the federal government to balance support to charities 
and limit foregone revenue has been consistently maintained through both the registration and 
taxation processes.  
Taxation and regulation issues raised by voluntary sector representatives during the 
Voluntary Sector Initiative in Canada in 2000-2005 were rebuffed, not just by the representatives 
of the Department of Finance, Treasury Board and the Canada Revenue Agency, but by more 
than seventy years of positive reinforcement for the statutory role first established by the federal 
government in the 1930 Amendment to the Income War Tax Act. In England the Charity 
Commission continues to enjoy the independence that was first set down by the Charitable 
Trusts Act, 1853.  
The regulatory regimes for charities in England and Canada both emerged under a 
general climate of economic and social upheaval, one in context of the industrial revolution, the 
other one hundred years later during the Great Depression. What history and the 
institutionalization of these two regulatory regimes for charities have demonstrated is that the 
origins of a regulatory regime lead to its positive reinforcement regardless of the extent to which 
external circumstances or its efficiency may change. Changes may take place at the periphery, 
and this has occurred in both Canada and England, but the core regulatory regime is likely to 
remain true to its origins.  
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Associations and foundations are typical legal forms of Civil Society Organizations 
(CSOs) in Switzerland. During the past years, several transformations of associations into 
foundations can be observed. This study analyzes the legal and managerial aspects and 
consequences of CSO transformations. It highlights the differences in the governance structures, 
and displays the changes in terms of members’ rights, control, and accountability. The 
managerial analysis gives a preference to the foundation governance structure according to 
coordination, decision-making, and innovation. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In Switzerland, associations and foundations are the most common legal forms of civil 
society organizations (CSOs). Under certain conditions, both are CSOs. However, there are 
considerable differences between these two legal persons under legal and managerial governance 
aspects. Although the choice of the legal form is of long-term influence, it is rarely done based 
on strategic considerations. Often, the choice is mainly influenced by reasons of practicability, 
costs, or habit. While the organization develops, the legal form might become inappropriate or 
even restraining. However, if a CSO changes its legal form, some legal constraints have to be 
taken into account. From a managerial perspective, the changes in the strategic management of 
an organization have to be respected.  
Until now, the literature has put an emphasis on analyzing the influence of different 
governance structures among profit, public, and nonprofit organizations (NPO) (Eldenburg and 
Krishnan, 2003). While the differences between these varying legal structures can be 
demonstrated, less knowledge has been gained about the differences within legal forms of 
nonprofits. This article analyzes the reasons for and the consequences of CSO transformations in 
the Swiss context. In Switzerland, a trend of transformation of associations into foundations can 
be observed (von Schnurbein, 2008). Employment in foundations grew much more than in 
associations. This extreme difference cannot simply be explained by the growth of the 
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foundation sector during the last years. The other reason is the shift from associations to 
foundations through legal transformation. Hence, our research question focuses on two major 
aspects: What are the legal and managerial consequences of CSO transformations for the 
governance structure?  
2. Legal differences and reasons for CSO transformations 
The study is based on theoretical considerations from literature reviews and the analysis 
of Swiss law. It is an interdisciplinary paper where legal and managerial aspects are taken into 
account. The article is enriched with results drawn from different case studies of CSO 
transformations in Switzerland.  
Under Swiss law, associations and foundations are both legal persons regulated in the 
Swiss Civil Code (CC). However, there are quite significant differences (table 1). Associations 
are corporate entities whereas foundations represent establishments. 
Associations are constituted by owners of fractional interests in the entity‘s assets 
(members) who have decision-making power. The articles of association may be changed in the 
general meeting. 
Foundations are legal entities constituted by a founder by dedicating the assets to a 
particular purpose (art 80 CC). Modifications of the organization and the purpose of the 
foundation can only be made under certain conditions (art 85 et seq. CC). Foundations have no 
members but do exist exclusively of legally independent assets. Foundations are set out with its 
own governance bodies, i.e., the foundation board. Foundations are in contrast to associations 
subject to supervision by a public authority. 
 
Table 1: Differences between associations and foundations under Swiss law: 
 Association Foundation 
Legal person Corporate entity Establishment 
Member Juristic persons or natural persons 
as members 
No members 
Alteration of the 
will 
Will may be altered by the 
members 
Will may not be altered 
Change of articles Articles of association may be 
changed by the general meeting 
Articles may be changed by the 
founder under the conditions of art 
86a CC 
Liquidation Association may be liquidated 
through a decision of the members 
Association may not be liquidated 
through a decision of the founder 
or the foundation board 
Reassignment of 
assets 
Not possible because of tax reasons Not possible because of 
regulations in the CC  
Supervision No supervision by a public 
authority 
Supervision by a public authority 
 
There exist considerable differences between associations and foundations with regard to 
members and the decision-making process. An association that transforms into a foundation tries 
to benefit from the advantages of the newly chosen legal form. There are various reasons that can 
move an association to transform into a foundation, e.g., because of the desire for independence 
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(ZEWO
3
), governance (Brot für alle, Freunde der SOS Kinderdörfer, Helsana), asset protection 
(Huelfsgesellschaft Winterthur), or access to new donors (Verein Kinderschutz Schweiz). 
The Huelfsgesellschaft Winterthur, which has supported persons in need in the city of 
Winterthur for nearly 200 years, may be mentioned as an example. The association was 
transformed into a foundation in 2007 to secure its assets for the long term. The association 
worked in a similar way to a foundation by distributing assets to beneficiaries. It was difficult to 
engage members actively, and the benefit of the membership was restricted to the ideal support 
of the association. The board of directors worked independently, and was confirmed or 
complemented at the annual general meeting by a modest number of members. The 
transformation from an association to a foundation served to secure the assets and left out the 
possibility to make some organizational changes in the future (von Schnurbein, 2008). 
Statistical evidence of the increased number of transformations can be taken from the 
official statistics of employment. In the period from 1995 to 2005, employment in associations 
grew by 3.8 per cent, in foundations by 45.9 per cent, and in the economy in general by 4.2 per 
cent. The development of working units
4
 shows even more significant differences. Among 
associations the number of working units decreased by 20.5 per cent, while the number of 
working units among foundations rose by 26.3 per cent (the general economic development rate 
was 0.1%). These figures allow the assumption that the growth among foundations is not only 
due to new establishments, as foundations usually do not employ many people. Moreover, we 
assume that the increase is partly a result of the transformation of associations into foundations. 
Compared to establishment of a legal person, a transformation is a decision where legal 
and managerial aspects have to be taken into account (Nowotny and Fida, 2007). Thus, the 
following section analyzes the legal and managerial aspects and consequences of the 
transformation of CSOs. 
3. Legal aspects of the transformation under Swiss law 
The federal law on merger, demerger, conversion, and transfer of assets and liabilities 
(subsequently referred to as Merger Law) entered into force in 2004. This law regulates amongst 
other things the adaption of the legal structures of associations and foundations in connection 
with mergers, demergers, conversions, and transfers of assets and liabilities (see art 1 para 1 
Merger Law). However, the direct conversion of an association into a foundation is not possible 
even though there are associations with activities similar to those of foundations (e.g., the 
allocation of assets for certain purposes).  
The transfer of assets and liabilities from the association to the newly established 
foundation (art 69 et seq Merger Act) may serve as an alternative option. This transfer regards 
only the association‘s assets and not the members‘ rights. The latter exist until the liquidation of 
the association. As the liquidation of the association is not imperative, the association may 
continue to exist as a sponsor of the new foundation. However, it could lead to a factual 
liquidation of the association if all assets of the association are transferred to the foundation. The 
association‘s members lose their rights with the liquidation of the association. The question then 
arises on how the former members may be integrated in the new structure. 
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4
 A working unit is a geographically distinct unit of an organization (e.g., a company) with a minimum paid 
working activity of 20 hours per week. 
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The transfer contract shall be concluded by the supreme managing or administrative body 
of the association (see art 70 Merger Law). According to art 69 CC, this is the board of directors. 
If all assets are transferred, a two-thirds majority of the members of the association is needed. A 
re-transformation from the foundation back into the association or any other legal form is not 
possible. 
It may be seen as a positive aspect that, due to the new governance structure, the 
foundation could gain independence from the democratic structures that dominated the member-
based association. In a foundation, the duties are concentrated on fewer persons as the organs of 
a foundation are usually smaller, and there are no members with a right to participate. The board 
of a foundation has the decision-making power. Therefore, higher flexibility in the management 
of a foundation may be achieved as there are no changeable wishes of members that must be 
respected; thus, long-term planning becomes easier. 
The downside of this transformation may be seen in the fact that, because of the absence 
of members in a foundation, there is no possibility to integrate donors directly into the legal 
person. Furthermore, the purpose of a foundation as set forth by the founder is, in principle, fixed 
and cannot be modified after the establishment of the foundation. This inflexibility may be seen 
as a disadvantage to a CSO, which should be adaptable to new trends. 
In the following section, the legal consequences of the transformation are analyzed with 
regard to members‘ rights, control, and accountability before and after the transformation. 
Members’ Rights 
As mentioned above, the main difference between an association and a foundation is that 
the former has members whilst the latter does not. The question arises how the former members‘ 
rights might be preserved after the transformation of an association into a foundation. This 
section (i) outlines what rights the members have in an association; (ii) discusses whether former 
association members may be regarded as founders of, and therefore exert influence on, the new 
foundation; (iii) tackles the possibility of former association members, or some of them, being 
appointed to the foundation council; and (iv) discusses possible ways through which former 
members may be protected. 
(i) An association has at least two organs: the general meeting (art 64 para 1 CC) and 
the board of directors (art 69 CC). The general meeting has different indefeasible competences 
(e.g., the authority to change the articles of association, supervision authority, and the right to 
recall the board of directors). Thus, the general meeting may change the articles of association in 
order to adapt to changing circumstances.  
In Switzerland a lot of associations do exist. They are, for example, used for sports clubs 
and choirs. The members have the right to administer the association and use its assets. However, 
the members also have the right to be protected. Art 75 CC protects the legality of corporate life: 
Each member shall be entitled by force of law to challenge in court, within one month of his 
having gained knowledge thereof, resolutions that he has not consented to, and that violate the 
law or the articles of association. 
The Swiss NPO Code
5
 is devoted to safeguarding the interests of association members. 
According to § 7 para 1 of the Swiss NPO Code, all members are entitled to voice their opinion 
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edited in 2006 by the Conference of the Presidents of Large Humanitarian and Relief Organizations of Switzerland. 
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on the items on the agenda, and to exercise their corresponding right to vote on the occasion of 
the general or delegates‘ assembly. However, it has to be mentioned that the protection of 
members‘ rights under the Swiss NPO Code is not as broad as under the Swiss Civil Code since 
the Swiss NPO Code is only subject to the rule ―comply or explain.‖6 If an association does not 
adhere to a regulation laid down in the Swiss NPO Code (if this is possible under the Swiss law), 
it has to be publicly and clearly justified. 
(ii) May the former members of the association exert influence on the new foundation? 
May they, for example, modify the purpose of the foundation? There is a difference between if 
the association as a legal person acts as founder and if its members become the founders of the 
foundation. 
Since the revision of the Swiss foundation law, there has existed a new art 86a CC (in 
force since 1 January 2006), according to which a founder may request for modification of 
purpose. However, according to art 86 para 3 CC, if the foundation is a legal entity, the right to 
modify its purpose lapses, at the latest, upon the expiration of 20 years after its establishment. If 
several persons have established the foundation, they may only jointly request modification of 
the purpose of the foundation (art 86a para 4 CC). If the association as a legal body is the 
founder, it may request modification of purpose. However, it should be kept in mind that the 
association should not be liquidated after the transfer of assets to the foundation, as otherwise 
nobody may claim founders‘ rights. If the founders are the former members of the association, 
the modification of the purpose of the foundation will often fall short of the required unanimity 
in art 86a para 4 CC, especially if there are a large number of former members. Based on these 
considerations, it makes sense that the association becomes the founder, as the decision-making 
regarding the modification of purpose may be made with a quorum other than unanimity. 
(iii) As the association‘s members cannot become members of the foundation (because 
the foundation does not have members), the question arises whether the former members may 
have influence on the foundation in another way. Is there a possibility for them to be entitled to a 
seat in the foundation board? 
To start with, it has to be mentioned that the foundation board – in contrast to the 
members of an association – does not have any influence on the formation of the will of the 
foundation. A foundation is not able to form a will, as it is bound to the will expressed by the 
founder upon the formation of the foundation. However, the foundation board has discretion, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Organizations that decide to submit to this code will declare in their annual reports, according to the principles of 
"comply or explain," to what degree they can apply the different recommendations of the code and, if not, on which 
points they cannot follow and their reasons for not respecting the "best practice." The Swiss NPO Code is a joint 
undertaking by 20 large and autonomous Swiss humanitarian non-profit organizations (NPOs) that joined forces to 
define up-to-date principles for the responsible and transparent Corporate Governance of Swiss NPOs. According to 
§ 1 Swiss NPO Code, the code addresses, based on the Swiss GAAP FER 21 definition, the governing bodies of 
large non-profit organizations domiciled in Switzerland which provide charitable services in the general interest, and 
publicly address an undefined number of donors, receive pro bono donations, and/or dedicated public funding. The 
Swiss NPO Code may be applied under certain conditions to associations (II. title, cipher 1 Swiss NPO Code) and 
foundations (II. title, cipher 2 Swiss NPO Code).  
6
 Swiss NPO Code, page 25: The ―comply or explain‖ principle forms the basis of the European code-based 
approach to Corporate Governance. Non-adherence to a specific aspect of the Swiss NPO Code has to be publicly 
and clearly justified. Conversely, non-adherence to R-principles (‗Recommendation‘) requires neither disclosure nor 
explanation. 
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within the foundation‘s purpose, on the fulfillment of its tasks. If the purpose of the foundation is 
broadly formulated, the foundation council has greater discretion. 
The founder, i.e., the association or the former association‘s members, has the right to 
name the first foundation board members in the deed of foundation or regulations, and to 
regulate the appointment of their successors. There is a possibility to appoint the former 
association‘s members as members of the foundation board. The members may be appointed for 
life. Nevertheless, it becomes problematic if a plurality of former members claims a seat in the 
foundation council. Although the size of the foundation board is not regulated under Swiss law, 
its ideal size results from the function of the foundation board as supreme leading organ. 
Baumann (2009) determines that, for the purpose of efficiency, small and medium foundations 
should have at least three and a maximum of five members in the foundation board, and big 
foundations at least seven and a maximum of nine members. The former members would have 
the chance to become a member of the foundation board, one after another, if a limitation on the 
mandate is introduced and the procedure on the appointment of successors is regulated.  
(iv) The Swiss NPO Code protects the former members and co-founders, as well as 
donors/sponsors as they support the foundation financially without getting the rights of the 
members of an association. According to § 11 para 1 of the Swiss NPO Code, full disclosure in 
the form of a business report is required in order to inform co-founders and donors/sponsors of 
the use of their contributions; they are to be granted information on the development of the 
organization and the strategic management-body‘s business policies. According to the 
commentary of the Swiss NPO Code, the willingness to engage in a dialogue should be 
encouraged with this regulation. Former members of the association have another right, 
according to § 12 para 2 lit. h Swiss NPO-Code: The members of the council of governors have 
to keep all members regularly informed, ensuring transparency concerning the use of funds. 
To conclude, in comparison to an association, a foundation has no members. With the 
transformation from an association to a foundation, the members lose all their statutory rights. 
The former members of the association may still have a certain influence on the foundation. On 
one hand, they have as founders (i.e., the association or the former members of the association) 
the right to modify the purpose of the foundation. On the other hand, the former members may 
take a seat in the supreme corporate body of the foundation, which may have discretion in the 
implementation of the purpose of the foundation. The Swiss NPO Code grants the right to 
information regarding the foundation to the former members of the association. However, under 
certain conditions, this right does not have to be respected. In addition, the greater the number of 
members, the more difficult the division of founders‘ rights becomes. Thus, in many cases the 
association is not liquidated but remains as a donor club with close connection to the foundation. 
With all this said, it has to be stressed that the former members of the association have far less 
rights in the foundation than in the association, and lose some rights as well (e.g., the right to 
change the articles of association). 
Control 
The control of an association lies within the power of the general meeting, which is 
constituted by its members. The general meeting is the supreme corporate body of the 
association (art 64 para 1 CC). It supervises the activity of the organizational bodies and may, at 
any time, dismiss them without prejudice to the contractual rights of the dismissed persons (art 
65 para 2 CC). The supervisory right as well as the demission right are indefeasible rights of the 
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supreme corporate body. The general meeting may exercise control over the board of directors 
and dismiss the same if it is does not agree with its actions. 
There is no possibility to restrain the autonomy of the general meeting to issue or amend 
the articles of association. The right of the meeting to change the articles of association may be 
seen as a certain possibility for control.  
A foundation does not have members – also the founder cannot be a member – who may 
control the actions of the foundation‘s organs. How can the former members of an association 
proceed against the actions and omissions of the foundation board? In principle there is no 
possibility to challenge the decisions of the foundation board in court. An exception is the 
declaration of nullity of such a decision. According to art 84 para 2 CC, the supervisory authority 
shall ensure that the assets of the foundation are used according to their purpose. The supervisory 
authority has to ensure that the foundation board does not violate the law, the foundation deed, 
and relevant regulations, and that it does not exercise its discretion incorrectly. The doctrine 
deduces from art 84 para 2 CC the right to file a complaint with the supervisory authority. The 
supervisory authority has to look into the complaint and grant party rights. Anyone with a close 
interest in the foundation has the right to file such a complaint. These include, for example, the 
actual and potential beneficiaries of the foundation, the founder and his or her heirs, a potential 
executor of the founder‘s last will, as well as the organs of the foundation and its members (e.g., 
the overruled members of the foundation board). If the former members of the association are not 
the founders of the foundation, members of the foundation board, or potential beneficiaries, there 
is no possibility for them to file a complaint with the supervisory authority. They only have the 
right to report their observations to the supervisory authority, according to art 84 para 2 CC. As 
this is not a proper legal remedy, they do not get party rights, nor is there a possibility for them to 
appeal against a possible negative decision of the supervision authority. 
It is possible to give the former members of the association the right to dismiss the 
foundation board to assure their influence on the foundation. The foundation deed or regulation 
may provide for a regulation stating that the foundation board or third persons may dismiss 
members of the foundation board. 
There is a difference between an association and a foundation with regard to the 
separation of powers. The separation of powers is a crucial element of the Swiss NPO-Code, 
which states in it § 6 that strict separation has to be observed between individuals serving in the 
strategic management body and those serving in an operative management capacity. § 10 Swiss 
NPO Code is devoted to the separation of responsibilities with regard to the foundation. It is 
possible that the council of governors assumes both the function of the highest governing body 
as well as of the strategic management body. If the foundation board has such double function, it 
has to ensure full transparency with regard to how this double function is carried out (see § 10 
para 2 Swiss NPO Code). 
To sum up, it may be stated that state control through the supervision authority cannot be 
compared with the control exercised by the members in an association. First, the former 
members have only, under the above-mentioned conditions, the possibility to do something 
against the acts and omissions of the foundation organs. Second, state control takes place 
retrospectively. The supervision authority will hardly be able to impede imminent misuses in 
time. Thus, granting the former members the right to dismiss those members of the foundation 
board who do not fulfill the expectations should be considered. The separation of powers 
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between the strategic and operative management bodies does not go as far in a foundation as in 
an association. 
While the exertion of control through members offers democratic legitimacy towards the 
public, the state supervision of foundations ensures an independent control mechanism. As 
accountability is becoming more and more important today, independency of supervision is rated 
higher than democratic legitimacy. 
Accountability 
The members of the board of directors of an association and the members of the 
foundation council are binding as bodies of the legal entity through the conclusion of legal 
transactions as well as through their conduct otherwise (directors‘ and officers‘ liability) (see art 
55 para 2 CC). Furthermore, persons in acting positions shall be personally liable for their fault 
(art 55 para 3 CC). Therefore, the liability of the above-mentioned persons for culpable action is 
not excluded. Art 55 para 3 is not an independent liability rule; for example, the conditions in art 
41 of the Swiss Code of Obligations for general liability in tort have to be fulfilled. The board of 
directors has the right and the duty to attend to the affairs of the association, and represent the 
association in accordance with the activities conferred to it under the articles of association (art 
69 CC). It is responsible to the general meeting (see art 65 para 2 CC). 
The board of directors of the association are not only liable to the members of the 
association and third parties but also to the association itself. In the latter case, a member of the 
association may file an action against the association and claim for payment to the association. 
This claim may only be made if the members of the board of directors did not file the action. The 
association may discharge the members of the board of directors from liability. With this 
procedure, the association renounces making a claim during a certain period of time. The 
discharge is only valid for facts that are known at the time of the resolution. The right to claim of 
members that did not agree expires upon six months after the resolution (in analogy to the right 
to claim in corporations). The resolution with regard to the discharge does not have external 
effects. The creditors‘ rights to claim will not be restricted.  
The foundation board may become liable to the foundation as well as to third parties 
(beneficiaries and creditors). In principle, the foundation and the supervision authority (but not 
the beneficiaries) are authorized to file an action. The enforcement of such rights often fails for 
lack of interest among the members of the foundation board. Due to the fact that a foundation 
does not have members who take care of the interests of the foundation, the supervision authority 
has to enforce the claims. In foundation law, there is no possibility for either the supervision 
authority or anybody else to grant the foundation board discharge from its liability (Sprecher/von 
Salis-Lütolf, 1999). Although this is mentioned in § 9 para 2 lit. e Swiss NPO Code, there is no 
possibility to give discharge to the council of governors. 
A question arises concerning to whom the foundation board is responsible. A foundation 
may be responsible to the beneficiaries, to the supervisory authority, or to its donors. In practice, 
nonprofits have a tendency to report primarily to their donors (Callen, Klein, and Tinkelmann, 
2003). To secure their donors, foundations often create complementary donor clubs that ―copy‖ 
the principles of associations but without the democratic influence on the organization‘s 
activities. 
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In conclusion, we can say that, in contrast to the law of associations, foundation law does 
not recognize the possibility to give discharge to the foundation board. Discharge may only be 
given to a board of directors of an association with regard to the association, but the board of 
directors remains liable with regard to third parties if certain conditions are met. While the 
members of an association may enforce their rights, comparable claims in a foundation can only 
be made by the supervision authority. 
4. Managerial consequences of the transformation 
The legal aspects of the transformation are concentrated in the process of transferring 
assets and liquidating the association. However, from a managerial perspective, the differences 
in the governance structures and the coordination before and after the transformation are of 
special interest. Usually, the operations and external perception of a transformed nonprofit do not 
change considerably. However, on the strategic level extensive differences can be observed. 
Schwarz et al. (2005) differentiate five management tasks of nonprofits, which comprise the 
structure that will be used for our analysis: organization, leadership, decision-making, 
coordination, and innovation. 
Organization 
As mentioned before, members are a constitutive criterion of associations. The members 
execute various roles within the association (Schwarz, 2005). First, they are the constitutional 
body of the association, and they contribute financially to the association through member fees. 
Second, the members invest time as volunteers, and members of boards and advisory groups. 
Third, the members profit from the services of the association and might profit from special 
conditions. Thus, the members are, at the same time, a legitimating body and primary 
beneficiaries of the association. This constellation is not possible in a foundation, which has no 
members at all.  
The foundation is an independent organization that is structured centrally. A foundation 
can be a member of an association or a federation itself. However, federal structures beyond 
membership have to be organized via contracts. Most importantly, regional or local organizations 
cannot become members of a national organization that is a foundation. Apart from drafting 
contracts, another solution is to guarantee the regional units a position in the board. However, 
this limits the board‘s capacity to act independently. Moreover, there are no direct possibilities 
for the beneficiaries of a foundation to participate in decision making.  
Leadership 
Democratic elections are the primary means of leadership enactment in associations. In 
federal structures, a stepwise procedure assures the legitimacy of the elections at all levels. 
Regional units elect their delegates, who vote for the members of the board of trustees. Finally, 
the board of trustees elects the CEO and the board of directors. At every stage, the voting organ 
is afterwards in control of the elected organ. Member fees are another instrument of leadership 
enactment. If the members are unsatisfied with the association‘s leaders, they can express their 
complaints by leaving the organization (Hirschman, 1970). If this happens significantly, the 
association‘s leaders will have to react. A notable example in Switzerland was the dispute 
between Swissmem, the trade association of the metal industry, and economiesuisse, the 
umbrella organization of the Swiss economy in 2006. Swissmem, the biggest payer of fees to 
economiesuisse, threatened to leave the organization because it was unsatisfied with the latter‘s 
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policy. After several negotiations, Swissmem remained a member but with a reduced 
membership fee; in addition, the president-elect of economiesuisse lost his post in the following 
elections.  
Decision-making 
The decision-making process in associations is shared by organs on several levels. In 
reality, the absence of participation of a major part of the members and the high influence of the 
elected boards tips the association away from democracy and creates a tendency towards 
oligarchy. In contrast, a foundation is per se an oligarchy, and decisions are taken independently 
and by one board. Thus, the decision-making in foundations can be realized more easily and 
more quickly. This is because, one, the foundation‘s board recruits its members mostly through 
co-optation, thus reducing the danger of fragmented boards because the existing board members 
vote for people like themselves; and two, foundations do not have to ask for legitimacy as long 
as they follow their stated purpose.  
Coordination 
Coordination encompasses the planning, quality management, and accountability of an 
organization (Schwarz, 2005). Strategic planning does not only mean goal definition but also the 
strategic coordination of planning in general. In the legal section, it became evident that 
associations can change their statutes and purpose at any time on the basis of members‘ votes. 
This allows them to react to changes in their environment. However, the purpose of a foundation 
basically cannot be changed. It can only be interpreted, but it remains rather inflexible. Thus, 
through the transformation the organization takes a decision with long-term consequences. 
The major difference in the accountability of the organization is the change from 
membership supervision to state supervision. The supervision of members has a reputation for 
amateurism, and growing regulations are leading associations into external revisions. State 
supervision offers an independent opinion, which is dominantly reduced to formal and legal 
aspects. 
Innovation 
Innovation is oriented toward organizational development and the ability to implement 
organizational change. In associations, two ways of development are possible. On the one side, 
innovation can start at the top level of the organization, initiated by the board of directors or the 
board of trustees. On the other side, the members can develop innovative ideas and bring them 
into the organization. Thus, the active participation of the members is a stimulatory element of 
organizational development. On the contrary, the members can consequently prohibit innovation 
and make organizational development impossible. In a foundation the board has much greater 
assertiveness and can easily implement change processes. However, the foundation lacks the 
innovative potential of member participation. Thus, organizational development is always a top-
down process. 
To conclude, the advantages and disadvantages of the transformation from an association 
to a foundation have been analyzed from a managerial point of view. The foundation has an 
advantage in having lean structures and smaller human resource requirements. On the one side, 
in times of decreasing voluntary action, foundations have a strategic advantage. On the other 
side, they are lacking subunits where interested and engaged members can gain their first 
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experiences in voluntary boards. Foundations have the potential to make and implement 
decisions faster than associations can.  
In contrast to the tedious and sometimes uncontrollable democratic processes of 
associations, the management of and coordination within foundations are better organized. 
Nevertheless, in practice there are many foundations with encrusted structures and old-fashioned 
management concepts. One reason for this might be that foundations do not feel external 
pressure to change, even from their members.  
5. Conclusion 
 
 The main legal differences between foundations and associations lies in the fact that 
foundations have no members, have no influence on its purpose, and are under state supervision. 
If an association is transformed into a foundation, the crucial question arises of how the rights of 
the former members of the association may be respected in the new structure and what the effects 
on the control and accountability are.  
 There may be various reasons for a transformation (e.g., due to governance 
considerations). Due to the fact that there is no possibility to change an association directly into 
an association, one has to make the detour of transferring the association‘s assets to a newly 
founded association.  
 In transforming an association into a foundation, the advantages and disadvantages of the 
different legal forms have to be kept in mind. Every foundation that wishes to be transformed 
should analyze carefully if its intended goals can really be achieved. All the same, foundations 
are becoming more attractive, and there have been more transformations observed recently. 
There are differences as well between foundations and associations under a legal and an 
economic point of view. In most cases, these differences do not have any effects on the business 
operation as the transformation seldom attacks the character of an organization. Hence, it seems 
reasonable to allow the direct change from an association to a foundation without having to take 
the detour of transferring assets. Such a possibility would fulfill the need of an association with 
tasks similar to that of a foundation (e.g., associations with a fairly small number of members, 
which distribute their assets to beneficiaries).  
 Considering the legal restrictions of a transformation, Riemer (2001 and 2003) would 
appreciate the possibility of a direct change from an association to a foundation in art 54 para 5 
of the Merger Law. In his view, the argument of the members losing their rights is de facto not 
valid. From a managerial perspective, the relatively small impact of a transformation on the 
organization‘s operations and external appearance simplifies the realization.  
 The managerial analysis shows that foundations have some advantages, especially in 
terms of decision-making, coordination, and innovation. However, the implications for the 
strategic level are not trivial. Hence, a transformation has to be well planned and executed in 
order to avoid problems in the structure of the foundation later on. 
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